I've always liked John Barrowman in everything I've seen him. I like his enthusiasm, his infectious smile, and particularly his willingness to be vulnerable - I suspect he could be a rather more serious actor than has been seen so far. And the fact that he is so good looking doubtless helps endear him to me, as I've always been a friend to my animal nature and unfraid to admire handsome men and beautiful women.
This evening (Thursday 24 July 2008), Barrowman has been in a show aiming to find out "what made him gay". He seemed terribly keen to prove that there is something biological that is well-named "being gay", and that its biological causation is determined from before birth - perhaps even in the genes. To me, this seems such a profoundly misguided project - indeed, potentially a very dangerous project, with the possibility of horrific policy consequences - but alas! also a project reflecting a way of looking at these matters that underlies much policy discussion relevant to gay issues, that I felt driven to write on a topic that I know many Conservatives would rather avoid. Oh well. Here goes...
Barrowman himself, fully endorsed and unquestioned by the show, assumed that there was a type of person that might be called "a gay", and there were other types of people that might be called "straight". I'll come back to this really fundamental error a bit later, but let's live with it for now and use the term "gay" with scare quotes to indicate that we mean by it a technical term indicating that an individual had neurochemical sexual responses to members of the same sex - probably more than to members of the opposite sex. In particular, we don't mean by the term "gay" here that one actually has sex with members of the same sex - Barrowman seemed happy to concede (albeit not to understand) that some people sexually attracted to the same sex do not in fact have sex with members of the same sex. "Gay", then, as the term is used for a while below, refers to homosexual preference, not homosexual practices.
Barrowman appeared to want to counter two kinds of thought: first, and perhaps most repellent to him, the idea that "being gay" is chosen by the individual; second, that "being gay" is determined by the way one is raised - as if, say, having an over-bearing mother or a distant father might "make me gay".
Well, since the definition of "gay" here is to do with neurochemical responses, it is pretty likely that it isn't going to be chosen for most people in our society at least - whilst it may be true that I could train myself to like Mozart, and so perhaps eventually my brain would say that it liked Mozart, in a freedom-worshipping society like ours, few people are going to choose to study Mozart unless they begin with some kind of attraction to that kind of music; there just isn't that much pressure to try to like Mozart. Similarly, there's very little, if any, pressure on people to try out homosexuality - indeed, there is still quite a bit of residual social pressure in the opposite direction - and hence presumably the vast majority of those that adopt gay lifestyles have natural inclinations that way - the choosing follows the preference, rather than the preference following the choosing (which might, I suppose, also be possible, as with most other tastes).
Thus the key interest seemed to be his aim to prove that he was "gay" because of his biology, rather than because of his upbringing. The thought that this is something important to prove appears to be quite widespread amongst homosexuals and those keen to avow themselves "gay-friendly". I'm not 100% sure what the issue really is, here. It seems patently obvious to me that virtually all of our natural tastes have at least a very significant biological component - my preference for apricot jam over strawberry is presumably significantly influenced by my genes, for example. I presume that the aim is to counter the thought that being homosexual is a mental illness created by poor upbringing. It seems clear to me that having homosexual preferences is manifestly not a mental illness. But I think that the biological argument isn't going to help here. For we know that there are many genetic illnesses, and someone that really wanted to urge that homosexuality is a mental illness would just say that it is a mental illness with genetic origins. We don't get anywhere, because what is and is not a mental illness is a matter of a label we as a society mark things with. Is it a mental illness to believe in god, as some societies have held - and some otherwise-respectable scientists urge even today? Is there a "religion gene" as some ardent atheists hope to prove? Is it a mental illness to hear the voices of angels, or is it a blessing? - societies have differed on this. Is it a mental illness to have political opinions that differ from those of the government? Arguing that "being gay" is genetic is not going to help here.
Indeed, matters are much worse than this. For if homosexuality were encompassed by a gay gene, then one could presumably eradicate it. Parents could have their foetuses tested, and if (horror!) they had the gay gene, these foetuses could be aborted.
What is it that the advocate of the "gay gene" or more generally "being gay is biological" view really wants to show? John Barrowman finished his show with what seemed to me a rather sad shot to camera in which he said that he had shown that his being gay was biological, so he couldn't "control" it, so he would instead embrace it. Does that illustrate the ambition? Is the idea that the advocate of the "gay gene" theory wants to proclaim "It's not my fault!"? But that seems to me the cry of the deeply insecure, the person who thinks that if there were anything he could do to "control" himself (meaning what? Meaning not becoming aroused by attractive men? Meaning not having sex with them? The former seems obviously beyond control by any but a Zen Bhuddist master of his passions, whilst the latter seems patently something that could be controlled, virtually regardless of one's biology) - the cry of the person who thinks that if he could "control himself" then he should.
Is that the thought - that it is okay for "gay" people to have sex with men because they are "gay"? But what if someone else - someone who isn't "gay" - decides to try out same-sex sex? Let's suppose that this is a man who would give brain responses of much greater arousal to the images of women than of men, but happens to be very keen on a particular male friend, and wants, as an expression of his affection for his friend, to have sex with him. What does the advocate of the "gay gene" view say about this? Does the fact that this person lacks a gay gene mean that it would be wrong for him to have sex with his friend? For if it is only our biology that "excuses" us for our homosexual actions, then if we lack that biology we lack that excuse.
Again, what does the advocate of the "being gay is biological" view have to say about societies such as subcultures in Ancient Greece in which homosexual activity was expected? Was everyone except for the Greeks with the "gay biology" bad for their homosexual behaviour?
Surely this cannot be the case offered. If homosexual activity is to be morally permissible (perhaps even morally commendable in the right context), it must be morally permissible at least for anyone competent to choose to try it - presumably at least any competent adult (obviously we might qualify this with statements about whether the person has already promised themselves lifelong to someone of the opposite sex, or taken a vow of lifelong chastity, but these are petty details that should not distract us).
Just as it surely must be an error to think that the morality of homosexual activity depends on having "gay biology", it also must be an error to think that one's "gay biology" forces one into [practicing] homosexuality. I might very much fancy my best friend's wife. That doesn't make me ill or bad, and it isn't something I necessarily need to change in myself unless it creates a clash with something else I want to do or want not to do. But what would my friend think if I slept with his wife and then tried to defend my actions on the grounds that I had a "fancying his wife biology" or a "fancying his wife gene"? Again, probably my dislike of washing up the dishes after myself reflects partially genetic preferences, but what would my wife say if I defended my not washing the dishes on the basis of my "not liking washing up" gene, or even just my "general laziness" gene (both these things may well exist)? Our preferences surely have a very important biological (perhaps even largely genetic) component, and probably some environmental element, also. But how we respond to our preferences - whether we act in accordance with our inclinations, act against them, ignore them, whatever - is largely up to us. We have little control over our preferences, but that does not rob us of responsibility for our actions.
Thus, John, there is surely no real need for you to try to defend "the way you are", but if you want to be convinced that the way you act is right, then appealing to the "way you are" isn't going to get you very far. If you feel for some reason that you need to defend your actions (and it is not my purpose here to claim that you do or do not), you will need moral arguments, not biological ones.
