I would like to further Theresa May’s calls for more efficient Westminster scrutiny of EU legislation with a few more suggestions.
It has been a persistent problem in Britain that the Government, in signing up to European legislation, has almost inevitably overridden the scrutinized assessments, conclusions and objections of the United Kingdom Parliament. In short, Westminster continues to be shunned as EU legislation is passed. This has been partly explained by the failure of the European Scrutiny Committee’s scrutiny reserve – by which Parliament, through its designated Committee, should 'okay' a particular Treaty or piece of legislation before elected ministers agree a decision in the Council of Ministers. The Government has overridden the reserve countless times and it has become, to some extent, a redundant tool. In fact, it is this kind of “democratic deficit” attributed to the EU which actually derives from badly designed parliamentary arrangements in Westminster. The Conservative Party has already led the call for the scrutiny reserve to be asserted on a “statutory basis,” so that ministers are fundamentally and legally obliged to gain Parliamentary approval before they pursue fuller negotiations in the Council of Ministers.
However, further action is needed. It is not simply a matter of scrutinizing legislation which may turn out to be unsuitable for UK interests, but it is a matter of ensuring the parliamentary process and legislative outcome is democratic, transparent and that ministers stand accountable before Parliament. Where does public consent fit into the scrutiny process? Should the British people at large not have a say on the general mandate of ensuring British interests when scrutinizing EU legislation? It would be popular, democratic and right to create a short electoral mandate (in practice, a short binding report) which provides ministers in the Committee and our elected representatives within the Council of Ministers a set of parameters and criteria for engaging with specific European legislation or removing Britain’s place within them. If that cannot be done, there is little consistency in the idea of fixing a scrutiny reserve for legislation which continues to lack any democratic consent or legitimacy. Theresa May and William Hague have both talked of the importance of democratic legitimacy in European scrutiny and on the Lisbon treaty, respectively, so I am confident they would recognise such an idea as valuable.
In such a scenario, the following key features of Westminster scrutiny should be settled:
- The European Scrutiny Committee must remain sitting in public, but its composition balanced in Parliament’s interest (i.e. the national interest), not favouring Labour or Conservative members;
- The Committee’s scrutiny reserve must be made statutory, so that their conclusive assessments are realistically binding on the passing of European legislation;
- The Electoral Commission would provide the democratic infrastructure for organizing additional public committee sessions (organized much like a court jury) to debate particular issues, on which a vote would need to be made for incoming legislation;
- The Committee would draw up a short mandate based on public sitting sessions, to serve as a legally binding guarantee for what can be achieved in the Council of Ministers;
- In terms of ‘negotiating space’, UK representatives in the Council of Ministers must fit "our" policy within a like policy (it will never be identical) to the criteria printed on the public mandate or ultimately, withdraw from the legislation.
Any ideas? What do you think?
