Dr Liam Fox is Shadow Defence Secretary.
Back in 2005 a British Army officer, Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, wrote a scathing critique of the U.S. Army and its performance in Iraq. In his article he accused the U.S. Army of cultural ignorance, moralistic self-righteousness, and unproductive micromanagement-among many other things. When asked why it was allowed it to be published in a U.S. Army magazine Military Review, the editor, Colonel William Darley, replied: "Because I want to win the war in Iraq".
Under the leadership of General Petraeus, who at the time was running much of the U.S. Army's educational and doctrine programme, Brigadier Aylwin-Foster's article helped to force the uncomfortable debate simmering inside the U.S. Army to the forefront. Four years later, not only has the U.S. Army overcome many of the institutional and doctrinal weaknesses from the early days of the Iraq war, they have also turned around a dire situation into one which is manageable and even winnable.
In the September issue of British Army Review we find an important and similar critique of the performance of the British Army in Basra. This is the in-house journal of the British Army, which up to now has avoided the kind of self-criticism and self-analysis which is so necessary for success in wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. I don't necessarily agree with every point made by Colonel Pete Mansoor, Dr Daniel Marston, or Professor Anthony King, but they are highly regarded and well respected in their field and it would be folly to simply ignore their views. All three convey the same message: if we fail to learn from our experiences in Iraq we are destined to fail in Afghanistan.
Failure in Afghanistan today would be the root of threats to the United Kingdom tomorrow. Afghanistan must be, and will be, our military's main effort under a future Conservative Government - not only in rhetoric but also in practice. This is why it is important that Government Ministers not only encourage the Army to learn from the lessons of the Iraq war but give them the support to translate lessons from Iraq into success in Afghanistan. Stifling debate and censoring comment from informed professionals, including those in uniform, prevents the Army from learning real lessons from our wars - lessons learnt at great cost in human life - and adapting to applying those lessons in Afghanistan.
I appreciate that it is not as simple as taking Iraq's lessons and applying them on Afghanistan problems. However, the confidence to undertake a healthy self-critical analysis is necessary to make our Army a better organisation in the longer term. In my opinion, the most serious criticism raised by the three authors in the British Army Review focuses on the Government, not the Army. This is why the Iraq War Inquiry needs to be open, in-depth, and carried out by a committee with both military and cabinet experience-exactly the opposite of how this Government is conducting the inquiry today.
It says a lot about the Special Relationship that the British and American armies can be this critical towards each other. Only the closest of allies could get away with this. Many believe that the U.S. Army's ability to self-critique, identify shortcomings, and then provide the resources needed for improvement is a uniquely American attribute made possible by perpetual American optimism. I disagree. The British Army is led by some of the best officers and NCOs in the world. Our commanders and soldiers performed bravely under difficult conditions in Iraq and there is no reason to believe that we won't learn from our experiences there. But Ministers must support this process and allow this to take place.
Dr Marston, one of the contributors to the British Army Review, is one of the world's leading experts in modern counterinsurgency. I have heard that he was approached by the Army and expressed an interest in working as an advisor to the MoD, but the Civil Service vetoed this because he is not already a civil servant. If true, how short sighted and unfortunate: I shouldn't think there are many world-class counterinsurgency experts in the Civil Service, yet it is precisely such people we need if we want to be successful in Afghanistan. He now plans to work for the US Army instead.
David Cameron recently said a Conservative Government would bring a 'laser-like focus' to the war in Afghanistan, to do what's necessary to achieve success. I know the new head of the Army, General Sir David Richards, believes the same. I hope that the publication of these critical articles starts a process of reflection and debate not only in the Army but in the Ministry of Defence as a whole.
