ConservativeHome's Election Review

The party must be careful about the implications of the failure to break through in Scotland, among public sector workers and in seats with large numbers of ethnic voters

ConservativeHome's General Election Review (executive summary here/ contents page here), concluded with ten recommendations.

One of CCHQ's big conclusions about the General Election campaign is that the party's greatest electoral failure was in not breaking through in Scotland, amongst public sector workers and with ethnic minority voters. This General Election Review has already examined this here.

One of the biggest decisions the party has to now take is the extent to which the party can ever win a majority if it does not break through into these three groups. The default response from Team Cameron seems to be that these groups have to be wooed. That's one explanation for the fact that Cameron's first visit as Prime Minister was to Scotland. There's certainly more that can be done. My understanding is that Conservative HQ had no defined strategy for ethnic minority communities throughout the last two years. Such a defined relationship-building strategy would be the job of a professional External Relations operation.

It is important, however, that CCHQ does not rush into the belief that converting Scotland and public sector workers is the easiest route to majority status. “All sensible marketing strategies focus on the most receptive customers, not the least receptive customers,” said one Tory insider. Would the party be better choosing to target more campaigning efforts on English constituencies and highly-taxed private sector workers? There is certainly a danger that the Conservatives will shower 'goodies' on voters that won't convert to the Conservative Party but the cost of those 'goodies' will alienate English, private sector supporters.

The ground war team should receive a greater share of the party's revenues so that it can spend early and over the long-term

ConservativeHome's General Election Review (executive summary here/ contents page here), concluded with ten recommendations.

A full audit of the effectiveness of Tory election spending needs to be undertaken. In many ways the party fought a very conventional election campaign - spending millions of pounds on billboard poster campaigning during the months running up to the election campaign. Two key areas of activity - which should have been funded from 2007 - were neglected as a consequence:

• The use of US-style micro-targeted internet campaigning where the party ensured it reached the 'influentials' within all key voter groups in society - from teachers to environmental campaigners to churchgoers.
• The proper funding of the ground war. Candidates in marginal seats during 2008 to late 2009 often receiving key funding three or four months late because money was being spent on expensive air war projects of dubious value. In addition and in aggregate too much was spent on the air war relative to the ground war according to key CCHQ insiders.
  

Team Cameron needs a conventional Chief of Staff or/and full-time Campaign Director

ConservativeHome's General Election Review (executive summary here/ contents page here), concluded with ten recommendations.

Two of this review's recommendations overlap:

• The appointment of a conventional Chief of Staff to head David Cameron's office and ensure fast, definite decision-making.
• The appointment of a full-time, experienced campaigns co-ordinator who reports directly to the party leader. Lynton Crosby who ran the party's 2005 campaign provides a model.

When meeting campaign insiders for this review two of the most common things said were 'there have been no major fallings out' and 'decisions aren't taken'. Those two observations are obviously connected.

The roles of chief of staff to the leader and campaign co-ordinator are different but they both address a key weakness in the Tory election campaign; inconclusive discussions. Staff inside CCHQ, suppliers to CCHQ and journalists complained of a lack of clear direction and inconsistent messages. A strong Chief of Staff or/and campaign co-ordinator is needed to bang heads together when there are disagreements and to ensure that those disagreements are resolved. Steve Hilton is accused by many of a volcanic temper - something he concedes. He often erupts because of the failure of the machine to function decisively. A strong Leo McGarry-style force within the operation will ensure key themes are chosen and then prosecuted. The figure could also resolve the creative tensions within the team - personified by Steve Hilton, strategy director, and Andy Coulson, communications director.

David Cameron's existing chief of staff, Ed Llewellyn is popular and trusted on foreign policy but, for whatever reason, does not fulfil the role recommended here.

Q&A Panel to discuss the Conservatives' General Election Campaign

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULLY BOOKED

THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CONSERVATIVE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Presentation followed by Q&A panel followed by drinks

6pm, Monday 7th June

Main speaker: Tim Montgomerie, Editor of ConservativeHome

With replies from:

James Forsyth, Political Editor of The Spectator
Iain Martin, Deputy Editor of the Wall Street Journal Europe
Lord Rennard, Chief Executive of the Liberal Democrats until 2009

RSVP to Bryony Fletcher

Location:
Policy Exchange's Ideas Space, 10 Storey's Gate, Westminster

The development of an External Relations Unit that will develop much better relations with opinion formers in the third sector and conservative movement

ConservativeHome's General Election Review (executive summary here/ contents page here), concluded with ten recommendations. One of them was this recommendation for an External Relations Unit.

The future of political communication - like the future of all communication - is about delivering targeted products to ever larger numbers of smaller groups. Macro or broadcast messaging still matters but micro-messaging or narrowcasting will be the difference between winning and losing elections.

A successful political party won't just have a big economic message but it will have effective, finetuned messages for groups interested in human rights abuses in Burma, who care about wetland preservation or the taxation of classic cars.

Team Cameron needs to develop better relations with leading third party organisations - both within and, most importantly, outside the Conservative Party.

Good relations with think tanks, charities, representatives of minority communities and thought-leaders matter for a number of reasons:

• They are a source of ideas for policy innovation and policy improvement;
• Trusted third party organisations provide more persuasive endorsements for policy initiatives than newspapers or politicians;
• In the internet age access to the supporters of third party organisations has never been more important or easy.

At present Team Cameron have a poor record of nurturing relations with the Conservative coalition. James Forsyth's Spectator article from January this year captured the problem perfectly. By way of example, despite their enormous contributions to the Conservative Party's decentralisation and political reform policies Douglas Carswell and Dan Hannan have received no formal acknowledgement of their input. There should be a regular traffic of ideas and insights between the authors of 'The Plan' and 10 Downing Street. Someone or some entity needs to make that traffic happen.

David Cameron should establish an External Relations Unit to develop constant, high quality relations with the leading charities, think tanks and campaigning groups in the country.  The Downing Street model needs to be integrated into similar operations in every department. The ERU - or whatever it is called - must be headed by an individual known to have access to the Prime Minister.

The appointment of a full-time professional pollster who will report unfiltered to the party leadership, ensuring all big initiatives are properly market tested so they are communicated in the best possible way

ConservativeHome's General Election Review (executive summary here/ contents page here), concluded with ten recommendations. One of them was this recommendation for a full-time party pollster.

A good pollster-politician relationship is not about the pollster telling the politician what to believe but the pollster will perform three main roles. He/she will give the politician an early warning of the issues worrying voters - particularly the voters in swing seats. Second, they will advise on which of the policies already chosen by the government/ political party should be front of shop and which should be back of shop. Thirdly the pollster will advise on how best to communicate policies, especially on language and tone.

It seems clear that the Tory leadership did not use polling properly in opposition. Three very good sources said that the 'Big Society' agenda was never properly tested or focus grouped. That is a political crime. It would be like Alex Ferguson buying a footballer even though he'd never seen him play. Although an impressive governing philosophy the Big Society was too nebulous for an election campaign. Key figures in the leader's circle acted as "creative directors". A typical creative director is so convinced of their idea that they *know* the public will come round to accepting their great idea, if only it is presented to them again and again. Only a powerful, full-time pollster - enjoying the party leader's confidence - can stand up to such a belief and ensure mistakes like the Big Society are avoided in future.

In government the party cannot continue with what has been described as a pick'n'mix attitude to researcxh - choosing findings that reinforce instinctive views and ignoring others. Team Cameron, so careful to study the Blair project, need their own Philip Gould.

The creation of a functionally independent Scottish Conservative Party on the CDU/CSU model able to develop a distinctive centre right pitch for Scottish voters

ConservativeHome's General Election Review (executive summary here/ contents page here), concluded with ten recommendations. One of them was this recommendation for a separate Scottish party.

BBC graphic.

At the depths of Labour's unpopularity, with the Tories gaining more than ninety seats across England and five in Wales, the Tories could not add to their miserable representation in Scotland. David Mundell held his constituency but the Scottish Conservatives fell further behind in some of its eleven key target seats despite spending £400,000 on the campaign. The Tory share of the vote was just 16.7%.

Conservative strategists believe that Scotland - and the other two groups most resistant to Tory charms, those dependent on the state for income and ethnic minorities - can begin to be won over by a Conservative government that does not live up to the nightmarish caricature that many voters have of the 'Thatcherite' Tories.

I believe a more radical option is required and one that fits the Coalition model now being developed with the Liberal Democrats. That idea is a separate Scottish party, able to develop distinctive policies for Scotland.

The idea was first mooted in April 2007 and these were the two arguments for it then:

1. "It gives the Scottish party - with a new name and a truly Scottish leadership team - the opportunity to break free from the long-held belief that it is a fully-owned subsidiary of the London party.  With its own distinct identity the Scottish Unionist Party (the name of the party until 1965 and a possible name for the 'new party') could be a leading advocate of The Union and would be more likely to be seen to be motivated by an unambiguous commitment to Scotland's interests rather than those of England.  The election of its leader - which should follow independence - would give the party the serious debate it desperately needs about its long-term identity.  Should it be defined by its Unionism, for example, or by a commitment to provide an alternative to the high tax, anti-business parties that dominate the Scottish landscape.
2. The move will also be helpful for Project Cameron.  The impact David Cameron has had on Conservative fortunes in England could count for more.  If the Scottish party continues to struggle he will no longer be tarnished by that underperformance.  If, however, there is a revival of the 'Scottish Unionists' he can claim credit for taking the bold decision to return the party to a degree of independence that it enjoyed until that 1960s name change."

There would still be a formal relationship between the Scottish identity and the Conservative Party - much like the CDU and CSU have a relationship in Germany - but it would be a Scottish party entirely focused on Scottish interests. Ideally it should have a new name. At the time we suggested the Scottish Freedom Party or Scottish Reform Party.  

Tim Montgomerie

David Cameron's road to 10 Downing Street

David Cameron is Britain's new Prime Minister. He has ended thirteen long years of Labour rule.

So much has gone wrong with our country. So much damage has been done by the incompetence and misjudgements of the Blair/Brown era.

Mr Cameron and his coalition government need the goodwill and support of every Conservative as they set about the daunting task of repairing Broken Britain.

The Cameron leadership also needs to learn the lessons of the past five years in Opposition and the past few weeks of the election campaign. Some things, like the marginal seats operation or the wooing of the national newspapers, worked well. Others, such as the failure to translate the Big Society into doorstep messages, were less successful.

Waiting until Cameron was safely over the Downing Street threshold, ConservativeHome publishes its guide to the campaign, the modernisation programme and the legacy of the opposition years. In preparing this guide I have talked to many senior figures across the party about what worked and what did not. This is not a kiss and tell memoir. Look away now if you are wanting stories of who fell out with who and so on. This is an attempt to review the main themes of the last few years and, in particular, offer recommendations for a second election that - despite the hopes of the new coalition - may not be so far away.

Tim Montgomerie

Click on the next entry link below to browse the review. Click here for the full list of contents and here for the executive summary.

Contents

Introduction

Executive summary

The review is divided into three main sections: observations on the campaign; observations on the Cameron approach to 'modernisation'; and observations on the inheritance from his years in opposition that Cameron takes into government.

THE CAMPAIGN

This election was the Conservative party's best opportunity in a generation and with a strong campaign it should have been won

The Conservatives never developed a strategic message for the General Election

The Conservative Party fought a good ground war, winning more seats than the average national swing would suggest

The election debates gave the Liberal Democrats by-election status, and disrupted an already disjointed Tory campaign
The Conservatives stopped losing on the economy but they didn't develop a strong or consistent economic message
The Big Society agenda is an exciting governing philosophy but it should never have been put at the heart of the Tory election campaign
No party ran a campaign responsive to the seismic impact of the expenses scandal - and to the prevailing mood of disillusion with Westminster politics

The Tory silence on the electorate's second biggest issue, immigration, was like Manchester United leaving Wayne Rooney on the substitutes' bench

Tax cuts twice reversed slides in the Conservatives' opinion poll rating

Team Cameron's success with the Murdoch empire could not compensate for continuing difficulties with the BBC

Because the Conservatives didn't fight Brown with the same ferocity that Blair fought John Major, Labour survived electorally

MODERNISATION

After three historic defeats the Conservative Party needed to change but modernisation in the first two years was unbalanced; core supporters were confused and the changes risked looking inauthentic

The big test for Cameron, given these tactical shifts, was whether he could convince voters that he was "the real thing"

By choosing not to define change, the Conservatives did not own it - leaving them vulnerable to the Liberal Democrats

LEGACY

One of Cameron's greatest legacies may be a new generation of Conservative MPs

The Conservative Party enjoys a massive financial advantage over Labour and the Liberal Democrats

Having two young and broadly similar politicians at the top of the Party remains problematic

The Tories failed to break through with three big voting groups

The nature of Cameron's leadership means that he'll have a difficult relationship with his own party

The tight circle around Team Cameron failed to build alliances with strategic opinion-formers

Cameron modernised the Conservative Party and drafted the most interesting post-Thatcher definition of Conservatism, reconciling it with One Nation conservatism

RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of practical recommendations.

***

More on the recommendation to create a separate Scottish party with its own policies and leader.

More on the recommendation to appoint a full-time professional pollster who will report unfiltered to the party leadership, ensuring all big initiatives are properly market tested so they are communicated in the best possible way.

More on the recommendation to establish an External Relations Unit that will develop much better relations with opinion formers in the third sector and conservative movement.

More on the recommendations for a full-time campaigns co-ordinator or conventional chief of staff.

Executive summary

The unpopularity of Gordon Brown and Labour's economic record meant 2010 was the Conservatives' best electoral opportunity in a generation.

The party won nearly 100 more seats in the party's best electoral performance since 1979.

The party came agonisingly close to a majority; falling short by 16,000 votes spread across nineteen constituencies.

62% of Conservative Party members thought the Tory campaign was poor. Just 20% thought it was good or excellent.

The team around Cameron failed to decide a big theme for the election, choosing instead to run a presidential campaign based around the personality of David Cameron.

The Conservatives won 21 more seats than if the national swing towards the party had been averaged evenly across the nation.

The Tories' fundraising machine was a huge success; raising more money than the party could spend, putting the party in a good place for a second election.

The decision to agree equal status for the Liberal Democrats in the election debates was the most avoidable cause of the Tory failure to win a majority. The debates have institutionalised three party politics and confused the Tory campaign.

The Conservatives never developed a consistent economic message, choosing - perhaps rightly - to downplay the austerity message in favour of caution.

The 'Big Society' message was never poll tested or properly focus grouped and failed to cut through on the doorstep.

After having led public anger on expenses throughout the summer of 2009 David Cameron did not develop his anti-politics message in 2010.

Tory strategists underestimated David Cameron's ability to sell traditional Tory messages - such as a tough approach to immigration - to floating voters.

Tax cuts twice reversed the Conservative Party's slide in the opinion polls - both at times of maximum vulnerability.

Team Cameron achieved considerable success in winning the support of key newspapers but the BBC remained hostile, complicating the Tories' electoral task.

The Tories lacked the killer touch that characterised Blair's campaign against Major in 1997. Although Labour performed badly the Tories shrank from the same kind of negative strategy.

David Cameron was right to modernise the Conservative message but newer messages on, for example, civil liberties and the environment should have been integrated with more familiar messages so that modernisation appeared authentic to voters.

The Conservative Party underperformed in Scottish constituencies, seats with large numbers of public sector workers and also amongst ethnic minority voters. It must now decide whether reassuring those voters could be at the expense of easier-to-reach voters in England and in the highly taxed private sector.

The Cameron project remains an exciting project - blending traditional Conservatism on tax, crime and immigration with new messages on the environment, poverty-fighting and civil liberties.

In preparing for a second election the Tory leadership needs to negotiate for the debates to take place earlier in the caampaign; put more money into its ground war; build better relations with the whole of the party and conservative movement; trust professional polling to test messages; and develop clearer decision-making structures.