Quentin Langley: How could a referendum on Europe be won?

Quentin Langley is a Senior Lecturer in Marketing at the University of Bedfordshire Business School. He has previously taught PR and Political Communications at London Metropolitan and Cardiff Universities. Follow Quentin on Twitter.

Polling suggested the 1975 referendum on Europe would be close, but the result was a 2:1 victory for “yes”. In 1979 polls suggested a close vote on Welsh devolution and an easy victory in Scotland. Scotland was the close one and Wales voted heavily against. Just weeks before the AV referendum that too looked close, but the vote was 2:1 for the ‘No’ camp. What all these votes had in common was a last minute swing to the status quo. This is not unusual, and to any conservative should not be surprising. In countries such as the UK, Ireland and France, where referenda are rare, this is the normal pattern. Switzerland and California are very different because they hold referenda all the time. This makes sense. The fact of having a referendum communicates to Britons – as it does not to Swiss or Californians – that the issue is very important. The result is that last minute deciders swing to the status quo. People who are not convinced of the need for change by the last week of the campaign tend to swing strongly against it.

Can voters be persuaded to vote for significant change? Sure. In Ireland it usually happens when there is a strong political consensus in favour of change. But even when all the major parties recommend voting ‘yes’ on a European treaty, the votes are usually fairly close and sometimes go against. In 1997 Scotland voted strongly for devolution – though the Welsh vote was very tight indeed. In both cases there was a considerable consensus among the political class – recall that the Conservative Party lost all its seats in both countries a few months earlier. In Scotland the consensus had been maintained for several years. It may also be relevant that the Scottish referendum (though not the Welsh, which was a week later) was massively disrupted in terms of media coverage by the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, a week and half before the vote.

All this is to say that the fact that polling presently suggests people would vote to leave the EU does not mean that they actually would. There is little chance of a strong political consensus for withdrawal, and big business is likely to be mostly against. Faced with such a situation, it is very probable that voters would develop a touch of nerves and balk at voting to leave. My own estimate is that on an In-Out vote, with the leadership of the main parties all recommending ‘In’, the’ Out’ side would not getmuch more than a quarter of the vote. Demanding a referendum is therefore a risky strategy. A decisive result such as this could take the issue off the agenda for another generation, or two.

Quentin Langley: A tour of the Prime Minister's reshuffle options

Quentin Langley is a Senior Lecturer in Marketing at the University of Bedfordshire Business School. He has previously taught PR and Political Communications at London Metropolitan and Cardiff Universities. Follow Quentin on Twitter.

It is perhaps surprising that there has been no unforced reshuffle with the second anniversary of the coalition only weeks away. It is known that David Cameron was critical of Tony Blair’s approach to reshuffles, moving ministers on a whim, sometimes more than once a year (John Reid being a notable example). In ten years, Blair had seven Leaders of the House of Commons and four Home Secretaries. I had assumed that when Cameron promised more stable appointments he had in mind Margaret Thatcher’s model in which there was a major reshuffle after each general election and halfway through each Parliament with minor reshuffles around the recess of the intervening years. As time went on, she settled on timing the reshuffle for the beginning of the summer recess, so that new ministers would have some weeks to prepare before Parliament resumed and sacked ministers would at least get the summer off. With no unforced reshuffle last year, it is plain that the PM has rejected that model. This may be because the coalition agreement complicates things. While the PM remains responsible for all appointments – as  Nick Clegg has confirmed – Lib Dem appointments, and possibly senior policy making roles in Conservative hands – need to be handled by consensus between the PM and DPM.

All that said, we can probably expect a major reshuffle this summer and I would anticipate another in the latter months of the Parliament, probably around Christmas of 2014.

Whenever there is a change of government it is always interesting to note who grows and who shrinks in office. Some people have talents peculiarly suited to either government or opposition, and do not cope well with the transition, while others thrive on changing to the opposite side of the Parliamentary aisle. In government, George Osborne has clearly grown in stature. Always well-regarded by the closest observers of the Conservative leadership, he was nonetheless derided by opponents and the media as ‘boy George’. He is young, and looks younger than his years, which did not help him in this most high-profile opposition role, but youth is something which time inevitably cures, and he has seemed since day one in office to be a master of his brief.

Quentin Langley: An elected Lords would produce better and more popular government

Quentin Langley is a Senior Lecturer in Marketing at the University of Bedfordshire Business School. He has previously taught PR and Political Communications at London Metropolitan and Cardiff Universities.

Let us start with the obvious point: the UK deserves a real second chamber. The less obvious, but nonetheless accurate, point is that we do not presently have one in any real sense. Our ‘upper house’ is a talking shop with no significant powers. It does not discuss finance bills. It has little or no role in holding the executive to account. It cannot block legislation. It can make suggestions – but so can ConservativeHome. Its suggestions can be overridden or ignored. It does not even significantly challenge any legislation which was promised in the manifesto of the governing party. Incidentally, if this precedent is a point of principle and not just a matter of convenience, the Lords should not oppose its own reform at either Second or Third Reading, since the manifestoes of both Coalition parties promised to replace the Lords with a largely (wholly, in the case of the Conservatives) elected chamber.

The ‘constitution’ of an elected dictatorship which Clement Atlee established in the 1940s and which successive Conservative governments have been too timid to challenge, has become so ingrained that we have forgotten that it was the British constitution which inspired Montesquieu to write of an ideal which separates the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. We no longer bother with that.  A temporary majority in the House of Commons – elected by a plurality of voters, perhaps no more than 35% - has total control of the executive and our unicameral legislature.  Since Atlee, we have governed by legislative action. Any restructuring of executive policy – a change in education or health policy, for example – is written into legislation. This means it is enacted on a whipped vote in the Commons. It is not seriously challenged. Suggestions from our alleged second chamber can be taken on board if they suit the government, or otherwise ignored.

In a better future – just as in our constitutional past – we would have a bicameral legislature in which both chambers exercise genuine power. New laws – which potentially put our liberty on the line – could not be passed without significant degrees of consensus, specifically the support of two chambers in Parliament, with significantly distinct mandates. It is not acceptable to maintain either a neutered second chamber with no powers or to pass real powers to a chamber which simply mirrors the Commons, and treats a plurality of the vote as though it is a substantial, unchallenged, majority.

Quentin Langley: National opinion polls can't be trusted to predict election results

Quentin Langley studied politics at Plymouth under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. He now teaches public relations at London Metropolitan University.

We need a new way of projecting opinion poll results into election results. In the past there have been two: the uniform swing hypothesis (USH) and proportional loss hypothesis (PLH). I have written about my preference for the latter in the past. Today, I suspect, that both these methods are wholly out of date.
Both are based on the proposition that, in one way or another, most constituencies will behave in similar ways. Despite the occasional importance of local factors, such projections have often proved broadly accurate in the past. The USH supposes that, if 10% of the electorate have moved from the LibDems to Labour then in each constituency the Lib Dem support will be reduced by 10% of the electorate and Labour’s support will be increased by the same amount. The PLH supposes that if Lib Dem support is down by half, then in each seat the party’s vote will fall by half, and Labour’s vote will increase by the same amount. But what if different constituencies behave differently?

Let us look at current polls, which suggest that LibDem support  is running around half the 22% of 2010. But we need to ask who has switched from the LibDems since 2010. There are many different types of LibDem voters.  The most obvious ones to have swung away are those who would have preferred the party to have done a deal with Labour. These might be thought of as falling into two categories: people broadly of the left who preferred the LibDems to Labour for any one of several reasons, including tactical factors; and partisan Labour Party supporters who chose to vote LibDem on tactical grounds. It is the second group I want to examine.

Let us begin by playing a thought experiment. What would happen if the only voters to change affiliation at the next election are Labour supporters who tactically voted LibDem in 2010? Obviously, this is ridiculous. Many people may change their votes for many reasons and in all sorts of directions, but let us still play this game.

Quentin Langley: What is the point of the Liberal Democrats?

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

It is a bit early in the new loving and friendly relationship to be asking this, but what is the point of the Lib Dems?  Any party or product has to have some sort of unique offering to the electorate.

This issue is likely to arise in any by election campaigns.  It is, of course, possible, that the Lib Dems will stumble in the perfect storm by election, where they have an entrenched and attractive candidate and trail by only a few hundred votes.  In any other scenario, they are likely to struggle.  On the whole, people who support the government are likely to vote Conservative and people who oppose it will mostly vote Labour – with a few choosing UKIP, Greens or, where relevant the SNP/Plaid.  The chances of the Lib Dems making any by election gains during this Parliament would seem to be low.  Indeed, if the party faces a by election in a seat it currently holds, it may have to fight hard to hold on.

If this prediction is correct, it will be the first time in decades that the Liberal Democrats or its predecessor parties have not made any by election gains for a full parliament.  Not counting the mini parliaments of 1964 and 1974, the Liberal Party, SDP or Liberal Democrats have made at least one by election gain in every parliament since Torrington in 1958.  They have taken seats from both Labour and the Conservatives which they could never have hoped to take in a general election.  They have nonetheless had a decent record of holding these seats.  In the 1970s and 80s they held half of their by election gains at the next general election.  In the 1990s things became more volatile.  In 1992 all by election gains were reversed.  In 1997 normal service was resumed, and they held two of their four by election gains.  In 2001, they held their lone gain.  In 2005 they held one of the two and in 2010 they lost their lone gain.

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

Quentin Langley: We should retain First-Past-The-Post for elections to the Commons but elect a reformed second chamber by Single Transferable Vote

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

A realistic look at electoral reform has to start from a number of premises, most of which are fairly obvious, but need to be thought through.

First, judgments about appropriate electoral systems involve issues of principle, but also of pragmatism.  Systems that work well in some circumstances do not work well in others. It is not enough to cite examples of systems which succeed in delivering stability (such as Germany) or which fail to do so (such as Belgium) and assuming that they would produce the same result here.  Nor can we assume that the system which has generally worked pretty well for us in the past will always continue to do so.

The main advantage of first past the post is that it tends to produce clear majorities for a single party.  As has been just reinforced, this is not guaranteed.  The fact that clear majorities have been the norm in the past does not mean they will be so in the future.  It is possible that we have moved on a long-term basis, into multi-party politics.  In these circumstances first past the post can produce anomalous results not just in terms of the opposition – as in 1983 – but in terms of the government – as in 1951 and February 1974.  The differences between the current hung Parliament and the 2005 result, when Labour won a clear majority with a smaller percentage of the vote and a much smaller lead over the opposition, is cause of concern.

Another advantage is that preserves a clear relationship between a single MP and a single constituency.  There are clear advantages to this in terms of accountability.  On the other hand, we know that some members are much more dedicated constituency MPs than others.  Some are, frankly, lazy and others have different career paths.  It is arguable that many voters would be better served in multi-member constituency in which they could choose to approach for help any one of several members: a dedicated constituency member rather than a government minister; one whose party they support rather than one they don’t; or simply one they find sympathetic to their cause.

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

Quentin Langley: How to read the polls

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

At first glance the polls seem extremely volatile and difficult to read.  At second glance, this is only partly so.  Nearly all the recent polls have shown the Conservatives at 35% +/-3 and Labour at 27%+/-3.  The Lib Dems, however, seem to be at 27% +/-7.  The consensus has them above Labour, and occasionally matching the Conservatives, but several polls, including the latest from MORI, have them in third place in the low 20s.

This raises two obvious questions.  Why the big variation in the Lib Dem vote?  And which pollster is likely to have it right?  This is not a new phenomenon.  In the run up to last year’s local and European elections, Populus was reporting Lib Dem numbers ten points, or 40%, below other pollsters.

Populus operates a slightly different methodology, though it is not intuitively obvious why this should produce a different result.  Indeed, unlike last year, it currently doesn’t.  Generally pollsters ask a fairly standard question: “if there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?  When an election has actually been called the question becomes “which party are you likely to support in the general election on the sixth of May?”  Populus shows voters a list of parties to choose from.  But why should this methodology produce a different result, and different only as to the support for the Lib Dems? 

My theory is this: about 10% of the electorate are irreconcileables.  They hate politicians, especially anyone they see as part of the establishment.  Given a choice of three candidates they will choose the Lib Dems.  Given a choice of four or more parties those same people will choose a fourth or fifth party.

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

At first glance the polls seem extremely volatile and difficult to read.  At second glance, this is only partly so.  Nearly all the recent polls have shown the Conservatives at 35% +/-3 and Labour at 27%+/-3.  The Lib Dems, however, seem to be at 27% +/-7.  The consensus has them above Labour, and occasionally matching the Conservatives, but several polls, including the latest from MORI, have them in third place in the low 20s.

This raises two obvious questions.  Why the big variation in the Lib Dem vote?  And which pollster is likely to have it right?  This is not a new phenomenon.  In the run up to last year’s local and European elections, Populus was reporting Lib Dem numbers ten points, or 40%, below other pollsters.

Populus operates a slightly different methodology, though it is not intuitively obvious why this should produce a different result.  Indeed, unlike last year, it currently doesn’t.  Generally pollsters ask a fairly standard question: “if there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?  When an election has actually been called the question becomes “which party are you likely to support in the general election on the sixth of May?”  Populus shows voters a list of parties to choose from.  But why should this methodology produce a different result, and different only as to the support for the Lib Dems? 

My theory is this: about 10% of the electorate are irreconcileables.  They hate politicians, especially anyone they see as part of the establishment.  Given a choice of three candidates they will choose the Lib Dems.  Given a choice of four or more parties those same people will choose a fourth or fifth party.

Quentin Langley: Do the Tories have a mountain to climb at the next election?

Quentin Langley read Politics under Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the University of Plymouth and now teaches Public Relations and Political Communications at Cardiff University.

There is a widespread belief that the Conservatives must achieve an enormous swing at the next election to win a majority – much bigger than at any election other than 1997.  It has been widely reported in the media that the Conservatives would need to be 10 points ahead of Labour to win a majority, whereas Labour won a comfortable majority in 2005 with a three point lead. 

Such reports are taken seriously, as though there was some precise relationship between the aggregate vote a party wins and the number of seats it wins: plug in the overall numbers and you immediately get the results for most constituencies, all except a handful that are too close to call.  This is all myth.

The relationship between aggregate votes and seats won under the first past the post system is tenuous at best, and degrades rapidly as more parties enter the equation.

Cast your minds back to 1987 – if, that is, you are old enough.  The BBC predicted – oh, sorry, projected – that the Conservatives would win with a majority of 26 when it turned out to be 102.  This was based, recall, not on poor opinion poll data, but on actual early election results.  They got the votes right, but the seats badly wrong.  The margin of 11 points delivered a very healthy Parliamentary majority, though much smaller than the margin of 12 points earned for Tony Blair a decade later.

The media explanation for the difference between the ’87 and ’97 outturns is that the system is biased in favour of Labour.  It is a neat narrative.  Both sides can take some comfort: Labour supporters are reassured and Conservatives get to feel hard done by.  But why is it, if the system is inherently biased towards Labour, that the BBC got the result of the 1987 election so badly wrong?  Certainly some things – including constituency boundaries – have changed since then.  But to switch from an unanticipated bias to the Conservatives to an even bigger bias to Labour in so short a period is astonishing.  There is also no evidence at all for the proposition.