Posted by Bob Seely.
Apologies to those who hate predictions, but by the time we’ll have finished hearing the Iraq War evidence sometime next year, may I predict the following:
The remaining vestiges of respect to which Tony Blair still clings, a result not of his personal qualities but of the fact that people genuflect to those who have held authority, will evaporate. This will be due to the overwhelming evidence that secrecy came before honesty, preparation and integrity. He will be seen by the media and the majority as a morally bankrupt individual who misled the people. He will spend the next 30 years of his life being held in increasing contempt and irrelevance – a more wretched version of Harold Wilson. This will strengthen the hand of those in the Conservative Party who do not believe that Conservatives should be modelling our strategy on this man.
The reputations of the BBC and Andrew Gilligan (remember him?), as well as those moderate voices who came out against the war (including people such as Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP and Ken Clarke MP) will be enhanced. By contrast, the Conservative Party’s position on the war will increasingly be seen as an error, not because one should oppose wars for political opportunism, but because there was a strong suspicion at the time that things were not as they seemed. It was as if the issue was too big, too serious and too important. The Opposition’s inability to hold Government to account will strengthen the opinions of those who see our current political system as broken.
There will be a reassessment in the MoD over the top brass’ relationship with the political classes. It will be privately understood in the MoD that the Armed Forces should have spelt out more clearly issues of kit and costs, as well as wider issues of over-stretch.
The public will be deeply shocked by the rushed and unprofessional manner in which Britain was committed to war, and the surprises will get worse, not better.
The inquiry will damage the reputations of the FCO and DfID, who will be judged as not supportive enough of troops on the ground and lacking understanding of operating in counterinsurgency environments.
It will become more difficult to govern thanks to two things. The sheer lack of competence over Iraq will harden public cynicism towards politicians’ abilities to manage and lead, and the public resistance to ‘spin’ will mean that it will increasingly difficult for politicians’ actions to be fairly judged.
