A Border Protection Service for the UK

Policy Proposals

The Report of the Border Security Advisory Committee

Chairman: Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington QPM DL

Conservatives

Task Force membership:

Chairman
- Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington QPM DL

Deputy Chairman
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Members
- Stuart Cameron Waller
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Secretary
- Chris Pope

In addition to consulting published sources, the committee interviewed border security experts across the world and noted lessons from the creation of border agencies in other nations. These experts were drawn from, among others, academia, law enforcement, industry, government and security.

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1. Foreword by the Chairman

The challenges posed today to the UK from terrorism, organised crime, people trafficking, illegal immigration and fraud are greater and more sophisticated than we have ever known before.

Huge increases in the flow of people across the globe; a new ease and availability of transportation; developments in communications, most notably the internet; technological advances and the rise of international extremism all contribute.

Added to this we are part of an expanded and expanding European Union – in the main without internal frontiers.

In this new and developing global environment, the border control and security apparatus of yesterday will no longer meet the bill, even with the benefits of the new partnership arrangements that have recently been established.

There is now an urgent need for fundamental re-design of our border arrangements so they will be able to catch up with global developments, and then serve us effectively over the coming decades.

Many in our population lack confidence in the effectiveness of the measures we have in place to deal with the extraordinary challenges we face, and so our border controls must also be seen to be able to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, to reassure our people as well as deter, prevent and apprehend those who might do us harm.

I believe these challenges would best be met by bringing together the existing border services into a single, unified and coherent Border Protection Service, providing stronger, more effective, better managed, more accountable and more efficiently resourced control of our frontiers.

Such a body would remove overlaps and duplication of effort as well as reducing overheads and allowing more of the resources allocated to border control to be directed to the front line where they are most needed.

But it would be a mistake to view border control only in defensive terms. Our economy, our way of life and our future all depend on encouraging people to travel legitimately to the UK, and on removing unnecessary barriers to global trade and commerce.

A Border Protection Service must therefore work to foster these opportunities for the good of the country.

This report does not claim to provide all the answers. Rather it makes high level policy proposals on how a Border Protection Service could be set up, suggesting a framework and boundaries for control and security aimed at meeting the many new and complex challenges – those we already face and those we are likely to face through the first half of the 21st Century.

Further extensive work is now needed to develop these proposals into an implementation plan that will bring this about. In doing so I would urge the earliest possible consultation with the management and staff of the existing border control and security organisations, and with the relevant staff representative bodies, all of whose views must be taken into account, and whose co-operation will be vital to taking further steps.

In recommending the creation of a single border service, we are making no criticism of the dedicated men and women who work in the police and the border agencies to protect and control our borders today. Quite the reverse. We acknowledge the excellent work that they do, often in difficult circumstances. But we believe that their efforts would be much more effective, and would better serve our country, within the framework of a unified Border Protection Service.

My full committee, including advisers, met on seven occasions, but the majority of the work has been completed by sub-groups and individual committee members and advisers, using their own experience and expertise and through extensive consultation with experts both here and internationally. I am grateful to all who cooperated with our work.

In particular I would like to acknowledge the support of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), which nominated advisers to the committee. ACPO has also completed a significant and authoritative body of work on border security, which my committee has drawn upon through our ACPO advisers.

Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington QPM DL

2. Introduction

2.1. Scope of the Report

On 26 February 2007 the Conservative Party declared that when elected it would create a Border Protection Service (BPS) that would unify current disparate border control mechanisms and organisations into a single effective entity.

This organisation, staffed mainly from agencies currently undertaking aspects of border control, would strengthen controls designed to reduce the threat of trans-national crime, illegal immigration and terrorism from entering and affecting the UK.

At the request of the Conservative Party, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington formed a Border Security Advisory Committee[1] to report on:

- The operational mandate for a BPS and the coverage it would be expected to provide.
- The powers it should have available to it.
- The size and scope of the Service.
- Which existing agencies or elements of agencies would be amalgamated into such a Service, and what its relationship would be with the Serious Organised Crime Agency, other police forces and the intelligence and security agencies.
- The legislative, constitutional and human resource aspects to the creation of a BPS.
- How to ensure simple and effective accountability operationally and to ministers.
- How the BPS would cooperate with other EU member states and international agencies.
- What lessons from other countries' experience with border policing services are relevant to the UK.

2.2. The Committee

The Border Security Advisory Committee, with the following membership, brings together representatives from several aspects of the borders, law enforcement and security spheres.

Chairman
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington QPM DL

Deputy Chairman
The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler JP DL

Members
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In addition to consulting published sources, the committee interviewed border security experts across the world and noted lessons from the creation of border agencies in other nations.[2] These experts were drawn from, among others, academia, law enforcement, industry, government and security.

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1 Hereafter referred to as the committee.
2 Further details can be found in Appendix A.

3. Executive Summary

The UK faces a hitherto unprecedented number of threats to its security. These include international terrorism, organised crime, diseases and illegal immigration. Many of these threats emanate from outside the UK's borders and their impact on the UK is not just financial but also threatens human life.

While the UK's island status enables some control over access, we sit within an enlarged and enlarging EU whose borders now extend as far as Belarus and the Ukraine. In the future, if Turkey joins the EU, the borders will extend to the frontiers with Iran, Iraq and Syria. With the Schengen arrangements now encompassing 24 countries, once someone travelling overland has crossed the external frontier of one of the Schengen countries (which comprise 22 EU countries together with Iceland and Norway), there are no further border checks until they reach Dover.

However, the UK has no single nation-wide force in charge of securing its borders. Instead, it relies on several different agencies, reporting to a number of different cabinet ministers. These include the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), specialist port units within police forces, the Metropolitan Police Service security command and the intelligence and security services.

Such a disjointed structure has, not surprisingly, led to difficulties. The lack of a clear border security strategy has resulted in a situation where agencies are unaware of where their shared priorities lie. This has resulted in key duties not being carried out, resources not properly allocated, organisations not working together as they should and focus being placed on narrow border control issues, specific to each agency and not the overall border security picture of the UK.

The control of our borders simply cannot be managed effectively under current arrangements. It is not possible to measure the performance of the elements of the border control agencies against any overall targets or objectives, or to quantify this against funding. There can be no overall indication of whether or not the tax-payer is receiving value for money on the control of borders.

All of this has led to a perception, amongst both the public and criminals, that the UK's border is porous and its controls easily bypassed.

This committee proposes the formation of a uniformed and unified Border Protection Service (BPS), which will bring together the key elements of those border control agencies mentioned above and other relevant organisations. The BPS would be a police service led by a chief constable, albeit with many wider ranging responsibilities than are traditionally associated with territorial police services.

This new Service would have to be accorded the powers, personnel, equipment and other resources necessary to allow it to fulfil its duties properly. It would be fully accountable to a single minister and funded from both existing budgets and by other means. It would work closely with, and draw best practices from, counterpart agencies in other nations.

Proposals

The BPS would staff border posts at UK entry and exit points, including airports, seaports and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, and patrol coastal and land border areas to prevent, detect and deter illegal activity. It would also carry out necessary functions away from the border in pursuit of its key duties.

Proposal 1: The BPS's key duties would be:
- **Providing effective counter-terrorism.**
- **Combating other serious and organised crime.**
- **Preventing the importation of illegal drugs.**
- **Preventing the importation of illegal weapons.**
- **Prevention of smuggling in order to protect the UK tax base.**
- **Preventing illegal immigration.**
- **Environmental control and protection.**

Officers would nee to be authorised with all relevant powers including the warranted powers of search and arrest and the ability to collect taxes and duties.

Proposal 2: The BPS would need:
- **Warranted powers to stop, search and arrest for all offences anywhere within the jurisdiction of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, including territorial waters. For Scotland the arrangements would need to be agreed with the Lord Advocate's Office.**
- **The ability to levy, collect taxes and duties and issue fines, seize goods or arrest those found to be in breach of the relevant UK legislation.**
- **Powers to prosecute all criminal offences detected including immigration and customs and revenue offences.**

It would be imperative that the BPS receive adequate funding to allow it to fulfil its full range of duties. This would help do away with the current situation where key responsibilities are sometimes not met due to inadequate allocation of resources.

Proposal 3:

- **Savings in overheads and by rationalisation should lead, over time, to availability of greater resources for the front line.**

- **Funding for the BPS would come from aggregation of appropriate elements of the budgets of existing border security agencies that would be merged into the new Service. Additional funding could come from customer levies.**

The BPS would need to be open and accountable under the UK democratic process. To serve the public and meet the requirements of democratic and political accountability, clear lines of reporting would be necessary.

Proposal 4:

- **The BPS would report directly to an accountable minister and ultimately to the Home Secretary. The Service would be inspected by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).**

- **The BPS would have an executive board to oversee its operations. It would comprise individuals selected from outside the Service, but who had knowledge and experience of border security issues.**

It would be crucial for the BPS to work closely with a range of other agencies, notably those involved in border security and law enforcement in Europe and beyond.

Proposal 5:

- **Administering effective and efficient border security would require a range of partnerships with international bodies. To some extent this would involve consolidating and building on arrangements already in place with the different agencies currently responsible for border control. An agreement also needs to be made with the Schengen member states on developing the UK's membership of Frontex.**

In creating the BPS, it would be important that care was taken not to lose the wealth of experience, best practice and corporate knowledge used daily by the individuals and teams in the existing organisations.

Proposal 6:

Given the diversity of the organisations concerned, their roles and remits, it is recommended that the formation of the BPS should be implemented through a series of rationalised stages.

The first step would be to draw up detailed plans on operations and how to bring the current disparate groups together. The next priority would be to bring those existing agencies under a single command and control. Finally, merging of elements of the organisations such as personnel, finance and so on would occur incrementally to reduce disruption.

In order to avoid unnecessary uncertainties or damage to staff morale, it would be important to outline long-term planning at the beginning of the amalgamation phase. It is therefore recommended that early engagement with existing management, trade unions and staff associations is conducted and that all are included within any human resource working group.

The BPS would bring together staff from the following.

- **BIA.**
- **The customs and excise and preventive functions of HMRC.**
- **The elements of Home Office police services, Scottish police services and Police Service of Northern Ireland involved in airport and sea-port policing.**
- **Ukvisas**
- **British Transport Police's (BTP) involvement in port policing on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.**
- **Ports-related work of Special Branch.**
- **Border policing work undertaken by SOCA.**
- **The border work undertaken by the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency.**

The BPS would not initially include the Identity and Passport Service, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency or TRANSEC, though these and other relevant organisations may, at a later stage of planning, have a part to play within the new Service.

The BPS would need to be equipped and trained with the full range of currently available technology, but would also conduct horizon scanning for new technologies which could further increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service, and also meet new and emerging threats to the security of the UK through its borders.

Proposal 7:

- **Substantial investment will be needed both initially and year on year, to ensure that the BPS has the vital technology to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency in meeting existing and emerging threats.**

- **Both legacy and new information and communication technology (ICT) systems would need to be fully integrated across the BPS. A full needs analysis and operational requirement identification would be carried out across the agencies which would form the BPS and a dedicated technology horizon scanning group would be tasked to identify new technologies and equipment that could increase effectiveness and efficiency, and to identify new technology threats.**

The formation of the BPS would require significant adaptations to current legislative and constitutional arrangements. Powers would have to be agreed and there would need to be clarification on how the new Service would both share information and operate alongside other bodies.

Proposal 8:

The creation of the BPS would require an Act of Parliament as was required for the creation of SOCA through the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. In the case of SOCA, legislation set out the Agency's constitution, functions, general powers (and those common powers of its staff to stop, search and detain) and its relationship with ministers. This could be used as a template for the creation of the BPS.

It would be desirable to deliver border security functions under a single UK jurisdictional framework.

Proposal 9:

At a more detailed level, there is a requirement for clarity on the extent of responsibility of the BPS geographically and by type of activity.

4. The UK's Borders

The UK is the world's fifth largest economy, with a value of around £6.5 trillion.[3] The UK has 10,500 miles of coastline and 225 miles of land border, including the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. Ease of entry and exit to the country for both commercial and tourist activity is critical to the maintenance and improvement of this position.

The vast majority of the UK's import and export trade by weight moves by sea, at a value of £349 billion and £317 billion[4] respectively per annum. The sea ports of the UK handled almost 600 million tonnes of freight in 2006 and saw over 25 million passenger journeys. This figure is expected to continue to rise.

The UK has some 71 international hub and major regional airports. In addition there are hundreds of privately owned aerodromes, airstrips and helicopter pads serving community, business and leisure aviation. UK airports handled around 235 million[5] passengers in 2006. This is expected to significantly rise over the next 20 years. In 2006 the operating profits at the major UK airports (BAA owned) was around £577 million[6] and the major UK airlines' profits were around £930 million.[7] The 32.1 million tourists visiting the UK from overseas injected £15.4 billion into the economy in 2006.[8]

4.1. The Threat to the UK's Borders

The threats to the UK are many and growing. And the context within which border control is undertaken has changed significantly in the last 20 years. While the UK's island status enables some control over access, we sit within an enlarged and enlarging EU whose borders now extend as far as Belarus and the Ukraine. In the future, if Turkey joins the EU, the borders will extend to the frontiers with Iran, Iraq and Syria. With the Schengen arrangements now encompassing 24 countries,[9] once someone travelling overland has crossed the external frontier of one of the Schengen countries (which comprise 22 EU countries together with Iceland and Norway), there are no further border checks until they reach Dover.

The growth in air travel means that it is now easier to enter the UK's airspace by light aircraft and there are many small airfields within easy flying distance of continental Europe, thereby facilitating the movement of people or illicit goods.

Finally, the growth in the internet has enabled and encouraged the easier distribution of materials, not always legal, but often by legitimate post, to the UK.

The risks of getting border security wrong, or of failing to act appropriately on border control issues, could be enormous for the UK economy, and for our health and well being and the continuance of the freedoms and safety we enjoy by living in the UK.

Terrorism

At present the threat to the UK from terrorism is categorised by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre as 'Severe', meaning an attack is highly likely and there is a continuing high level of threat. There is no indication that this threat level will reduce significantly, and national experts have argued that this threat will remain with us for at least 20 – 30 years.

Even before the attacks against the US on 9/11, Al Qaida, its affiliates and its supporters planned and conducted strikes against those they considered to be opponents of Islam. The list of atrocities before and since 9/11 spans the globe. Both civilians and the military have been targets. Notable attacks include the East African embassy bombings in 1998, the USS Cole attack in 2000, the World Trade Center attacks in 1993, Bali in 2002, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and a host of other incidents across the globe.

The London attacks of July 2005 in which 52 people were killed, reminded us of the very real and serious threat to the UK. Further reminders came in 2006 with a plot to blow up airliners flying out of the UK, and in 2007 with the failed attempts to target those leaving a London night club and the attack against Glasgow airport. Many other plots have been thwarted in the UK and around the globe.

Those planning and executing attacks in the UK have been both British nationals and immigrants. A common factor has been that many of those involved in these plots, including the British nationals, have travelled overseas, for example to Afghanistan, Bosnia and Pakistan, for training and preparation, and then returned to the UK for their attacks.

There is no doubt more attacks will be attempted against the UK and those involved are again likely to travel abroad for preparation. Others may travel to the UK for the sole purpose of

3 www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=479
4 www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/Blue_Book_2007_web.pdf
5 www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=14&pagetype=65&appid=7&newstype=n&mode=detail&nid=1431
6 http://www.baa.com/annualreview07/our_performance/BAA_accounts_final.pdf
7 IATA figures. www.iata.com/whatwedo/economics
8 www.visitbritain.org/ukindustry/
9 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden

carrying out attacks. It is also possible in the future that materiel for attacks could be smuggled into the UK from overseas.

We must also not forget that in the future other extremists – not only adherents to the Al Qaida doctrines – could well attempt to carry out attacks in the UK or using the UK as a base for attacks elsewhere. These people could bring in personnel and materiel from abroad, or seek to ship goods from the UK to support global extremist activity.

Serious Crime and Drugs

The majority of identified serious organised crime groups are reported to be involved in the illegal import or export of goods that are stolen, prohibited, controlled or liable for duty, including drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, precursor chemicals, firearms, vehicles, counterfeit goods, wildlife, gems and cultural artefacts, as well as people.[10]

Illegal entry into the UK is increasingly connected to human trafficking. According to the Home Office up to 75% of illegal entry is facilitated by organised crime.[11] The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has assessed the level of activity and adverse impact of serious organised criminal involvement in immigration crime in the UK to be significant. Some 25% of its operational efforts are directed towards this type of criminality.

Trafficking in heroin and cocaine poses a threat to the UK in terms of the scale of serious organised criminal involvement, the illegal proceeds secured and the overall harm caused. Home Office estimates put the harm caused by Class A drugs at a value of around £13 billion a year. This largely arises from crimes committed by addicts to fund their habit, the damage caused to family life and communities, and costs of treating addicts' health.[12]

According to Home Office statistics, an estimated 20 tonnes of heroin and 35 tonnes of cocaine are brought into the UK each year. About 90% of the heroin that reaches the UK originates in Afghanistan and passes through Turkey and the Netherlands. Cocaine originates from South America, is usually shipped to Spain and then distributed around Europe. Synthetic narcotic drugs coming into the UK often originate in mainland Europe.

However, in recent years the African continent has been used as a means of smuggling drugs into Europe. Cocaine from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela has been transported by ship and air into Europe via Africa. Of particular concern to the UN's International Narcotics Control Board has been the use of courier mail to transfer cocaine via South Africa. Heroin is increasingly coming into the UK from South West Asia and South East Asia via African air and sea ports.[13] According to the UN, human trafficking is worth some $44 billion a year and up to 27 million people worldwide are held in slavery. According to a 2007 report into human trafficking by the Home Office[14] it was estimated that the size of the UK market for trafficking for sexual exploitation was worth around £275 million in 2003. This figure was expected to rise.

Firearms

The easing of border controls, coupled with the expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe, with its history of conflict and relatively lax gun control laws, has resulted in an influx of firearms (including fully functioning, deactivated and imitation guns, as well as electroshock weapons such as Tasers) to the UK.

There is a public perception that gun crime is now out of control in the UK and with a spate of killings over the past year, most notably of minors, it is clear that more needs to be done to address the issue.

A study by the Home Office and the University of Portsmouth found that while the conversion of imitation firearms continues to remain a significant issue, the main source of firearms in the UK comes from illegal importation.[15]

Weapons seized in the UK have come from, amongst other sources, Europe, the former Soviet states and war zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Economic Threat

According to the 'State of the Future' survey by the World Federation of United Nations Associations[16] some $520 billion of income that flows through the world's black economy[17] comes from counterfeiting and piracy. The production of and trade in counterfeit goods is increasingly linked with other forms of serious organised crime and terrorism. EU customs officials estimate that at least two thirds of the counterfeit goods they seize come from China.

The World Health Organisation estimates that up to 25% of drugs used in the developing world are fakes and these pirated

10 http://www.soca.gov.uk/assessPublications/downloads/threat_assess_unclass_250706.pdf
11 Home Office: Securing the Border, March 2007
12 SOCA website
13 INCB Annual Report 2005
14 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/human-traffick-action-plan?view=Binary
15 http://www.port.ac.uk/aboutus/newsandevents/frontpagenews/title,58854,en.html
16 http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/sof2007.html
17 All commerce where applicable taxes are avoided.

medicines are putting the health of patients at risk.[18] The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has reported a number of incidents of counterfeit medicines being imported into the UK.[19]

Smuggling is not a victimless crime. Those involved often have links to other serious crime including terrorism.

Tobacco smuggling not only undermines the Government's health objectives, it also damages legitimate businesses and encourages wider criminality. Government figures estimate that the illicit market share of cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco in the UK is around 16%, costing the UK some £19 billion in lost revenue.[20]

HM Treasury has recorded that in 2005-06, the last year for which estimates are available, it lost between £2 billion and £3 billion on carousel fraud.[21] Carousel fraud arises as traders who import and export goods between EU countries do not have to pay VAT. Items can be imported, passed through a series of contrived transactions – where VAT should be collected – and then exported. At that point the dishonest trader can submit a claim for the repayment of the tax that was never collected in the first place.

Meeting the Social Threat
The pace of change in world population is speeding up: globalisation, new patterns of migration caused by war, famine or economic circumstances, the enlargement of the EU and ease of travel all contribute. The UK Government has to balance the economic benefits that migration brings to the country against the costs of public sector service provision such as housing, education and the health service.

A report, in March 2008, by Javier Solano and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU's chief foreign policy coordinator and the European commissioner for external relations, found that climate change poses a number of security risks to the EU, notably from environmental migrants. The report noted that within a decade, Europe must expect increased migratory pressure, with millions of people fleeing poverty, conflicts and environmental damage in other parts of the world, notably Africa.

The latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that by 2080 one to three billion people worldwide will be experiencing water scarcity, 200 to 600

million will face hunger and two to seven million will be under constant threat of coastal flooding[22] and may attempt to move from their homelands to more secure locations.

Disease
Diseases such as avian flu, Bluetongue and foot and mouth pose a serious risk to the UK population, agricultural industry and economy, with outbreaks potentially costing the economy billions of pounds. Diseases can be introduced into the country by a variety of means including carriage by humans, animals, freight and postal traffic from EU or non-EU countries.

4.2. Existing Control Arrangements
UK border control is at present exercised by a disparate group of government bodies and agencies. For more information, see Appendix B.

- The Border and Immigration Agency (BIA).
- The customs and preventive functions of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
- The elements of Home Office police services, Scottish police services and Police Service of Northern Ireland involved in airport and sea-port policing.
- UKvisas
- British Transport Police's (BTP) involvement in port policing on the Channel Tunnel rail link.
- Ports-related work of police Special Branch.
- The border activities carried out on behalf of Defra to prevent the introduction of animal and plant diseases.
- The border policing work undertaken by SOCA.
- The border work undertaken by the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency

4.3. Problems with the Existing Arrangements
Since the committee was established in 2007, new legislation (the UK Borders Act 2007[23]) and constitutional arrangements have been put in place that are in large part consistent with the approach that the Conservative Party has been encouraging the Government to adopt. There is some evidence that the Border Management Programme[24] had led to improved collaboration, in particular between HMRC and BIA but more recently the Government has announced the formation of a single agency bringing together BIA, UKvisas and relevant elements of HMRC.

18 http://www.wpro.who.int/media_centre/fact_sheets/fs_20050506.htm
19 http://www.mhra.gov.uk/Safetyinformation/Generalsafetyinformationandadvice/Adviceandinformationforconsumers/Counterfeitmedicinesanddevices/CON019608
20 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./budget/budget_06/other_documents/bud_bud06_odtobacco.cfm
21 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pre_budget_report/prebud_pbr06/press_notices/prebud_pbr06_press03.cfm
22 http://www.ipcc.ch
23 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2007/pdf/ukpga_20070030_en.pdf
24 The Border Management Programme was established in March 2004 to promote closer and more effective joint working in order to strengthen the UK's border security, whilst minimising the impact on legitimate traffic.

These measures do not, however, go far enough and are unlikely to achieve some of the other desired objectives that the BPS will provide including a single management structure, reduction of overheads and more efficient tasking in pursuit of identified priorities.

It is too early to assess the real impact of the changes that have been made but failure to take this opportunity to bring all the services involved in securing the border together in a single agency carries the following challenges:

- Lack of a comprehensive overarching strategy.
- Lack of understanding regarding the roles of the different agencies involved in pursuing the objective of secure borders.
- Imbalance in investment (human resources and training, technology, infrastructure) in improving the agencies which have a role to play in securing the border.
- Difficulty of agreeing shared overall priorities, measuring performance against overall targets or objectives and assessing value for money.
- Inefficient sharing of information and the development of intelligence.
- A focus on narrow issues that have an impact on the work of individual agencies rather than the overall UK border security effort.
- A silo culture resulting in reluctance to engage with 'partner' organisations.
- Inefficient use of resources (such as when personnel from different agencies are needed to deal with the same incident, owing to the fact that no one individual has the necessary powers to deal with the issue). With separate organisations there is a significant risk of additional overheads for headquarters staff, training and provision of equipment.
- Geographical lottery as to the quality of service to be provided at individual ports depending on the commitment of local senior management of the agencies involved.

There is little doubt that improving border security in the UK will be challenging and complex. Those who seek to exploit our borders are increasingly adaptive and capable. They will seek to exploit areas of weakness, including inter-agency fault lines and unproven or unreliable technology and will invest in new equipment and tactics of their own.

The creation of a single border agency responsible for all immediate tasks required to secure the borders should provide a positive public perception of the services being provided and improve confidence in the efforts being made to protect national wellbeing, and in the Government's ability to exercise proper control. Equally important, a more coherent, comprehensive and robust regime should also have a similar effect in terms of deterring criminal activity.

A national strategy, with clearly defined priorities, for policing the UK's ports should set a standard for the level of security to be provided at each entry point. The efficiency of use of the resources required to meet that standard can only be improved by establishing a single agency through which this service is to be provided.

5. Proposals for a New Border Protection Service

It is proposed to create a new, integrated, uniformed BPS, with full executive control and responsibility for maintaining and enforcing border control and security measures mandated by parliament.

The BPS would be formed by amalgamating the relevant functions of elements of the main existing bodies involved with border control and security – the police service, BIA, HMRC and UKvisas.

The BPS would be a police service led by a chief constable, albeit with many wider ranging responsibilities than are traditionally associated with territorial police services. But this would ease issues of jurisdiction, delivery and coordination in the management of the threats posed by crime and terrorism. Similar challenges were encountered over the creation of SOCA.

We do not propose to include those agency functions not related to border control and security. We recognise that in the case of HMRC, which has only just formed, there would be further structural change in not only incorporating the organisation in a new body but also disaggregating their current structures and functions.

There are additional agencies and organisations which, at a later stage of planning, might also have a part to play within the BPS.

The inclusion of UKvisas and (the possible future inclusion of) the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) into the BPS reflects the fact that, despite their physical remoteness from the border, their upstream roles in the validation of travel entitlement and identity (together with the issue of travel documentation) is critical to the effectiveness of border control. A key issue to resolve would be whether all the functions of the IPS might transfer, or whether only the UK Passport operation should migrate, leaving the National Identity Scheme to be managed as a residual function within the Home Office.[25]

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) undertakes safety compliance and search and rescue coordination, these being core border security functions. It does not have a law enforcement remit but does play a vital role in public safety.

The police are responsible for the management of crime within the 12 mile UK jurisdictional limit but have few assets to provide this maritime function, whereas the MCA holds valuable assets that could assist.

The security section of the Department for Transport – TRANSEC – has a policy, inspection and advisory role in relation to the protection of the travelling public, transport facilities and those employed in the industry. This covers maritime, aviation, road and rail sectors. The maritime and aviation activities of TRANSEC are core border security functions.[26]

The functions not included in the proposed service relate to the control of animals and animal products across the border, as carried out by Defra and the State Veterinary Service (SVS) (and local authorities). As Defra and SVS have other extensive functions, we believe animal related border control issues would be better delivered through partnership.

We recognise that the creation of the BPS from so many existing agencies would be a very significant challenge, not least due to understandable resistance by current stakeholders. The people – both in current agencies and in the new organisation – are clearly the critical element, and every effort would be needed to explain the benefits of the new arrangements and carry them along. It would be critical to avoid losing too many existing staff, with their expertise, along the way. But over time, despite the need for internal specialisation, opportunities for staff to cross develop and enjoy a greater variety of career pathways would be a valuable enhancement.

The BPS as envisaged would offer the following advantages over the existing regimes.
- There would be one governance and accountability arrangement covering all the main border security and control agencies.
- Responsibilities across all of the main border activities would be clearly defined.
- The majority of border functions in relation to people and goods would be fully harmonised with one set of controls.
- The creation of a single border control and security organisation accords with the EU Border Management Strategy.[27]

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25 At present the NIS is only dealing with identity issues associated with foreign nationals; as such there is a clear strategic fit with border control. Should the NIS develop as intended into a domestic scheme then, notwithstanding that border security would benefit from the services of the scheme, this strategic fit would be reduced such that inclusion within the BPS might no longer be appropriate.

26 The US authorities believe that it has been a security success to bring together the regulation of transport security and the delivery of operational functions at ports.

27 Development of the EU's Integrated Management System For External Borders; Border Management Strategy, Report of Informal JHA Ministerial Meeting, Tampere, 20-22 September 2006, available online at eu2006.fi.

- The inland pursuit of direct failures within border control would be incorporated in respect of both BIA and HMRC functions.
- The fullest interoperability would accrue and powers, terms and conditions, systems and objectives could be harmonised across the main border security functions to maximise the impact against the threat.
- An entity of significant scale would arise enabling very considerable deployment flexibility to match the threat.
- Partnership interfaces relative to the bulk of frontline border control functions (a key aspect of current vulnerability) would be eliminated, thereby delivering a seamless approach.
- The creation of a new entity encompassing each of the main border security functions would create a strategic opportunity for the introduction of a customer levy to enhance funding – particularly taking account of the charging models associated with both UKvisas.
- Enhanced potential to capitalise on the benefits of e-Borders would arise.
- With inclusion of BIA enforcement functions (see below), clarity would be achieved regarding the responsibility and arrangements for the management of inland immigration functions.
- The need for partnership interfaces relative to the bulk of border control functions would be eliminated.
- There would be a single point of contact for UK, EU and foreign agencies needing to deal with border control, making all aspects of co-operation and joint working more effective.
- A single service, with appropriate powers and leadership, if properly formed and managed, should increase public confidence in the UK's border security.
- Savings in overheads should lead, over time, to more people and resources being moved to the front line. Similarly, costs would be saved in equipment and technology and could be diverted to more effective systems.

5.1. Mission Statement

The following encapsulates the proposed mission of a new BPS:

To provide for the security of the UK, its citizens and economy by maintaining strong borders, which allow for the movement of people and goods with the minimum of disruption but protect us from those who may cause us harm.

5.2. Scope of Responsibilities

Physical Tasks

The BPS would staff border posts at UK entry and exit points, including airports, seaports and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, and patrol coastal and land border areas to prevent, detect and deter illegal activity.

The efficient and effective operation of the BPS would be pivotal in meeting government policy priorities in:
- Countering terrorism.
- Combating other serious and organised crime.
- Cutting the importation of illegal drugs.
- Cutting the movement of illegal firearms into the UK.
- Collection of taxes and excise duties.
- Cutting illegal immigration.
- Environmental control and protection.

It is proposed that the BPS should:
- Have police powers to stop, search, arrest, detain and prosecute those who breach or are suspected of breaching criminal, immigration and customs laws.
- Have a 'protective services' capacity to undertake serious crime investigations into incidents such as robbery that happen within its jurisdiction but are not cases which fall within the remit of SOCA.
- Search and inspect motor vehicles, aircraft, ships and trains as well as their cargos.
- Maintain border checking facilities, both physical and technological, to verify travel and identity documents for passengers and freight documentation for cargo.
- Be able to undertake physical checks of goods and freight in transit as well as the contents of packages entering and leaving the UK via postal or courier services.
- Undertake initial asylum interviews.
- Operate detention facilities for those deemed inadmissible to the UK or whose identity needs to be verified.
- Provide removal functions for those whose presence in the UK is illegal.
- Have reciprocal arrangements with EU counterparts as well as enter into protocol agreements with border agencies worldwide.
- Undertake counter terrorism functions including firearm patrols of airports, sea ports and international train stations as well as carry out armed operations to search infrastructure, aircraft, trains, motor vehicles and vessels for terrorists, stowaways and contraband.
- Ensure that all goods are correctly declared and all relevant EU and UK taxes and duties are paid.
- Seize goods not correctly declared for tax and duties.
- Be able to seize counterfeit and dangerous goods.
- Be able to issue on the spot fines for breaches of custom levy and duty rules.

- Enforce environmental protection and health legislation.
- Assist with fishery protection duties.

Intelligence

An important function of the BPS would be collection and sharing of information and intelligence. This should be legislated for and would entail:

- Collecting and collating information and data on travellers coming into and leaving the UK.
- Monitoring unusual behaviour which may indicate criminal or terrorist activity.
- Liaising with partners in SOCA, local police services and the UK's (and overseas) intelligence and security services.
- Sharing information and intelligence with international bodies such as Interpol and Europol.
- Working with colleagues from other countries in joint operations to gain intelligence on criminality and terrorism.
- Assessing the future development of the threat to UK borders, including emerging technology available to criminals.

Overseas Tasks

Two hundred BIA staff already work abroad within UKvisas – the joint FCO and Home Office organisation dealing with the issue of visas abroad. Over 40 staff work abroad as Airline Liaison Officers, to stop passengers travelling to the UK who do not have genuine documents. A number of former immigration staff now work abroad as Intelligence Liaison Officers and are currently managed by SOCA. These roles would all need to be filled by the BPS.

Mail Interdiction

The BPS should also take on an interdiction role in relation to the threat from importing and exporting contraband via international postal or courier services. At present Royal Mail employees examine in the presence of an HMRC officer postal packages arriving from outside the UK for prohibited or restricted goods such as drugs, obscene material, weapons, endangered species and counterfeit goods, and to confirm the description and value stated on the declaration is correct. They also check customs declarations to determine if customs duty, excise duty and import Value Added Tax (VAT) is chargeable. Present measures are inadequate to provide sufficient border control and security as the current automated scanning and physical inspections cannot ensure all items are thoroughly checked. One of the important roles of the BPS is to address this unsatisfactory and unacceptable situation.

Air Cargo

The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and cargo aircraft. The air cargo system is vulnerable to security threats including potential plots to place explosives aboard aircraft, illegal shipments of hazardous materials, criminal activities such as smuggling and theft, and potential hijackings and sabotage by persons with access to aircraft.

Private Security Companies

The use of private security companies is important in border security, but there is a need for better regulation and licensing. The BPS should be given responsibility for licensing 'known shippers' (in the EU known as 'Authorised Economic Operators') – those considered to have the highest security standards, and inspecting cargo forwarding companies with regard to the security and safety measures they need to adopt. Further regulation of private security companies working at airports and sea ports and the screening of those who work for them is necessary. This may include a common standard of inspection for in-house, as well as contract, staff under the Private Security Act 2001.

The Enhanced Role of the BPS

It is important that the BPS offers added capacity beyond the level of service provided under current border security arrangements. For instance, the BPS needs to be more visible to present a deterrent to criminals and terrorists and provide reassurance to the public, in addition to being used to the maximum effect in intelligence-led operations.

Lord Carlile of Berriew, the Government's independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, has criticised current border control measures in the UK which leave some of the busiest airports and ports unmanned for extended periods.[28] Lord Carlile has also described small private airstrips and remote coastal ports as vulnerable to those wishing to bring explosives or weapons into the country.

The lack of adequate security coverage was clearly illustrated on 30 June 2007 as no armed police were on duty at Glasgow Airport - Scotland's busiest and used by some 8.8 million passengers a year - when two suspects attempted to detonate a car bomb.

The lack of effective border cover continues to leave the UK open to criminal gangs who want to smuggle in goods, people and drugs.

There is also continued public concern at the ineffectiveness in dealing with those who came to the UK illegally or legally but overstay and this needs to be addressed.

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28 Report of the Operation in 2005 of the Terrorism Act 2000 – Lord Carlile of Berriew QC – May 2006

To meet these challenges it is vital to enhance the existing level of cover and the BPS would need to provide:

- 24/7 coverage at all major air and sea ports.
- A reliable presence and patrols of smaller ports and airstrips.
- Increased action on smuggling, trafficking and duty avoidance.
- Improved enforcement to deter illegal immigrants and deal with 'overstayers'.

Proposal 1: The BPS's key duties would be
- **Providing effective counter-terrorism.**
- **Combating other serious and organised crime.**
- **Cutting the importation of illegal drugs.**
- **Reducing the importation of illegal weapons.**
- **Prevention of smuggling in order to protect the UK tax base.**
- **Cutting illegal immigration.**
- **Environmental control and protection.**

5.3. Liaison

The BPS should have close liaison with:

- Airport Operators' Association.
- Board of Airline Representatives in the UK.
- BAA.
- British Air Transport Association.
- British Ports Association.
- British Security Industry Association.
- BTP.
- Civil Aviation Authority.
- Civil Nuclear Constabulary.
- Defra.
- Department for Transport including its security section (TRANSEC).
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- The elements of HMRC not incorporated into the BPS.
- The Home Office, Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly
- Home Office police services.
- Intelligence and security services.
- International travel and freight industries.
- Local authorities, regional transport authorities and Transport for London.
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency and HM Coast Guard.
- Ministry of Defence, including the Ministry of Defence Police.
- National ports policing scheme.
- Police Service of Northern Ireland.
- Royal Mail, international couriers and consignees.
- Security Industry Authority.
- SOCA.
- Scottish police services.
- United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre.

5.4. Powers

At present the three main agencies, the police services, HMRC and BIA, each have different sets of powers with overlaps sometimes only being exercisable in particular circumstances, such as when the 'lead' agency is absent.

The position is complicated by the fact that the availability of powers varies across the agencies dependent upon the legislative designation of the particular port or the routes being travelled.

Equally, different ports are subject to different regulatory regimes: for instance designation under the Terrorism Act 2000 versus the Aviation Security Act 1982 creates variation in the available agency powers and applicable security frameworks.

At a practical level, even were agency powers and the legislative frameworks at ports to be harmonised, current variation in staff terms, conditions and remit would impact adversely on deployment flexibility. This reinforces the need for rationalised powers within the BPS.

Those officers of the new Service that would require them will need:

- Warranted powers to arrest for all offences anywhere within the jurisdiction of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, including territorial waters. For Scotland the arrangements would need to be agreed with the Lord Advocate's Office.
- The ability to levy, collect taxes and duties and issue fines, seize goods or arrest those found to be in breach of the relevant UK legislation.
- Powers to prosecute customs and revenue offences.

All criminal offences would be processed in co-operation with the Crown Prosecution Service.

Proposal 2: The BPS would need:
- **Warranted powers to arrest for all offences anywhere within the jurisdiction of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, including territorial waters. For Scotland the arrangements would need to be agreed with the Lord Advocate's Office.**
- **The ability to levy, collect taxes and duties and issue fines, seize goods or arrest those found to be in breach of the relevant UK legislation.**
- **Powers to prosecute all criminal offences detected including immigration and customs and revenue offences.**

5.5. Funding

The BPS would be funded by an aggregation of those elements of the existing border agencies' budgets allocated to border control and security, and other government funding allocated to borders.

It is expected that savings would accrue from reduction of overheads and rationalisation of some costs resulting from the new body. Clearly some of the savings on overheads would be offset by start up costs and the need to retain residual non-border functions in some of the disaggregated agencies, such as HMRC. However, it should be expected that there would be net savings, which should be re-allocated to the front-line improvements to border security advocated in this report.

As mentioned earlier, formation of a single border control/security organisation would present a strategic opportunity for the introduction of a customer levy to enhance funding. To some extent this combination already exists for elements of border security. But consideration would be needed on the extent to which a significant increase of border users' contributions might have an adverse effect on the UK economy. Heavy border security related charges may make this country unattractive to international travellers, operators and businesses.

Proposal 3:
- **Savings in overheads and by rationalisation should lead, over time, to availability of greater resources for the front line.**
- **Funding for the BPS would come from aggregation of appropriate elements of the budgets of existing border security agencies that will be merged into the new Service. Additional funding could come from customer levies.**

6. Accountability of a Border Protection Service

The BPS would need to be open and accountable under the UK democratic process. To serve the public and meet the requirements of democratic and political accountability, clear lines of reporting would be necessary.

A diverse range of bodies or Acts regulate border control agencies as they stand at present. These are wide ranging and are governed by a broad swathe of legislation. Oversight bodies include:

- The Home Affairs Committee.
- The Foreign Affairs Committee.
- The Treasury Committee.
- The Parliamentary Ombudsman.
- The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) - which includes HMRC and SOCA within its terms of reference.
- The Tribunals Service.
- The Immigration Appellate Authorities.
- The Investigatory Powers Tribunal.
- The Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner.
- The Better Regulation Task Force.
- The Adjudicator for Customs.

Ultimate accountability for these bodies lies with Parliament and the Government, however while border control is a core state activity no single department has overall control. The majority of issues relating to it are the responsibility of the Home Office.

The existing Home Office police service reporting structures, with police authority members appointed from elected local authorities, would not be appropriate for the BPS's national remit.

The preferred option is an executive board structure such as that of SOCA, which is an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body sponsored by, but operationally independent from, the Home Office. However, unlike SOCA (where the director is a member of the board), the board of the BPS could comprise individuals (including stakeholders) selected from outside the Service, but who had knowledge and experience of border security issues.

The main reporting line should be to the Home Secretary, via a dedicated Borders Minister, who would be accountable to parliament on UK border issues. Alternatively the BPS could report direct to the Treasury, but this would be inappropriate as it is proposed the new organisation has a principal policing role. The BPS should come under parliamentary scrutiny from the Home Affairs Committee.

To reflect the national standing of the BPS, there should also be clear reporting lines to the Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly. For Scotland it may be necessary to create a new ministerial post into the Scottish Executive to facilitate this arrangement.

To provide public confidence on professional standards, the IPCC should be given the extended remit to investigate complaints against the BPS. (The IPCC has, since April 2006, had legal powers to investigate serious complaints and allegations against HMRC.)

In accordance with it sitting within the Association of Chief Police Officers structure, it would be appropriate for the BPS to receive regular inspections by HMIC to ensure its work is effectively reviewed and endorsed. (HMIC undertook its first inspection of the law enforcement activities of HMRC in October 2005.)

Proposal 4:
- **The BPS would report directly to an accountable minister and ultimately to the Home Secretary. The Service would be inspected by HMIC.**
- **The BPS would have an executive board to oversee its operations. It would comprise individuals selected from outside the Service, but who had knowledge and experience of border security issues.**

7. International Co-operation

Administering effective and efficient border security would require a range of partnerships with international bodies. To some extent this would involve consolidating and building on arrangements already in place with the different agencies currently responsible for border control. There are also opportunities, some of which are included below, that are currently being missed and which should be taken up by the new BPS.

Reciprocal arrangements with EU counterparts and border agencies worldwide

Close co-operation with other law enforcement agencies in the EU and beyond would be crucial. Europol is the principal mechanism within the EU for the co-ordination of member states' activities against serious and organised international crime. The BPS would need to work closely with SOCA's Europol Desk, especially on covert operations coordinated by Europol which could cross UK borders.

The EU legal framework includes a number of measures designed to increase border security which limit the need for reciprocal arrangements between individual national agencies with a mandate to secure borders. The UK does not employ all these measures as a result of our position on Schengen – we participate on police co-operation but not on border control. Examples of EU-inspired measures include:

- **Foreign surveillance operations** - Section 83 Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (which amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act [RIPA]) is based on the principles of Article 40 of the Schengen Convention 1990 and introduced procedures for continuing surveillance operations when suspects enter or leave the UK. The point of reference for enabling these operations is the UK Sirene[29] office within SOCA. The BPS would need to have a key role in facilitation of such operations, and coordination would be more efficient if only one agency (the BPS) is involved at the point of exit/entry of the countries involved.

- **Joint operations** - The Justice and Home Affairs Council decision to step up cross-border co-operation, particularly in combating terrorism and crime (12-13 June 2007), incorporates provisions of the Prüm Treaty which deal with police co-operation and information exchange within the framework of the EU.

These provisions deal with cross-border police co-operation and information exchange on DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle number-plates. The BPS would need to play a central role in any cross-border joint operations flowing from these provisions, and is likely to be a key client of the national contact point which has access rights arising from them.

Some specifically drafted arrangements for bilateral or multilateral co-operation would remain necessary despite developments within the EU. The UK and France have established juxtaposed controls for travel via the Channel Tunnel. Responsibility for these controls would devolve to the BPS which would also have an important role in the Cross Channel Intelligence Conference. This is an annual meeting in which police officials from coastal regions on both sides of the English Channel (Belgium, France, Netherlands and UK) meet to discuss policing issues, joint working arrangements and how best to detect and disrupt cross-border criminal activity.

Close collaboration with border security agencies outside the EU would be necessary to handle movement of people and property by air and sea. Typically, co-operation agreements of this nature deal with communication, the exchange of information and joint security assessments. To a large extent the BPS would simply benefit from the arrangements already in place, but these would need to be reviewed on a case by case basis to identify anomalies and opportunities and, in particular, in the light of the e-Borders project.

This builds on the powers conferred by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and seeks to export the UK border in the sense that the direction on entry would be made before the passenger embarked for the UK. This would be achieved by establishing an 'Authority to Carry' scheme whereby authority to carry individual passengers to the UK would be granted or refused at the point of departure for the UK. Just as with cases occurring within the EU, covert cross-border operations involving the UK and emanating from outside the EU are likely to be coordinated by SOCA.

Access to Information
The BPS would require timely access to a range of law enforcement and other information from international sources. Where practicable, access to this information should be direct, but the nature of international co-operation is such that in some cases access would be via a national contact point that may be maintained by another agency.

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29 Sirene UK is a programme that connects the UK's police national computer with those nations (the 15 EU member countries prior to May 2004, plus Norway and Iceland) that use the Schengen Information System. This system helps UK law enforcement to disrupt the movement of criminals and stolen goods, locate missing or wanted people and help reduce the opportunity for identity fraud.

SOCA, for example, provides a single platform which coordinates access to Schengen, Europol and Interpol. This minimises the risk of duplication of effort and increases the chance of seeing the 'big picture' by capturing all information relevant to a current enquiry.

SOCA coordinates UK law enforcement co-operation, and is the point of contact for securing close co-operation (via Europol) between law enforcement agencies across the EU on serious organised crime. As part of this single platform, the UK's Interpol Office (National Central Bureau) is also administered by SOCA. Whereas SOCA's remit is, by definition, focused on serious organised crime, the Interpol Office provides a mechanism for coordinating international enquiries (such as within and beyond the EU) on serious crime which may not be organised. The advantages of keeping the Europol, Schengen and Interpol offices together within SOCA outweigh any consideration of moving any or all of them to the new BPS.

The UK does not yet have access to the Schengen Information System (SIS I) but is now waiting to join the second generation system (SIS II) when it becomes operational (2009/2010). SIS II would include some upgrades relating to biometric data but access to SIS I would give the UK access to the following types of alert:

• Persons wanted for extradition to another member state.
• Missing persons.
• Request for a locate report on witnesses and people for court appearances.
• Requests for information reports on major criminals and linked vehicles.
• Stolen vehicles, trailers, firearms, identity documents and registered banknotes.

One consequence of not participating in the Schengen border control measures is that the UK, even if connected to SIS I, would not have direct access to a sixth category of SIS data - alerts regarding individuals who have been refused access to the Schengen area because of criminal convictions or for reasons of national security. This data ('Article 96' data) is gathered by other EU countries for immigration and visa purposes and UK access is restricted to criminal law and policing information.

The new BPS will inherit this position other than in the unlikely and undesirable event that the UK signs up to full participation in Schengen (including open borders and hot pursuit) in the meantime. The situation may be brought into sharper focus if the upgraded Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the new Visa Information System (VIS) attract more and better quality data.

This situation reinforces the need to establish the best possible bilateral relations to permit exchange of information on a case by case basis. It also highlights the need to take full advantage of other directly accessible sources of relevant information which may include the same data on which Schengen countries rely to make decisions to refuse access.

In the context of the Schengen 'information gap', it makes sense to examine what practical assistance the BPS would be able to obtain from international organisations involved in countering serious organised crime and other forms of serious criminality.

Interpol

Through its secure global communication and information network, I-24/7, Interpol provides online access to its databases. These include persons known or wanted internationally for serious criminal activity, lost and stolen travel documents, stolen vehicles, fingerprints, DNA profiles and stolen works of art. For the UK, primary access to this network is through the National Central Bureau at the headquarters of SOCA. This information is of direct relevance to the work of border security agencies throughout the world. From a UK perspective, there is a reasonable prospect that many individuals who are known or wanted for criminality that bars access to the Schengen Area would also be recorded in Interpol's international nominal databases. Arguably, therefore, details of individuals seeking to enter the UK should be systematically checked against Interpol's databases. In the absence of full access to Schengen data, such checks become imperative. This is not currently happening.

One of the most significant recent advances made by Interpol, building on the creation of the I-24/7 network which connects the police services of 186 countries, is the introduction of a global database of Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD). SLTD contains details of over 14.4 million stolen or lost travel documents from 123 countries. The technology (Mobile Interpol Network Database/Fixed Interpol Network Database MIND/FIND) has been developed by Interpol to enable SLTD to be searched at border control points by a simple swipe of the document over an optical reading device. This is enabled either by creating an interface between I-24/7 and the national police network or by the provision of a stand-alone facility (updated regularly) at the points where checks need to be made. Work is underway to use this facility to check other Interpol databases, in particular the nominal databases.

The first countries and regions to have made this facility available to those responsible for border security, such as France and Switzerland are already getting results.

The UK e-Borders team is currently working with Interpol to identify a solution that would make MIND/FIND available to those responsible for securing the UK's borders. e-Borders is scheduled to be fully operational by 2014, with core services available by 2010. The UK border services need, and given goodwill and funding, could have, access to MIND/FIND today. This situation should be monitored closely, but in any event the combination of I-24/7 and MIND/FIND would be an essential tool for the BPS.

World Customs Organisation (WCO)
As the BPS would take on part of the role currently undertaken by HMRC at border points, it makes sense for the new Service to take full advantage of the services offered by WCO:
- **Headquarters services** - Offers various benefits including fostering collaborating to identify best practice enforcement strategies, publication of intelligence reports and hosting working groups and other meetings.
- **Customs Enforcement Network** - Comprises a communications network, an information and analysis database and a website for Customs services.
- **Regional Intelligence Liaison Officers.**

Frontex
Frontex, an EU agency based in Warsaw, was created in 2005 as an independent body tasked to coordinate operational co-operation on border security between member states. The activities of Frontex are intelligence driven, and the agency complements and provides particular added value to the national border management systems of the member states.[30]

UK membership of Frontex would require a unanimous decision of the Schengen Member States as Frontex is seen as a Schengen-building measure. The Government's application for this has been refused and the UK has challenged the refusal. The implications of the creation of Frontex for the BPS depend on the outcome of that challenge. In the meantime, no Frontex joint operations on UK territory would be allowed.

The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council on 21/22 June 2007[31] welcomed the launching of a Coastal Patrol Network, and included a call for every effort to be made by all concerned for Rapid Border Intervention Teams (a Frontex initiative) to become operational as soon as possible. These are measures which the BPS should monitor even if the UK is not, as yet, participating fully in Frontex activities.

Borderpol
Created in 2003, Borderpol is an association of senior border policing leaders, with members and associates consisting of an international network of senior professionals from government and industry. Its aims are to facilitate international border police service co-operation, and support all international organisations, national border authorities and services whose mission is to detect and deter border-related crime. By definition, membership of Borderpol would be open to senior members of the BPS.

Proposal 5:
- **Administering effective and efficient border security would require a range of partnerships with international bodies. To some extent this would involve consolidating and building on arrangements already in place with the different agencies currently responsible for border control. An agreement also needs to be made with the Schengen member states on developing the UK's membership of Frontex.**

30 Taken from the Frontex website http://www.frontex.europa.eu/
31 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf

8. Human Resources

The formation of a BPS through amalgamation of existing agencies presents a number of significant challenges in terms of the most vital aspect of any such agency – people.

More than 34,000 people are currently employed by existing agencies on border protection and control, broken down as follows:[32]

- BIA – 21,000.
- HMRC border protection element – 8,000.
- Police services, uniformed (geographic constabularies and BTP) – 1,262.
- Police, Special Branch – 1,575.
- Ukvisas – 2,337.

Although the formation of the BPS would rationalise many of the overhead elements of current staffing, it should be assumed that approximately this number would be required for the new service in its early stages. Additional information on the staffing and structure of existing agencies can be found in Appendix B.

Given the diversity of the organisations concerned, their roles and remit, it is recommended that the formation of the BPS should be implemented through a series of rationalised stages.

The first step would be to draw up detailed plans on operations and how to bring the current disparate groups together. The next priority would be to bring those existing agencies under a single command and control. Finally, the merging of elements of the organisations such as personnel, finance and so on would occur incrementally in order to avoid disruption.

In order to avoid any uncertainties or damages to staff morale, it would be important to outline long-term planning at the beginning of the amalgamation phase.

The following factors must be taken into account.

- The merger of different organisational cultures and traditions and integration of staff from other backgrounds.
- The consolidation of terms and conditions of employment.
- Making best use of an inherited estate configured and located to respond to the problems of the past and not the business needs of the new organisation.
- The development of systems and processes to underpin any new way of working, including greater centralisation of knowledge, and mechanisms to ensure that activity is directed against the greatest threats.

- The rationalisation of objectives and performance management.
- The integration of overseas networks of liaison officers.
- Movement of staff from established areas of work into new ones.
- Managing new relationships with operational partners whose expectations may have been set by past arrangements with individual agencies.
- Initial human resource and training resources/costs required for change management.
- "Planning blight" where agencies embark on costly and/or major unilateral change initiatives prior to any process to bring them within the BPS or that they fail to match their own plans to the overall change plan - each scenario impacting on any amalgamation.
- Staff retention in key skills areas (during transition and post-merger).
- Legal considerations connected to transfer of employment including TUPE,[33] and the special employment law position of police officers.
- Engagement with trades unions and staff associations and their inclusion in human resource implementation working groups.

Proposal 6:
Given the diversity of the organisations concerned, their roles and remit, it is recommended that the formation of the BPS should be implemented through a series of rationalised stages.

The first step would be to draw up detailed plans on operations and how to bring the current disparate groups together. The next priority would be to bring those existing agencies under a single command and control. Finally, the merging of elements of the organisations such as personnel, finance and so on would occur incrementally to avoid disruption.

In order to avoid unnecessary uncertainties or damage to staff morale, it would be important to outline long-term planning at the beginning of the amalgamation phase. It is therefore recommended that early engagement with management, trade unions and staff associations is conducted and that they are included within any HR working group.

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32 While SOCA has a dedicated work programme focussing on borders (and there are clear links across to other SOCA work programmes) there are no staff specifically employed on border security other than a small number based at Heathrow and Gatwick airports.
33 Transfer of undertakings. This is the main piece of legislation governing the transfer of an undertaking, or part of one, to another. The regulations are designed to protect the rights of employees in a transfer situation enabling them to enjoy the same terms and conditions, with continuity of employment, as formerly.

The BPS would bring together staff from the following:

- **BIA.**
- **The customs and excise and preventive functions of HMRC.**
- **The elements of Home Office, Scottish police services and Police Service of Northern Ireland involved in airport and sea-port policing.**
- **BTP's involvement in port policing on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.**
- **Ports-related work of Special Branch.**
- **Border policing work undertaken by SOCA.**
- **The border work undertaken by Trading Standards and the Vehicle Inspectorate.**

The BPS would not initially include the Identity and Passport Service, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency or TRANSEC, though these and other relevant organisations may, at a later stage of planning, have a part to play within the new Service.

9. Technology: Existing and Future Systems

The use of the latest and most efficient technologies would be crucial to the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the BPS. The BPS would need to be equipped and trained on the full range of currently available technology and funded to enable maintenance of technology and training.

Horizon scanning mechanisms would also be required to identify new technologies to increase further the effectiveness and efficiency of the service, and also meet new and emerging threats to the security of the UK through its borders. One of the opportunities offered by the formation of the BPS would be the creation of a group of users, scientists and technologists for this purpose. Such a group could also have the role of identifying new technology threats to our borders. The group should work closely with larger science and technology organisation such as the Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB).

The scope of the responsibilities of the BPS, as identified in this report, is wide and, if accepted, would certainly require the provision of a range of technologies currently not generally available to the agencies responsible for border control. Some major developments are however underway, notably e-Borders, which should represent significant progress in bridging existing technology gaps.

In broad terms the essential technology requirements can be grouped under seven headings:
- Corporate operational support needs.
- Inspection, identification and validation of persons travelling in and out of UK ports.
- Inspection, identification and validation of goods shipped in and out of UK ports.
- Inspection, identification and validation of ships, trains and vehicles travelling in and out of UK ports.
- Assurance that all relevant taxes and duties are paid.
- Monitoring the movement of hazardous materials.
- Prevention of illegal trafficking of people and goods through coastal and land border areas.

Corporate Operational Needs
The following would be required to support the corporate operational needs of the BPS:
- Integrated information and communication technology systems to support command, control, communications and intelligence handling.
- Secure and immediate communications both within the BPS and with external agencies with adequate bandwidth to accommodate large amounts of data including high-resolution images and video.

- Support systems to administer a large and complex organisation, with differing backgrounds and IT providers, integrated on to a common IT platform.
- Suitable systems for the protection of officers while on duty, with firearms, less lethal options and personal protection and operational equipment.

It may be necessary to combine IT systems early on in the new organisation's administration (such as personnel, finance, estates). The key step would be to combine the corresponding business function and management first (such as having one personnel director and one personnel department, before developing one personnel system). The new organisation would still operate for some time using several different IT applications for the same functions and this must be considered during any implementation phase.

Similarly the IT departments should be combined and one ICT manager appointed at an early stage. This is to ensure objective guidance. It is anticipated that combining two or more IT departments would free up a large proportion of staff whose functions were duplicated.

Functional Technology Requirements
The following are the technology requirements for each specific area of the BPS's work.

Common to each requirement, including the movement of goods, ships, trains and vehicles, the collection of taxes and duties.
- Immediate, integrated electronic access to all the existing inspection and verification technologies and records available to each of the current constituent agencies.
- Immediate technical capability to communicate securely with all necessary UK agencies and with commercial carriers, such as air and sea lines and rail companies.
- Immediate technical capability to access information from international bodies such as Interpol and Europol and to exchange information with border protection agencies in other relevant countries.
- Enhanced technologies for detecting and searching for illegal goods, especially in dealing with container traffic and air freight.

Cross-border movement of people.
- Earliest possible access to the new capabilities of the e-Borders system and the new National Police Database.
- Strategy to integrate urgently needed new biometric verification and identification capabilities, now being tested, into operational use.
- A strategy to integrate new behavioural analysis methods, now being tested, into operational use.

Monitoring the movement of hazardous materials.
- Enhancement and systems integration of sensor systems to detect hazardous materials.

Trafficking through coastal and land border areas.
- A nationally agreed strategy to identify coastal and land border areas most at risk from illegal trafficking of people and goods and plans to strengthen national defences against such activity by use of technologies such as radar, detection and sensor systems, integrated with the BPS or military capability to deploy a response to deal with threats.

The Way Forward

Experience has shown that, beyond identification of strategic areas of technology interest, as set out above, it is essential that a full needs analysis and operational requirement identification is carried out with the potential user communities in each of the agencies which would form the new BPS. Professional staff from the National Policing Improvement Agency, HOSDB and perhaps other scientific and technical agencies such as the Forensic Science Service should be tasked to conduct such work with each of the contributing agencies, consisting of:

- A needs analysis to define the capabilities and operational requirements of the users.
- Analysis of the results.
- Identification of the gaps/shortfalls between existing technology systems and the identified operational requirements which could be met by the following.
  » Expansion of existing capabilities (such as Airwave,[34] Semaphore[35]).
  » Systems under development (such as e-Borders,[36] Police National Database European Biometrics project). Systems already in use in other countries who have invested in relevant technologies which could be acquired or adapted for UK use. (The US, Australia and others).
  » New, emerging, technologies which are likely to become available within the medium term and which should make a major impact on meeting requirements.

Proposal 7:

Substantial funding investment will be needed both initially and year on year, to ensure that the BPS has the vital technology to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency in meeting existing and emerging threats.

The BPS would need to be equipped and trained in the full range of currently available technology and funded to enable maintenance of technology and development of training.

Both legacy and new ICT systems would need to be fully integrated across the BPS. A full needs analysis and operational requirement identification would be carried out across the current agencies which would form the BPS and a dedicated technology horizon scanning group would be tasked to identify new technologies and equipment which could increase effectiveness and efficiency, and to identify new technology threats.

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34 Airwave is a secure digital radio network used by the UK's emergency and public safety services.
35 Project Semaphore uses on-line technology and advance passenger information provided by airlines before arrival to screen and record individuals as they enter and leave the UK, providing a comprehensive passenger movement audit trail.
36 The full implementation of the e-Borders programme will assist greatly in this regard. Project Semaphore which is trialling the computerised systems for e-Borders prior to full implementation in 2009 uses technology and databases to screen people before they travel to the UK. It has already looked at 29 million passengers and assisted with over 1,000 arrests from 13,000 border alerts.
Using this system, those trying to gain entry into the UK, having previously been refused entry, will be identified. The sharing of data internationally will expose those involved in organised crime or believed to pose a risk to the UK because of terrorist links.
The ability to accurately record details of everyone entering or leaving the UK will have enormous benefits and is long overdue. It will make it more difficult for those wanted for crimes by the police in the UK or elsewhere to leave or enter the country in order to avoid justice or commit further crimes.
Such systems will help address the problem of overstayers; those remaining in the UK without a visa or when the visa has expired. They will assist the BPS in tracing over stayers, organising their safe detention and effect their removal from the UK.

10. Legislative and Constitutional Matters

10.1. Legislative Implications

The creation of a BPS would require an Act of Parliament as was required for the creation of SOCA through the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. In the case of SOCA, the legislation set out the agency's constitution, functions, general powers (and those common powers of its staff to stop, search and detain) and its relationship with ministers. This could be used as a template for the creation of the BPS.

The timescales for legislation may also be used for comparative purposes. The white paper for SOCA, 'One Step Ahead, a 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Criminals,' was published on 29 March 2004.[37] The SOCA Bill received Royal Assent on 7 April 2005 and the Agency itself was launched on 1 April 2006.

The formation of SOCA provides a useful case study on the legislative implications of a new organisation. For further details, see Appendix C.

Intelligence and Information Sharing

The current legal framework for sharing information between agencies is complex. The more agencies involved, the more complex it becomes. Information can be passed between agencies via statutory powers called 'gateways.'[38] An example of a statutory gateway is section 115 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Clearly, the creation of a single agency responsible for border control and protection would simplify any data sharing arrangements.

Proposal 8:
The creation of the BPS would require an Act of Parliament as was required for the creation of SOCA through the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. In the case of SOCA, legislation set out the Agency's constitution, functions, general powers (and those common powers of its staff to stop, search and detain) and its relationship with ministers. This could be used as a template for the creation of the BPS.

10.2. Constitutional Implications

Two sets of jurisdictional issues exist in the management of border security functions. First, the differing legal frameworks operating within the nations comprising the UK; second, the boundaries of legal responsibility between the agencies currently delivering border security.

Both HMRC and the BIA have pan-UK powers and responsibilities whereas (except in relation to terrorism) the police services operate under different frameworks in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It would be desirable to deliver border security policing functions under a single UK jurisdictional framework, achieved as follows:

- **Scotland** - The creation of a BPS with legitimate authority in Scotland would be achieved through Westminster's reserved powers.

- **Northern Ireland** - Should the policing and criminal justice functions currently held by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland transfer to the Northern Ireland Executive in the future, it is likely the Executive would assume responsibility for the BPS. In practical terms, this is likely to give the Executive the power to contribute to the strategic priorities and the annual plan of the BPS, in particular on how it exercised its functions in Northern Ireland.

Consideration needs to be given to the position of the Channel Islands and Isle of Man, which are not part of the United Kingdom, but whose services work closely with their mainland counterparts. The new force should establish a Memorandum of Understanding with each of the Crown Dependencies to define the basis of the relationship.

At a more detailed level, there is a requirement for clarity on the extent of responsibility of the BPS both geographically and by type of activity. For instance, as is the case with railways, statutory provision could be made to specify the physical limit of the new Service's responsibility around a port. This principle could be extended to the border. It may also be necessary to set a threshold for inclusion or exclusion within the remit of the BPS of small ports located away from the border (such as airstrips) and for major or critical incident handover.

Proposal 9:
At a more detailed level, there is a requirement for clarity on the extent of responsibility of the BPS both geographically and by type of activity.

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37 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-organised-crime-300704/organised-crime-300704?view=Binary
38 Legislative provisions that allow data to be shared between departments/agencies.

11. Appendices

11.1. Appendix A: Lessons learned from foreign border security forces

Introduction

The establishment of border security forces or agencies throughout the world has thrown up several different models. These include:

- Agencies with full responsibility for security of the border but which form part of a larger entity with a wider overall remit.
- Integrated 'one-stop' agencies that carry out the range of border security activities which previously had been carried out by separate agencies.
- Agencies that handle immigration and other security issues at the border, which work alongside other agencies sharing responsibility for border security.

Perhaps a unique example of the first category is the United States where Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Canada's Border Service Agency (CBSA) is a rare example of the second category albeit the Royal Canadian Mounted Police maintains a presence at certain border points.

There are numerous examples, including the United Kingdom, of the third model. An emerging model, for example Finland and France, is agencies collaborating to share responsibility for specific functions so that where only one agency maintains a presence at a particular border point that agency fulfils the role which another agency would otherwise provide.

Inevitably where change has been made the countries involved had both positive and negative experiences. In reviewing those experiences care has to be taken in placing too much weight on views which might prove subjective. Nevertheless a review of the literature and exchanges with those having personal experience of establishing dedicated border security services has helped to identify a number of key issues which would need to be either utilised or avoided.

United States

The US has some of the world's largest and most complex borders. Its land borders are 7,473 miles long and its sea boundaries are 12,380 miles long. It is heavily reliant on its sea, air and land borders to maintain its position as the world's largest economy.[39] The USA is also heavily reliant on cross border movement to facilitate its large (and growing) energy demands.[40] Its northern border with Canada is 5,525 miles long and has 84 manned points of entry and numerous unmanned crossing points. Over 250,000 people enter the US daily through these manned points of entry (POE). The value of trade crossing this border is in excess of £188 billion/annum. The US' Southern border with Mexico is 1,933 miles long and has 25 manned POEs. Some 800,000 people legitimately cross this border daily and the value of trade crossing this border is around £112 billion per annum.

Both the northern and southern borders experience significant illicit movement from economic migrants, narcotics smugglers and other criminal groups. The USA has 143 international sea POEs. These POEs are the primary route for imports and exports which have a combined value of £1.47 trillion/annum. In addition to these land and sea POEs the USA has 216 international airports. These airports accepted 46.1 million international visitors in 2004 that in turn spent £47.6 billion.[41]

Prior to the events of 9/11, responsibility for the control of borders fell to a number of different federal departments. These departments' responsibilities often conflicted or overlapped and had no unified reporting hierarchy. They included the Department of Justice (immigration), the Department of Treasury (customs), the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Transportation.

The Homeland Security Act (2002)[42] integrated the majority of federal agencies involved in border activities into a single entity, the DHS. DHS is responsible for all internal US security issues and includes organisations such as the Secret Service and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The US Coast Guard remains as a standalone division within the DHS. The other agencies within DHS with specific border control responsibilities report to the Directorate of Border and Transport Security (BTS). The BTS consists of three main agencies: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

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39 US GDP is $13 trillion (2006)
40 13.15 m barrels of oil/day, 120.6 bn m³ gas/year
41 Source: The Travel Industry Association of America/US Department of Commerce.
42 http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/

The DHS employs around 183,000 people. Of these TSA employs 43,000 personnel, CBP employs in excess of 40,000 (including the US Border Patrol); ICE around 18,000 and the US Coast Guard around 89,000 (including part time staff and reservists).

Canada

The CBSA was established in December 2003.[43] CBSA brought together related functions and staff that were formerly part of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. This consolidation of agencies came as a response to 9/11 and was driven by a desire to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

The workforce comprises approximately 13,000 employees, including over 7,200 uniformed officers. CBSA provides services at some 1,200 points across Canada and 39 international locations. This includes 119 land border crossings. CBSA operates on a 24/7 basis at 61 land border crossings and nine international airports. CBSA officers also perform marine operations at three major ports in Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver and process and examine international mail at three mail centres located in Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal.

Each day, some 266,000 travellers, 18,000 trucks and 77,900 courier shipments enter Canada, which results in average of $9.1million in import duties $63.7 million in Goods and Services Tax/Harmonized Sales Tax each day. The value of cross-border trade with the U.S. alone averages $1.9 billion a day.

Germany

The German Federal Police (Bundespolizei)[44] has, among other responsibilities, a specific remit for the protection of the external borders. Its activities in this domain include surveillance of the land, sea and air borders, controlling cross-border traffic (including checking travel documents and the right of individuals to cross the border) and search measures.

There is a particular focus on preventing the illegal entry of individuals, trans-border crime, vehicle trafficking, narcotics criminality and border-related document abuse. The Bundespolizei also has duties relating to asylum procedures.

The activities of the Bundespolizei are complemented by the Federal Customs Administration (and the Water Police of the States of Bremen and Hamburg in their respective sea ports) which also carry out border police duties.

The Bundespolizei has about 40,000 employees, including 30,000 police officers. Of these, about 21,000 deal with tasks concerning border protection.

Singapore

The Singapore Immigration & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) was formed on 1 April 2003, with the merger of Singapore Immigration & Registration (SIR) and Customs & Excise Department (CED). ICA has brought together the immigration control and clearance performed by the former SIR and enforcement work performed by the former CED at the various checkpoints. The ICA is responsible for the security of Singapore's borders (immigration and the entry of people and cargo through land, sea and air checkpoints) and, as with the police, is an agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The amalgamation which created the ICA did not include the policing functions and the Singapore Police Force maintains Airport and Coast Guard Departments which work in close collaboration with the ICA.

Finland

The Finnish Border Guard (Rajavartiolaitos) is a military organisation noted for its skills in patrolling the vast forest-covered borders with Russia, its efficiency in capturing those who attempt to cross into Finland illegally and the fact that it is the only state authority in large parts of Lapland.

It reports directly to the Ministry of the Interior, thereby providing direct accountability and an efficient chain of command. The Guard is comprised of some 3,600 personnel, including 500 conscripts, special forces units and aviation, coastguard and marine capabilities. In the event of armed conflict, the guard will be incorporated into the Finnish Defence Forces.

Its main duties are:
- Guarding the land borders and territorial waters of Finland.
- Passport control at border crossing points, airports and ports.
- Rescue operations (at sea & remote areas of Lapland).
- Investigation of border security related crimes.
- Customs control in those border crossing points lacking customs authorities.

The border guard has limited police powers during criminal investigations. However, the power to arrest a person is only given to the commanding officer of a detachment.

43 http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/C-1.4
44 Previously known as the Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS))

Common border security issues

The following issues have all been raised during the creation of border agencies in other nations. While several of these points have been raised elsewhere in this report, their importance and the fact they were deemed important by other nations, justifies their reiteration.

Consolidating existing organisations into a single body

Different results have been achieved in terms of handling inter-agency rivalry during merger processes. In some cases, this has been achieved without apparent disruption; in others difficulties of a historic and cultural nature may have had a negative impact. Translating this to the UK scenario, considerable emphasis has been placed on inter-agency collaboration which will, in some way, help the transition process. Nevertheless, care will need to be taken with welding together organisations with long histories, different cultures and different functions.

Leadership/Decision Making

A clear chain of command, with a readiness to assume responsibility and to make decisions is a necessity.

Accountability

Direct reporting to the appropriate minister (or management authority) provides effective accountability.

Partnerships

Close partnerships need to be developed with other government departments and industry in order to ensure the smooth operation of any cross-departmental issues.

Bureaucracy

Where possible, excessive bureaucracy, waste and ineffectiveness need to be curtailed and it would be important to study (and re-engineer as appropriate) existing administrative processes to ensure that they support operational activities in an efficient way.

Powers

In at least one foreign example, while the amalgamation of different agencies into one new one succeeded, it failed to eradicate many of the problems that had existed before. As such, the agency lacks the power to carry out many simple duties. The BPS must have a clearly defined mandate and the ability to be able to meet all of its requirements.

Technology

There needs to be a rationalisation of ICT projects to define the relationship of ongoing projects with the impact on other initiatives. There is a need to produce demonstrable results that illustrate the efficiency and effectiveness of systems used.

Intelligence

Ports, airports and border crossings of all sizes and scales of traffic pose a potential threat to security. Not all are currently policed on a 24 hour basis yet any of them could serve as the point of entry or departure for a prospective or wanted terrorist or other criminal. The experience of other countries shows the need to keep all vulnerable points in the loop when it comes to sharing intelligence assessments and other key information.

There needs to be such confidence in the BPS that other agencies are comfortable in sharing information and intelligence to an extent that would achieve the best effect. Otherwise, fear of compromise can encourage an unconstructive protectionist culture. The experience of other countries shows that the recruitment process for the BPS would require a focus on unquestionable integrity and impeccable reputation if its intelligence function is to operate effectively.

Public Confidence

It is important to create public confidence that the UK's borders are as secure as they can reasonably be. This would help in the deterrent factor and help minimise the penetration of entry points by criminals or illegal immigrants.

11.2. Appendix B: Existing Agencies

Border and Immigration Agency (BIA)

Role

Formerly the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate, the BIA started work in April 2007 under the new title with its officers wearing uniforms. Its first year is as a 'shadow agency', transitioning to full status in April 2008. The BIA is an executive agency of the Home Office. It has responsibility for managing immigration control in the UK in the following areas.

- Immigration - consider applications from people who want to come to the UK to work, do business, visit relatives, take a holiday or settle permanently.
- Nationality - decide applications from people who want to become British citizens.
- Asylum - responsible for processing all claims for asylum and asylum support made in the UK and for removing people from the UK when their claims fail.
- Border control and entry clearance - Last year immigration officers facilitated the arrival of nearly 90 million passengers in the UK, more than 12 million of whom were subject to immigration control. The BIA and the FCO runs UKvisas.

- Enforcement – As well as being responsible for immigration policy, BIA enforces the immigrations laws. The BIA works closely with the authorities in other countries, gathering intelligence and mounting operations.
- Appeals – BIA shares targets with the Department for Constitutional Affairs, the department with responsibility with the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal for the fast and efficient processing of appeals against immigration decisions.

The BIA currently comprises two principal operational arms: Border Control (BC) and Enforcement. The BC arm is primarily present to facilitate the legal entry of those wishing to enter the UK and is the most visible face of BIA, its staff manning the immigration desks at ports of entry and at the controls in France and Belgium. It also includes the Airline Liaison Officer (ALO) network of BC staff working with passenger carriers abroad, offering advice on the acceptability of documents presented for travel. Recent policy from the BIA refers to the development of the ALO network, to build a global system of border security advisors but in reality their remit is limited to advice to airlines on UK entry requirements and fraudulent identity documents.

Staff

There are some 21,237 staff within the BIA. The breakdown by department is shown below:

Department	FTE's 2007/8
BC	4,600
UKvisas	2,337
Asylum	3,800
Enforcement	3,900
Migration	4,100
Corporate Services	2,500
Total	21,237

The 4,600 BC staff are deployed across 37 UK ports of entry managed within eight operational commands. The 37 ports are the international ports of entry with the actual coverage within each being based on a single agency risk assessment. Only 19 ports have 24 hour border control coverage. This leads to a situation where illegal entrants are identified by other agencies at ports where there is or may be no coverage. While BIA policy is that these should be dealt with by Enforcement in practice these are often unavailable and the burden falls to the police. BIA border control regions/commands do not coincide with either the police or HMRC regions.

In terms of enforcement, the police service, by default, has found itself dealing with a significant proportion of offences of illegal entry and residence. At the start of this decade and following representations from the police service, BIA accepted responsibility for this level of immigration crime. However, the BIA was unable to meet this operational requirement on its own and has since sought to discharge this responsibility by working in partnership with the police service and funding joint police and BIA enforcement teams co-ordinated by seconded police managers.

While operating within individual force boundaries, these teams are configured at Level 2[45] on the ACPO regional model and in total comprise 600 BIA staff and 170 (BIA funded) police officers. Deployment has largely been based on the 'Tipping the Balance'[46] asylum seeker target. This has the effect of limiting effort against those of illegal status more generally, thereby frequently failing to address local needs. To date this partnership arrangement has been predicated on the strategic intention that, in time, BIA Enforcement develops its own capability and capacity and becomes self-sufficient.

Corporate Support

There are currently some 2,500 staff engaged in corporate support services within the BIA. There is a plan to move transactional back office functions to the Home Office shared services programme in February 2008. The BIA represents 90% of the client base of the existing programme.

There is a separate corporate services transformation programme looking to streamline other core functions including HR and finance. Within the BIA, corporate procurement support is provided by a central procurement team (the Commercial Support Team) who take the lead on:
- Tendering new contracts.
- Guidance.
- Governance.
- Government Procurement Card.

In addition, the agency has a number of professional procurement teams strategically positioned across the business to provide specialist support to major projects and programmes and in business critical operational areas. The leads in each of these areas come together to form the agency's Senior Commercial Managers' Forum which is responsible for ensuring commercial excellence across the business and for the successful delivery of the agency's commercial strategy.

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45 Level 1: Crime localised and confined to a Basic Command Unit (BCU) or Force - in the case of the BPS, contained within/nearby a port.
Level 2: Cross-border issues affecting more than one BCU within a force or affecting another force or regional crime activity and usually requiring additional resources.
Level 3: This relates to crimes committed on a national scale and which may transcend international boundaries.
46 The government's target which states that the number of refused asylum seekers removed each month should exceed the number of new asylum applicants.

The BIA has a significant dependency on external suppliers in delivering its core business services. This includes the detention estate, asylum seeker accommodation and cash support and processing payments for applications made in the UK and overseas. These bought-in goods and services collectively cost the BIA £1 billion per annum.

Salary Structure

Civil service pay scales, terms and conditions apply but vary depending on the grade and location of the post. BIA has a London and national pay scale and all new entrants start on the minimum.

In addition, London posts attract a London Location Allowance and any shift working posts attract Shift Disturbance Allowance. Other allowances may be payable depending on the particular nature and location of the post.

There are four trade unions that represent the majority of the agency's staff:
• Public and Commercial Services.
• First Division Association.
• Immigration Service Union.
• Prospect.

Estate

The BIA is organised into six regions (North West, North East Yorkshire and Humberside, London and the South East, Scotland and Northern Ireland, East and West Midlands and the East of England, Wales and the South West) that do not correspond with ACPO policing regions.

This is supported by a significant estate with in excess of 200 buildings, all leased, and many where the BIA is collocated with several other agencies.

The BIA has offices in London, Liverpool and Sheffield and smaller ones around the country. There are public enquiry offices in Croydon, Birmingham, Liverpool and Glasgow. Several thousand staff work as immigration officers at air and seaports nationwide ranging from Heathrow, Gatwick and Dover to other smaller locations throughout Britain. Because the BIA is new, its future estates strategy is still in development.

There are ten immigration removal centres in UK managed by HM Prison Service and private companies on behalf of the BIA. Additionally, they have several hundred staff based in UK embassies and high commissions and consulates overseas.

HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)

Role

HMRC was formed on the 18 April 2005, following the merger of Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise departments.

Apart from its purely fiscal responsibilities HMRC is responsible, under the overall direction of Treasury ministers for taking the front line role in protecting society from illegal imports of drugs, alcohol and tobacco smuggling and tax fraud.

As part of the transition to HMRC, the new agency shed a number of its intelligence and investigation functions relating to drugs and organised crime to SOCA. In contrast to the police services and BIA, HMRC activity at the UK's border is primarily focussed on the movement of goods rather than people or criminal networks.

The Enforcement and Compliance group of HMRC has responsibility for its border activity. This is discharged through the Detection Business Directorate, which comprises four geographic regions with a central headquarters. These do not correlate with the BIA BC or police ACPO regions. The directorate's 5,500 staff cover both the frontier and inland functions in relation to the detection and disruption of:
• The importation of illegal drugs.
• Excise and other fiscal fraud.
• The importation of restricted and prohibited goods.
• Counter-proliferation (border enforcement only) including Project Cyclamen.[47]

HMRC also has a significant role in the facilitation of goods being exported from the UK, which is important to the economy.

Notwithstanding their stated remit, the deployment and activities of HMRC staff, are heavily influenced by the organisation's Public Service Agreement (PSA) objectives and targets. Of three PSA objectives, one includes the strengthening of frontier protection against threats to security of the UK. This has no associated performance measures whereas each of the other objectives - linked to excise matters - has a range of performance targets. The consequence is that HMRC effort at the border is primarily focussed on excise and duty issues. This has the tendency to limit HMRC's ability to engage in joint agency risk management and operational activities in relation to the border.

Staff

HMRC employs some 85,000 staff. Of these 8,000 work in detection, investigation and intelligence matters.

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47 The installation of radiation detection devices at UK ports of entry by HMRC.

Corporate Support

The organisation relies on centralised HRMC services. There is no discrete provision for border security.

Salary Structure

The civil service terms and conditions apply.

There are three trade unions that represent the majority of HMRC staff:
- Public and Commercial Services.
- First Division Association.
- Association of Revenue and Customs for senior staff/managers.

Estate

HMRC is based at 290 locations including 25 ports (of which five have 24 hour coverage) and they regularly visit ten further ports. This leaves a significant number of ports with infrequent or no coverage.

The estate is currently the subject of a number of reviews which will not be completed until approximately 2010. The staff involved in border protection are regularly deployed at about 10-15 airports throughout the UK. They have a 'mobile strike force' capability to cover other locations.

The accomododation is mainly their own although there is some co-location with other agencies.

The Police Service

Role

There are 52 geographic police services distributed across the three separate legal jurisdictions of England & Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. In addition we must encompass the element of the BTP responsible for policing the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. Furthermore, the Island Dependencies of Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man subscribe to the work of the National Ports Office and have a representative on the ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters [TAM]) Committee.

With the exception of where private police forces are present, the policing of seaports and airports and the border is the full responsibility of the geographic force chief constable within whose area the port or border is located. These same chief constables also have responsibility for the management of inland drugs and immigration crime that is not within the remit of BIA or SOCA.

Policing at the border and ports can be described as falling into three broad categories: intelligence, protective security

and general policing (including the management of major and critical incidents).

Intelligence

The intelligence function at the border and ports is the role of Special Branch officers whose responsibilities are set out in the Home Office Guidelines for Special Branch. They cover:
- Counter terrorism.
- Serious organised crime.
- Child abduction.

Counter Terrorism

The counter terrorism function is primarily aimed at preventing and monitoring the passage of terrorists through ports and border controls. The legislative powers conferred under Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 provide a platform to prevent, detect and deter terrorists from entering or leaving the UK through manned ports. Special Branch officers collect valuable intelligence from those of interest travelling through ports in fulfilment of the requirements set out in the National Police Counter-Terrorism & Extremism Strategic Assessment & Control Strategy and of the Security and Intelligence Agencies. During the year 2006/2007 11,443 national security intelligence reports and 10,234 crime intelligence reports were submitted from Special Branch officers at UK ports.

Serious and Organised Crime

Special Branch responsibility for serious and organised crime was accepted in the mid 1990s when it was identified as a threat to national security and was included within the remit of the Security Service. Special Branch officers at ports have since identified and reported upon the movements of criminals. Given the recent decision of the Security Service to cease work on this objective, it is questionable whether this function should remain within the remit of Special Branch. It nevertheless needs to be discharged by some aspect of policing.

Child Abduction

The responsibility for child abduction would appear to derive from the fact that Special Branch officers have traditionally been the police border control presence at ports and are in a position to intercept those children being illegally removed from the UK. It is questionable whether this function should remain within the remit of Special Branch. It nevertheless needs to be discharged by some aspect of policing especially given that additional demands may now come from the introduction of the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre.

Protective Security

Protective security is a specialist uniformed policing function at ports that relates to the protection of the port infrastructure and operation from threats posed by terrorism and serious and

organised crime. This may involve an overt armed presence in ports and perimeter patrolling including the policing of the Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) footprint.

General Policing

Beyond protective security, there is a uniformed general policing duty for the management of Level 1[48] crime and disorder that may arise within a Port environment. This may range from the full time presence of significant police resources at major ports to coverage by the local force basic command unit. This general policing duty includes addressing volume crime as well as the co-ordination and management of critical and major incident response at ports in partnership with port authorities and other emergency services.

Staff

The 1,424 Special Branch posts are funded by the Home Office for ports duties in England and Wales (at a cost of £212 million) although not all are appointed to this role within respective forces. There are approximately 120 Special Branch officers deployed at ports in Scotland and 30 in Northern Ireland. Each is employed and directed by the chief constable within whose geographic area the port is located. Additionally, another 1,200 uniformed officers are currently deployed to UK airports at an annual cost of £71.3 million. The National Ports Office is the main Special Branch ports office of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) located at London Heathrow. It has a staff of seven police officers and four civilian support officers funded through the MPS Dedicated Security Post (DSP) allocation. The office performs a number of national functions and provides a 24 hour contact facility.

The National Ports Analysis Centre is located within Merseyside Police Headquarters and provides a range of intelligence products in support of ports policing, with the focus on counter terrorism. The current staff of 23 is a combination of police and support staff funded through the Merseyside DSP allocation.

Corporate Support

If the police resources are paid for by the port authority, they will also provide administrative support. For Special Branch officers, some support is provided through the DSP system. Otherwise it is the responsibility of the local host Force. There is also an element of collaborative working via the regional Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU)/Regional Intelligence Unit (RIU) structure.

Salary Structure

Police and police staff (local government) terms and conditions apply but with variations between individual Forces. There is no commonality with other relevant agencies.

Estate

There are approximately 3,200 ports in the UK (including all air, sea and rail ports). In total Special Branch officers are deployed at 57 of them, of which seven have 24 hour cover. Although fewer in number than BIA and HMRC staff, Special Branch has the widest coverage of ports throughout the UK.

Uniformed officers are permanently present at nine 'designated' airports in the UK where the port authorities contribute towards the costs for protective security and general policing. At all other non-designated airports and seaports the policing response to any identified threat from terrorism and crime is a matter for the local chief constable, as is the management of the general policing duty.

Estate provision is largely within that of the host or parent police force with a limited amount of office accommodation provided at ports.

In terms of CTU/RIU accommodation, there are contrasting requirements across the estate. For example, Leeds and East Midlands are benefiting from having acquired new buildings, while Birmingham, London and Manchester have to juggle between existing sites with the aspiration to move to new premises.

There is an overarching MOU under which port authorities are expected to provide facilities for Special Branch officers. There is a current debate about who should bear the responsibility for these costs. Agencies are encouraged to share accommodation wherever possible.

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)

Role

SOCA assumed its statutory functions on 1 April 2006. It brought together staff from the National Crime Squad (NCS) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS); staff and resources from HMRC to support the transfer to SOCA of certain work on drugs trafficking and associated criminal finance; and some of those dealing with organised immigration crime in the UK Immigration Service. To this, SOCA added a number of individuals with other backgrounds to widen the skills available.

The SOCA board has determined five generic priorities to guide SOCA's business, as follows.
- To build knowledge and understanding of serious and organised crime, the harm it causes, and of the effectiveness of different responses.
- To increase the amount of criminal assets recovered and increase the proportion of cases in which the proceeds of crime are pursued.

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48 Level 1: Crime localised and confined to a BCU or Force - in the case of the BPS, contained within/nearby a port.

- To increase the risk to serious organised criminals operating in the UK, through proven investigation capabilities and in new ways.
- To collaborate with partners in the UK and internationally to maximise efforts to reduce harm.
- To provide agreed levels of high quality support to SOCA's operational partners and, as appropriate, seek their support in return.

The SOCA board has determined that SOCA should aim to apportion its operational effort broadly as follows against the main threat sectors:
- Drugs trafficking, primarily Class A - 40%
- Organised immigration crime - 25%
- Individual and private sector fraud - 10%
- Other organised crime - 15%

Much of this effort will be deployed working with or supporting operational partners. The board has further determined that SOCA should aim to devote broadly 10% of its operational effort to supporting law enforcement partners when these objectives would not otherwise be SOCA priorities. SOCA has a particular duty to collaborate with partners in the UK and internationally to maximise efforts to reduce harm. In the case of the border this includes embedding a limited number of staff within the intelligence infrastructure operated at some major international ports. They do not, however, have any direct frontline presence or involvement in the management of border controls.

SOCA has 20 work programmes, one specifically focused on borders. Its aim is to increase the risks for serious organised criminals moving people, goods, and money/assets into and out of the UK and prevent circumvention of UK border controls. However, many of the others have a direct link to border security, such as people trafficking.

Structure and Resources
SOCA is divided into four directorates. Each specialises in particular aspects of the work.

In practice, staff from the three operational directorates may come together in multidisciplinary teams to tackle particular threats. The directorates are:
- **Intelligence** - gathers and assesses information and uses it to counter organised crime. The directorate ensures that all activity is knowledge led and directed towards agreed priorities, and that SOCA builds strong working relationships with other agencies, including other law enforcement partners.
- **Enforcement** - provides a flexible operational response to threats, building high quality criminal cases against key targets and organised crime groups.

- **Intervention** - focuses on attacking criminal assets and working with the private sector. Intervention also houses the international arm of SOCA, which is a particularly important element of the business because most of the organised crime threats involve activity in other jurisdictions.

SOCA also has a Corporate Support department that supports, facilitates and develops its capabilities.

Exercise of functions in Scotland and Northern Ireland

SOCA has a UK-wide remit, but some matters are devolved to Scotland in keeping with differing laws. In Northern Ireland the various law-enforcement agencies, including SOCA, have come together to tackle organised crime through the Organised Crime Taskforce.

To provide an effective and coherent response to organised crime threats, SOCA has agreed to work in partnership with the agencies in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
In this context, SOCA:
- Provides intelligence support to law enforcement agencies.
- Conducts a range of intervention activity against organised criminals.
- Runs enforcement operations with other agencies such as the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency.
- Facilitates international law enforcement.

Staff
SOCA has 4,400 staff. None are specifically employed on border security matters apart from a small number based at airports. Staff are allocated to the specific SOCA functions described above.

Apart from several dedicated officers at Heathrow and Gatwick they have no permanent border presence.

SOCA operates from some 50 sites in the UK, as well as a number of overseas locations. Economies are anticipated from the rationalisation of the SOCA estate and ICT infrastructure as SOCA develops larger hubs across the UK to support its business model.

SOCA has approximately 40 offices throughout England, Wales and Northern Ireland. They are largely a mix of old NCIS and NCS offices with their HQ in London.

Salary Structure
SOCA has its own pay, grades, terms and conditions structures.

There are two main trade unions:
- UNISON.
- First Division Association.

11.3. Appendix C: Legislative Implications – SOCA case study

The specifics of the legislation for the legitimacy of SOCA, jurisdiction, and authority to gather information and implement operations were left open to parliamentary and public debate. The then Home Secretary informed the public that the first step was to establish a task force to consider the most appropriate form of governance for the single agency. The task force reported back that the SOCA would comprise representatives of each constituent organisation, would consult widely with stakeholders, and would report to ministers within a month. He also said that parliament's approval for the necessary legislative changes to create the new agency would be sought at the earliest legislative opportunity. This announcement and the proposed process were unique statements of open democracy. Never before, in the UK or even in most other democracies, had the establishment of an agency meant to be involved intensely in intelligence gathering and dissemination, and its role, authority, jurisdiction, and legitimacy, been made known publicly prior to its creation.

The first hurdle of reform and transformation had been overcome by July 2004. The proposed constituent agencies that would be amalgamated into SOCA's new organisational structure had in this case participated and consented to the proposals of the working group task force for the creation of the new agency.

In terms of accountability, the legislation noted that scrutiny would be conducted through the House of Commons in the normal way. Unlike the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Home Affairs Committee would have open access and scrutiny. SOCA staffs would be subject to the scrutiny and appeal mechanisms of the IPCC in England and Wales. In general terms, the IPCC would handle complaints against SOCA officers in the same manner as complaints against police officers or officers of HMRC. The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland would do so in that region. In Scotland, the responsibility would be with the Lord Advocate. A bespoke inspection regime for SOCA was to be provided through HMIC. The Cabinet Committee on Organised Crime would be responsible for determining overall priorities. SOCA would be required to submit an annual report. But SOCA would be exempt from freedom of information requirements, as it should to be able to protect information provided to it from various sources (both within the UK and abroad).

During the parliamentary process Sir Stephen Lander said: "This is one of the biggest changes in the intelligence functions of UK law enforcement since the 1960s. The Serious Organised Crime Agency presents a real opportunity to make a difference and tackle crimes that affect every man, woman and child in this country". Clearly, he was bringing public attention to the wording of the legislation, as it was not solely inclined towards organisational transformation. Instead, wording was aimed at a radical reform in consideration of the context and content of the threats and vulnerabilities facing British society.

Whilst any such process must be 'bespoke' the legislative process that led to the creation of SOCA is solid benchmark for the creation of the BPS.

12. Glossary

Airline Liaison Officers (ALO)
The network of BIA border control staff working with passenger carriers abroad, offering advice on the acceptability of documents presented for travel.

Airline Operators Association (AOA)
The trade association representing the interests of 70 British airports.

BAA
A private company that owns and operates seven British airports –Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Southampton.

Board of Airline Representatives in the UK (BAR UK)
The industry association for scheduled airlines undertaking business in the UK.

British Air Transport Association (BATA)
The trade association for UK-registered airlines.

British Ports Association (BPA)
The trade association representing the interests of 89 British ports.

Border and Immigration Agency (BIA)
Government agency tasked with managing immigration and maintaining the UK's border security.

Borderpol
International association of senior border policing leaders.

Border Protection Service (BPS)
The Border Security Advisory Committee's proposed new border security force for the UK.

Bundespolizei
German federal police.

British Transport Police (BTP)
The national police force for the railways providing a policing service to rail operators, their staff and passengers throughout England, Wales and Scotland. The force is also responsible for policing the London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, the Glasgow Subway, the Midlands Metro tram system and Croydon Tramlink.

Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA)
Canadian border security agency

Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
The UK's independent aviation regulator.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
US government organisation which brought together several border security agencies including the Transport and Security Administration, US Customs and Border Protection, US Citizens and Immigration services and the US Coast Guard, under one command.

e-Borders
UK technology programme to join up and modernise current systems. Itended to provide enhanced information on passengers and their movements.

European Border Guard
Proposed, but as yet unrealised, border security force, as envisaged by the European Commission.

Europol
European Law Enforcement Organisation aimed at improving the effectiveness and co-operation of EU member states in preventing and combating terrorism, drug trafficking and other serious forms of international organised crime.

Forensic Science Service (FSS)
Private company supplying forensic science services to police forces in England and Wales.

Frontex
EU agency based in Warsaw, tasked to coordinate operational co-operation on border security between member states.

HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)
Promotes the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through inspection of police organisations and functions.

HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
Responsible for collecting taxes, administration of various benefits and the enforcement of border and frontier protection. Created following amalgamation of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise.

Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB)
Provides science and technology advice, and research and development, for the Home Office, the police service and other government departments.

Identity and Passport Service (IPS)

Provides passport services to UK citizens. Currently scheduled to part-manage the National Identity Scheme (ID cards) for British and Irish nationalresident in the UK.

Intelligence Liaison Officers (ILO)

Former immigration staff now working abroad under the management of SOCA.

Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)

The UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism. It is based in the Security Service's headquarters at Thames House.

Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) and HM Coastguard

The MCA is responsible throughout the UK for implementing the Government's maritime safety policy. That includes co-ordinating search and rescue at sea through HM Coastguard, and checking that ships meet UK and international safety rules.

Rajavartiolaitos

Finnish border security force

Schengen Agreement

Accord between European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) to end border checkpoints and controls between participating nations.

Schengen Information System (SIS) I and II

Information system used to enforce the Schengen treaty. It is a database that contains information on certain persons and property. SIS II is an upgrade of its predecessor and will include access to biometric information.

Semaphore

IT system using on-line technology and advance passenger information provided by airlines before arrival to screen and record individuals as they enter and leave the UK, providing a comprehensive passenger movement audit trail.

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)

National police unit responsible for undertaking pro-active operations against serious and organised crime.

Singapore Immigration and Checkpoints Authority

Singapore's border security agency.

TRANSEC

The Department of Transport's division tasked with protecting the travelling public, transport facilities and those employed in the transport industries.

United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC)

Collects intelligence on trafficking, co-ordinates the law enforcement response and works alongside other agencies and non governmental organisations in combating human trafficking.

UKvisas

Joint Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office unit which runs the UK's visa service through British diplomatic Posts overseas.

Vehicle and Operator Services Agency

A division of the Department of Transport formed following the merger of the Vehicle Inspectorate and the Traffic Area Network division of the Department for Transport. VOSA provides a range of licensing, testing and enforcement services.

World Customs Organisation (WCO)

Intergovernmental organisation focused on customs matters. Develops global standards and harmonises procedures, helps facilitate international trade, helps enhance customs enforcement and compliant activities and anti-counterfeiting and piracy initiatives.