Ben Rogers: Burma, the case for sanctions

Benedict Rogers is Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, and was Conservative Parliamentary Candidate for the City of Durham in 2005. He works for the human rights charity Christian Solidarity Worldwide , and is the author of A Land Without Evil: Stopping the Genocide of Burma’s Karen People.

I have just returned from my 13^th visit to the Thai-Burma border – which, when added to my visits to the India-Burma border, the China-Burma border and Rangoon and Mandalay mean I have so far made a total of 17 visits to the Burma region since 2000. On each visit, I have talked with people who have seen their villages burned, loved ones killed, women raped and tortured, and have been used for forced labour. This time was no different.

In a camp of 3,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) on the banks of the Salween River, I met a woman whose 15 year-old son had been killed by the Burma Army. He had been tied to a tree, his head cut off. I met another woman whose husband had been mutilated and killed. Burma Army soldiers had gouged out his eyes, tore off his lips and cut off his ears. And I met a third woman whose husband had been hung upside down from a tree, tortured, his eyes gouged out, and then drowned. This is the terrible truth about Burma today.

Tell the world

And so it begs the question: what should the international community do? First of all, pay attention. With some welcome exceptions, the world’s media and politicians have ignored the terrible situation in Burma for far too long, and yet it ranks as one of the world’s worst human rights catastrophes. I will never forget, on a previous trip through the jungle, meeting a 15 year-old boy whose parents had been killed and his village burned, and he had been taken as a forced porter for the Burma Army. He looked me in the eye and said:

“Please tell the world to put pressure on the regime to stop killing its people. Please tell the world not to forget us.”

A brutal military regime rules the country by force, having lost elections in 1990 to the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Yet those elected in 1990 are either in exile or in prison, and Aung San Suu Kyi has spent more than 12 years under house arrest. In 2003, the regime attempted to assassinate her.

More than 1,100 political prisoners remain in jail, subjected to the most barbaric forms of torture. Over a million people are internally displaced in eastern Burma, victims of the regime’s policy of ethnic cleansing bordering on a slow attempted genocide against the Karen, Karenni, Shan and other ethnic groups. More than 3,000 villages in eastern Burma have been destroyed since 1996.

When the military attacks, they loot and destroy everything – rice barns, crops, livestock, cooking instruments and homes, and lay landmines at the entrance to villages to stop those who have escaped from returning. Civilians are used as human minesweepers, forced to walk across fields of landmines to clear them for the military – losing their limbs and often their lives in the process. On top of all this, Burma has the world’s highest number of forcibly conscripted child soldiers – some as young as 9, taken from bus stops and street corners and forced to join the military.

Genocide?

Some argue that these violations are simply part of a counter-insurgency policy to crush ethnic armed resistance groups. But it is much more than that. To call it counter-insurgency is to add unwarranted legitimacy to the regime’s policies, and to pin the blame unfairly on the ethnic groups. The armed resistance groups exist to defend their people and their land against an aggressive, brutal dictatorship. They are fighting a struggle for survival. Civilians are targeted – raped, tortured and beheaded. And even in areas where ceasefires exist, such as Kachin and Mon States, forced labour, land confiscation and rape continue.

So the international community should start by calling the crimes by their proper name: crimes against humanity. Although ‘genocide’ is a debatable term, and what is happening is not on the same dramatic scale as Rwanda or the Holocaust, if you read the Genocide Convention and subsequent interpretations, several of the definitions fit Burma. It is perhaps a slow attempted genocide. Certainly it is crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing – and there is a case to investigate regarding genocide.

The myths about sanctions

There is a debate emerging over the question of sanctions. Some people question whether sanctions against Burma work. Others argue sanctions hurt the people, not the regime. Some believe we can open up Burma through economic investment. Yet all these arguments are founded on several myths.

Myth 1 is that sanctions have failed. But the truth is, sanctions have not really been tried. Only the United States has meaningful trade and investment sanctions. The European Union (EU) bans investment in certain State-owned enterprises in Burma, who are named in a list produced by Brussels. On that list are a tailor shop and a pineapple juice factory – but not a single company in the oil, gas, timber or gem sectors, the major sources of revenue for the regime. The regime’s two major conglomerates – the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) – are exempt from sanctions. Yet the UMEH, whose shareholders are limited to the military establishment, has as its stated objective “to support military personnel and their families” and “to try and become the main logistics and support organisation for the military”. By 1999, the UMEH had established nearly 50 joint ventures with foreign firms.

If the EU banned investment in the UMEH and the MEC, and froze the regime’s assets, it would hit the Generals where they would feel it most – in their pockets. As it is, French oil company Total remains one of the single largest foreign investors in Burma – and one of the single largest sources of revenue for the regime. And it is a regime which spends almost half its budget on the military, and less than $1 per person per year on health and education combined. It has expanded the military to up to 400,000 – yet it has no external enemies. The military is used solely for internal repression.

Myth 2 is that sanctions hurt the people. No one is talking about Iraqi-style blanket-sanctions. Those who campaign on this issue want targeted sanctions, aimed at the regime and its assets. No foreign investment in Burma really benefits the people. Three-quarters of the population live in the subsistence agriculture sector, outside the realms of foreign investment. They do not see the benefits of investment, and they are not hurt by sanctions. A minority of people working in the affected sectors may lose their jobs as a result of sanctions, but we face a stark choice: to allow the regime the finance it needs for its survival, thereby condemning Burma to continued oppression and violence, or to cut the regime’s financial lifelines, forcing it to come to the table.

Myth 3 is to compare Burma with countries like Cuba. But while Cuba has its grave human rights problems, Burma is far worse. Burma ranks alongside North Korea and Sudan as one of the world’s worst. Indeed, it could even be in a category all on its own. What other regime has imprisoned and attempted to kill a Nobel Laureate, ignored the results of an election, forcibly recruited more than 70,000 child soldiers, and carried out systematic rape, torture, forced labour, religious persecution and ethnic cleansing?

Myth 4 is that sanctions are an imposition by well-intentioned but naïve Westerners. This could not be more wrong. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have repeatedly called for sanctions. All the major representatives of the ethnic groups call for sanctions. The overwhelming majority of Burmese people I have met call for sanctions. Surely we should respect the will of the Burmese people and their democratically elected leaders?

Myth 5 is that if you are pro-sanctions, you are pro-isolation and against engagement. This is one of the most polarising, destructive and inaccurate myths of all. I am not against talking to the regime. Indeed, I, along with the rest of the Burma pro-democracy movement, call for tripartite dialogue between the regime, the NLD and the ethnic groups. The ethnic groups and the NLD have consistently shown they are willing to talk. Only the regime has refused.

The recent campaign to bring the issue of Burma to the agenda of the UN Security Council proves this point. In the resolution, tabled by the US and the UK and vetoed by China and Russia, no punitive action was mentioned. The resolution was an entirely reasonable call for the regime to release political prisoners, open up the country to international humanitarian aid, and enter into dialogue.

Nobody is talking about isolation. The question is not whether to engage, but how and on whose terms? The UK tried has tried economic investment before. In the 1980s and 1990s, we regularly held trade fairs in Rangoon – while the regime was bombing Karen villages. The regime did not change as a result of us pumping money into its coffers.

What is needed is financial support for the pro-democracy movement, not the regime. If the UK provided assistance to Burmese human rights groups within the country and in exile to develop their capacity, it would make a difference. Some of these groups risk their lives gathering much-needed information inside Burma, and disseminating it to the world. Others are engaged in human rights education and civil society development. There are broadcasters and publications devoted to the spread of information within Burma. We should be supporting them.

Myth 6 is that sanctions drive the regime into the hands of China, India and other countries in the region. But the regime has always been more friendly with these countries anyway. Burma is a member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Western foreign investment is never going to counter the regime’s attitudes – and it will simply enable them to buy more arms. Instead, the US and the EU must embark on a concerted effort to put pressure on China, India and the ASEAN member states to use the influence they have with the regime to bring about change. If it was properly co-ordinated, the international community could develop an effective “good cop, bad cop” strategy – with the US and the EU providing the stick, and China, India and ASEAN the carrot. If China, India and ASEAN could be persuaded that the regime itself is the cause of instability in the region, they may be persuaded to have some tough words with their friends the Generals. If China, India and ASEAN can be persuaded that it is in their interests to use their influence for change, they may just do so. It will be hard work, but it is worth trying.

At the end of the day, sanctions are only one tool in the toolbox. No one believes sanctions alone will change the situation. They must be used alongside other measures. But people should not underestimate the effect of US and EU sanctions. Withdrawing Western investment cuts off some of the regime’s revenues – meaning it can buy fewer arms than it would otherwise have done. If we had tougher measures from the EU, combined with pressure on China, India and ASEAN to do more, it would have even more effect. Greater engagement by the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General would also help. And there is one thing we can be sure of: lifting sanctions, before there is any meaningful progress towards democracy, would send entirely the wrong message to the regime. And in any case, is a regime which gouges out the eyes and cuts off the ears of its people really one we would want to invest in?

For readers who wish to know more, I would recommend the following papers published by Burma Campaign UK:

• Pro-Aid, Pro-Sanctions, Pro-Engagement
• The European Union and Burma: The Case for Targeted Sanctions
• Failing the People of Burma? A call for a review of DFID policy on Burma