When Margaret Thatcher led Britain to war in the Falklands we had a clear war aim: "to cause the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands, if necessary by means of military force".
Unfortunately the same clarity of aims seems to be lacking in the current campaign in southern Afghanistan. The latter was announced in 2005 in terms if "reconstruction", with the then Defence Secretary John Reid expressing the somewhat naive hope that it might be completed without a shot being fired. Given that the Taliban are primarily a Pushtun movement and southern and eastern Afghanistan were the Pushtun heartland, this was never likely to happen.
So, at a time when Afghanistan rather than Iraq is increasingly being seen as the key challenge, it would be wise to review what our specific war aims should be in Afghanistan. I would suggest the following:
1. Preventing a radical Islamist state being established which would be used to launch jihad attacks on other parts of the world. This is essentially what happened to Afghanistan when the Taliban government invited bin Laden to base his operations there after he was forced out of Sudan.
2. Preventing radical Islamist organisations obtaining nuclear material, which would allow them to create a "dirty bomb" i.e. the scattering of radioactive material over an area by means of conventional explosives. There has long been evidence that ex soviet nuclear material has passed through Afghanistan, with some evidence that some Taliban commanders may have been able to obtain it.There is also evidence that in summer 2001 bin Laden met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists who provided al-Qaeda with a blue print for developing a nuclear bomb and discussed uranium mining in Afghanistan.
3. Allowing a stable Afghan government to emerge that the West can positively engage with to promote a gradual liberalisation. However, this does not necessarily mean a government exercising the same degree of governmental control over all of its territory as a western government does over its regions. The power of successive Afghan governments has always declined significantly the greater the distance from Kabul.
If specific war aims such as these are clearly enunciated then military strategy can be developed that is both consistent with them and actively works to achieve these aims. However, the lack of clear enunciation of such aims by both the British and American governments has led to a series of policies that politically may undermine these basic war aims.
Most notable of these is President Bush's reported decision to allow US forces to undertake operations inside Pakistan without the prior consent of the Pakistani government. Nothing could be more calculated to swing even the most pro western liberal minded Pakistanis against the West. Popular reaction could all to easily lead to the emergence of a radical Islamist government in Pakistan in the not too distant future - precisely what we are fighting in Afghanistan to prevent.
Equally questionable, is the present British government's policy in Southern Afghanistan that was originally sold to the public in terms of "reconstruction". However, we now have British forces fighting to hold small towns such as Musa Khala and Sangin in Helmand against Taliban attacks. If this is part of a military strategy that will prevent the Taliban taking over Afghanistan again, then no one should argue with that. However, it is worth bearing in mind that historically the Afghan government's influence has always been significantly less in provincial capitals than it has been in Kabul. The provinces such as Helmand were effectively ruled by governors appointed by the interior minister and even the governor's influence declined significantly in the rural areas away from the provincial capital. I have travelled through many rural Afghan towns and villages and apart from the provincial capitals most did not even have a police outpost. If there was a major outburst of 'trouble' then the provincial police chief might have sent a bevy of police there for a few days. But by and large provincial rural areas have traditionally been largely left to govern themselves. So, whilst Afghan officials may well be keen to get British troops to enforce the government remit in remote rural areas, it would be politically naive to engage in such activities - unless they form part of a military strategy that clearly contributes to specific war aims.
If the government is serious about the war in Afghanistan not only must it provide our troops with adequate equipment and a fair policy on when leave starts, it must most fundamentally of all spell out much more clearly what the specific war aims actually are. That is the very least that we owe to our armed forces when we ask them to put their lives on the line.
