Martin and Cranmer have both discussed the refusal of seven Muslims to stand when the judge entered court at their trial, on the grounds that they stand for no-one but Allah. Each of them attempts to argue that Islam includes no such rule. Neither discusses what seems to me to be an interesting question of whether they would, in practice, have refused to stand had the judge been a man rather than a woman.
I personally find it inappropriate and (in the literal sense) offensive when non-Muslims attempt to pronounce upon what is or is not true Islam. I certainly have no interest whatever in the opinions of non-Christians as to whether true Christianity "really" opposes all wars or forbids homosexual practice or the various other issues upon which non-Christians presume to pronounce. (I have great interest in their views as to whether practicing homosexuality is right or whether we should all be pacifists, but that is quite a different matter from my regarding non-Christians as religious authorities, well-placed to pronounce upon the true nature of a religion they do not share.) I imagine that many Muslims must feel much the same when Jack Straw or Tony Blair lecture them upon whether true Islam really requires women to wear veils. Those that publicly disavow involvement in a religion have thereby disqualified themselves from pronouncing upon the "true" content of that religion. (People can, of course, say things along the lines of "My understanding of the orthodox teaching of Islam is..." or "The form of Islam I have always found most attractive teaches, I believe, that..." But neither the orthodox form of a religion nor the form I might find most attractive as a non-believer is the same thing as the "true" form of that religion - the form the god in question really commands/desires (if it exists and does issue commands/have desires).)
Martin and Cranmer are both quite right to be disturbed by the case, but not, in my view, because it involves any distortion of orthodox Islam (which they may well be right that it does). Here is my take.
No-one alleges that these seven men were forced to be in Britain at the time of the alleged offences. We do not keep people here, like some Warsaw Pact state. If they wanted to live in Britain, they needed to abide by British laws, British rules. One of the rules of living in Britain is that if you are brought to trial for something you respect the judge. Not to do so is an offence in itself, and can attract significant punishment. That applies whether you are innocent or guilty.
That rule is not something you are able (or should be able) to opt out of on the grounds that your religion forbids it. We do not (and should not) honour any and every religious practice in the UK. Some religions require people to sacrifice their children at periodic intervals. We do not believe that religious tolerance requires us to grant them freedom to pursue their religious practices. Suppose that someone proclaimed that he worshipped an overtly misogynist deity which required him to spit at any woman he saw. Would we expect the judge to tolerate being spat at to honour these religious convictions? (And note: the issue is not whether these are genuine religious convictions or whether they represent the orthodox form of their religion.)
Just as we would not tolerate the defendants spitting at the judge, so we should not tolerate them refusing to offer a mark of respect to the judge when the judge enters the court. Now, we do not require everyone to stand to offer respect (e.g. we would not ask this of a disabled person). So perhaps there might be other options - it might not hurt to ask them what mark of respect they would prefer to show and to consider whether we thought it adequate. If, for example, their common practice in the rest of life - established genuinely and beyond dispute - were that they would show respect (e.g. for their parents or for teachers or community elders) by saluting from a sitting position, it might be worth at least contemplating whether a salute might be tolerable.
What must not be tolerated would be for them to simply offer no mark of respect - which appears, on the face of it, to be what happened here.
Here's another thing about this case. I believe that Muslims ought to be subject to the same legal requirements as the rest of society - they must abide by British laws, pay British taxes, and show respect to British courts. But the quid pro quo of requiring Muslims to treat with the legal authorities as the rest of us must is that the legal authorities must treat with Muslims as they do with the rest of us, as I urged in my previous post. If the law starts treating Muslims in special ways (e.g. by saying that Muslims must stand in separate lines at airports and be subject to additional checks), then I believe we open the door to Muslims requesting special dealings - sharia law, their own norms of conduct in court and so on. I favour equality before the law and equality of treatment by the state, and also equality of demands of respect from people towards the law and its institutions - regardless of their religion.
