Since "right" and "wrong" appear all the rage in tomorrow's headlines, I thought I would write something on what I believe those terms mean. This is very much a post for the wet towel round the head brigade, so if philosophical discussion isn't your thing, look away now!
First I'll tell you how I think things work. Then I shall tell you what is useful or otherwise about some other conceptions.
Here's how it is (in my as-ever-humble opinion). I recognise three forms of morality:
- At the first level, and most strictly, morality reflects the will of the gods. If I say "Slaying your brother is wrong; slitting the throat of an ox on midwinter's eve is right" that translates as "Odin (or whichever god I have) wants us not to slay our brothers, and wants us to slit the throat of an ox on midwinter's eve". Morality is, in my view, ultimately and most properly a matter of divine command. Every "wrong" contains a "thou shalt not". Morality is thus relative to a particular religion, for what is my god is something I choose (or inherit through my parents or garner in some other non-logical way). (Of course, being relative to a religion does not mean that morality is not universal - Odin might will that everyone, whether an Odin-worshipper or not, avoids slaying his brother.) This relativity to religion means that in a multicultural society, much moral debate might have little prospect of coming to resolution. If Odin wills that I slay the ox, and Vishnu wills that I spare the ox, then an Odin-worshipper and a Vishnu-worshipper cannot come to a shared view concerning what is right and wrong in this matter. Religious diversity means that the most we can hope for is to tolerate much of the behaviour of others that we ourselves believe to be wrong.
- At the second level, and parasitic upon the first, is when Society takes the role of a god. In this case, morality reflects the will of Society. More strictly and more typically, it will reflect the will of that sub-Society that is of interest. So, if someone says "Smoking is wrong", we might translate that as "The Society of Islington luvvies wills that we do not smoke."
- At the third level, and more robustly than the second, there is the form of morality that expresses a moral attitude. So, just as I might say "Raa, raa, West Bromwich Albion! Boo, boo, the Wolves!", when I say "Murder is wrong; charity is right", I am just saying "Boo, boo, murder! Raa, raa, charity."
In my view, the interesting variants here are the first and third. Proponents of the third category of morality are people such as David Hume and AJ Ayer. Obviously there is no prospect of rational persuasion into the morality of others in this case; someone that disagrees with my morality isn't making a mistake.
In contrast, if we share a religion, then moral statements of the first category have rational persuasive force. This is because an inseparable element in the having of a god is an aspiration to do its will (if it has a will). If I were to say "Adultery is wrong, but so what?", that would unpack as saying "I aspire to do what my god wills; My god wills that I not commit adultery; I don't care that my god wills that I not commit adultery." Thus, the person that did not care about what he believed moral would be guilty of logical inconsistency - by accepting the relevant god, he has signed up to aspiring to do its will.
The atheist that wants to hold on to moral language is obviously driven to the third category of morals. But I don't really understand why the atheist is interested in moral statements anyway. Far better, I would have thought, to go with Nietzsche, and eschew morality altogether in favour of a self-defined aesthetic programme. In your more purple moments, you could call yourself your own god (much as Nietzsche apparently occasionally did). But really you are saying that what is beautiful and noble and excellent and whatever other aesthetic virtues you prize is more important to you than what "feels right". The Nietzschean path seems to me clearly more likely to lead to a pleasant society than the "morality is what seems good to you" form of libertine outlook, whose only destination is decadence and nihilism.
There are other conceptions of these matters than mine. Some people think that there are moral facts, like aesthetic facts. So, just as something can be objectively beautiful, it can be objectively virtuous. My key problem with this is that I just can't "hear" a moral statement without a command in there. I just can't hear "stealing is wrong" without hearing "do not steal". Then, with a command, I want to know who is issuing the command. And without the presence of that command, I don't recognise the alleged moral "fact" as anything different from an aesthetic fact - it seems to me that moral "facts" are nothing more than the aesthetics of actions.
But what of debates of consequentialism, utilitarianism, and the like? To me, these seem to be either systems for expressing my attitudes (category three) or devices by which I discern the will of my god (e.g. my god might always will that which achieves the greatest happiness for the greatest number). Thus they are important, but they are a cross purposes to the discussion above.
So, then, perhaps if I have convinced you, then now we know what "right" and "wrong" mean. Where has this got us?
Well, as I mentioned, in a multi-religious society, inter-religious moral debates cannot have rational conclusions. All we can strive for is to tolerate. But that will leave us with three choices when it comes to policy-making. Either, we found policy-making on a particular morality - i.e. on a particular religion - and then (if that religion permits) have systems of tolerating the potentially immoral behaviour of others. Or we reject morality from policy-making altogether. Or moralities enter in severally, through the particular moral codes/offerings of different participants in the debate (e.g. in a democracy).
My favoured path is a combination of all three two, in the following way. I believe that the construction of the constitution - the limits on power - should proceed according to a particular moral system (Anglican Christianity). (For example, legal process should reflect the injunction not to bear false witness.) Then, within those constraints, specific policy decisions should not have any moral element at all. It is not the job of specific policies to promote or defend morality. The fact that adultery is not illegal does not mean that it is right - and this is very important in a tolerant society, because the fact that it is legal likewise does not protect it from moral criticism. (This is a serious error often made - the belief that because something is legal we should not be able to say it is wrong.) It is the very absence of morality from policy-making that should free us to be moral critics. We should be able to say that we think it is right for couples to stay married, or wrong to eat so much that one becomes obese, or wrong to refuse work and prefer to live on benefits.
And remember: moral suasion is helpful. When I say to someone stealing that stealing is wrong and he agrees, then I have pointed out to him an inconsistency between his actions and his aspirations. This gives him the opportunity to reform himself, to make himself more the person he aspires to be - obedient to his god. Moral criticism and encouragement should be seen in this light - as acts of kindness. If one only has the third category of morality to employ - that of the decadent atheist who wishes to cling to moral language and for whom moral statements merely express attitudes - then a statement such as "adultery is wrong" is a statement of an attitude; it is the statement that "I do not like adultery or adulterers". For the decadent atheist, then, moral criticism can only ever be unpleasant - to be morally criticised is to be the recipient of hatred. Once we recognise this, I think we can understand better a tension that often arises in moral debates between category three moralists and others. The religious believer is trying to be kind when he criticises, and the atheist takes him as being hateful. This illustrates the great importance in moral discussions of trying to understand the other's point of view. For without this effort, much misunderstanding will certainly follow.
