A YouGov poll found that nearly twice as many voters thought the Liberal Democrats had run a better campaign than the Conservatives (37% to 19%). ConservativeHome's survey of more than 3,000 Tory members found 62% judged the overall campaign to have been “poor”. 55% of successful candidates agreed. 65% of unsuccessful candidates agreed.
In many ways CCHQ ran a presidential campaign focused on David Cameron. This was most obvious in the last 48 hours. Cameron's through-the-night marathon conveyed energy and determination but there was little attempt by CCHQ to convey a big message then or at any time in the campaign.
For a period, the 'Big Society' was put at the heart of the campaign. Amazingly, the Big Society was never tested in focus groups and it failed on the doorstep. One leading adviser to the campaign complained of a “cavalier” approach to research. “They latched on to research that backed their views and ignored any research that challenged it.” The party had no powerful message on political reform, even though the expenses-gate had traumatised the nation's relationship with parliament only twelve months earlier. For twelve months the Conservative Party said that Britain's debts risked Greek-style problems but - perhaps astutely - it never spelt out a deficit reduction programme that was significantly different from that of Labour or the Liberal Democrats. Some of voters' top concerns - like immigration - were barely mentioned in the party manifesto. Immigration was never given a day in the party's election grid. A day was found, however, for a schools music competition. The Tory leadership promised change but only defined what change meant at the end of the campaign, via its 'Contract with voters'. A poll of Tory activists at the start of the election campaign called for more specifics from the Tory leadership. 97% said the campaign was too general.
It is difficult to know why strategic consistency was never achieved. Some suggest it is in Cameron's personality. He likes to keep his options open and allowed many campaign themes to run simultaneously. He was also reluctant to choose between the recommendations of his three most influential advisers. In crude terms, Shadow Chancellor George Osborne wanted a focus on the economy. Strategy director Steve Hilton preferred a big picture vision of change. Communications director Andy Coulson wanted a more retail, detailed offering. All options were pursued simultaneously against the advice of the party's polling and creative advisers. Only when George Osborne moved into Conservative HQ for the election campaign did clarity begin to emerge. Inconclusive and never-ending meetings were curtailed and decisions started to be taken more quickly, and were acted upon. Cameron still lacks a Chief of Staff in the Jonathan Powell/ Leo McGarry mould. Someone ready to bang heads together.
In many ways CCHQ ran a presidential campaign focused on David Cameron. This was most obvious in the last 48 hours. Cameron's through-the-night marathon conveyed energy and determination but there was little attempt by CCHQ to convey a big message then or at any time in the campaign.
For a period, the 'Big Society' was put at the heart of the campaign. Amazingly, the Big Society was never tested in focus groups and it failed on the doorstep. One leading adviser to the campaign complained of a “cavalier” approach to research. “They latched on to research that backed their views and ignored any research that challenged it.” The party had no powerful message on political reform, even though the expenses-gate had traumatised the nation's relationship with parliament only twelve months earlier. For twelve months the Conservative Party said that Britain's debts risked Greek-style problems but - perhaps astutely - it never spelt out a deficit reduction programme that was significantly different from that of Labour or the Liberal Democrats. Some of voters' top concerns - like immigration - were barely mentioned in the party manifesto. Immigration was never given a day in the party's election grid. A day was found, however, for a schools music competition. The Tory leadership promised change but only defined what change meant at the end of the campaign, via its 'Contract with voters'. A poll of Tory activists at the start of the election campaign called for more specifics from the Tory leadership. 97% said the campaign was too general.
It is difficult to know why strategic consistency was never achieved. Some suggest it is in Cameron's personality. He likes to keep his options open and allowed many campaign themes to run simultaneously. He was also reluctant to choose between the recommendations of his three most influential advisers. In crude terms, Shadow Chancellor George Osborne wanted a focus on the economy. Strategy director Steve Hilton preferred a big picture vision of change. Communications director Andy Coulson wanted a more retail, detailed offering. All options were pursued simultaneously against the advice of the party's polling and creative advisers. Only when George Osborne moved into Conservative HQ for the election campaign did clarity begin to emerge. Inconclusive and never-ending meetings were curtailed and decisions started to be taken more quickly, and were acted upon. Cameron still lacks a Chief of Staff in the Jonathan Powell/ Leo McGarry mould. Someone ready to bang heads together.