Here is a commonplace thought amongst Conservatives: in many areas of life, we cannot rely upon mere rules. Rules, baldly stated, without organic systems of interpretation and application, are unlikely to be robust to changing circumstances. Even if they aspire to include complex provisions, there will inevitably be unforeseen contingencies and the rule will ultimately do little more that bind in aspic the presumptions of the period in which it was written.
In contrast, we say, organic systems, embodying discretion, tradition, and culture, are more adaptable through time. As a consequence, for matters such as the governance and particularly the constitution of a state, where unforeseen contingencies will be legion, organic processes are better than rules.
So far, so familiar. But now pause to consider the corollary of this: an Establishment is vital to the health of a nation.
You doubt this follows? How could it not? Whence else could come this "organic process" to "embody the constitution in a tradition and culture", if it be not vested in a group of persons raised up and tasked with the role of guardians?
Perhaps you think of the term "Establishment" as implying some smallish subset of society whilst, in fact, the role could be delivered by society as a whole, through the democratic will. But this is not an option. For the very essence of a constitution in a liberal state (and I assume we desire some form of liberalism, here) is that the constitution should limit and direct democracy. If we never thought the people's will could be in error, we would need no checks and balances and there would be nothing for a constitution to do. Perhaps practicalities would require us to have some system of setting out how often we actually voted, but whenever we needed to consider changing that, the procedure would be straightforward - we'd just have an extra vote.
No. It is precisely because we do not trust democracy absolutely that we have a constitution at all. Thus the general democratic will is not an option for the organic delivery of our constitution.
We would not, of course, require the Establishment to be closed, in the sense that no-one that did not begin in the Establishment could ever enter it. But it would require enough inertia that it could develop its own character and preserve what was good about its ideals whilst being open to new developments (obviously, such flexibility is of the essence of the whole project - a static and inflexible Establishment would be no better than a static and inflexible rule). If its membership changed at random then its ideals would too.
Indeed, strictly, the Establishment might even consist of a complex of groups. So, perhaps the Establishment might consist of the bureaucratic class, the legal class, the political class, the media class, the literary class, and the academic class, all at tension and in fruitful debate. But the practical reality here is that each of these groups would have thought-leaders and decision-drivers. And in practice it is both inevitable and desirable that this elite group will have certain common characteristics of education, outlook, assumption, and aspiration. Most important and challenging, in my view, is that they be imbued with a sufficiently common deontology and noblesse oblige.
By "deontology" I mean to imply that they take an interest in the consequences of their actions, but deny that, ultimately, just any means can be justified by an end. Of course there will be cases in which short-term expediency justifies some restriction of normal liberty - the locking up of even innocent foreigners during a war, perhaps, or the execution of cowards. But there must be a limit, and a fairly fierce one. The Establishment must dwell within an eruv line of absolutes on an eternal consequentialist's Sabbath. Not for the Establishment the universal luxury of appealing to Necessity against Justice, the road to Hell paved specially for tyrants and self-serving oligarchs.
As with deontology, so with noblesse oblige. The Establishment must always understand that it is privileged, and its task and meaning is to use that privilege to serve those less so privileged. It exists for others, not for itself.
In addition to these operational properties, the Establishment must have a goal - the object of the constitution, the lens through which its constitutional judgements are to be seen. There is more than one such goal one could envisage - the glory of the state; the expansion of the borders; the freedom of the people; the prosperity of the people; social justice with progress; and so on. We could debate which such goal is best, but I shall not do so this time. I have said enough.
So, to conclude, the need for an Establishment, that consists of a relatively small subset of society, but is not so closed that it ossifies (and so defeats its own purpose) and yet not so open that it loses its integrity, is implied by the standard Conservative contention that organic systems make for superior constitutional protectors than constitutional rules. Such an Establishment, if it is to serve its constitutional function, must subject its actions to limits beyond Necessity, must understand that its goal is to serve those not within the Establishment, and must have a goal for its constitutional tradition. Do we, fellow Conservatives, believe that we have an Establishment in Britain equal to this task? If not, shall we abandon our aspiration for an organic mechanism of constitutional protection, or shall we take or facilitate measures that would allow such an Establishment to arise?