ConservativeHome's 100policies

Jonathan Munday: Rule by Referendum

> Policy summary

That all controversial social and constitutional topics should be put to a compulsory referendum and subsequently enacted.

> Policy explanation

When parliament was set up in the 13th century it took 3 weeks for MPs to travel from their constituencies and it was impossible for them to quickly consult their voters, who had to rely on their judgement. Now with the internet and modern communication it is far easier. There is no reason why important decisions of morality or constitutional or treaty law cannot be made by the electorate as a whole. Indeed there is increasing evidence that MPs as a class are failing to represent their constituents both for Party reasons and because they are different from them in kind - more male, more chattering class, more metropolitan. There is an economic theory called "the wisdom of crowds" that says that crowds i.e. the electorate as a whole are more likely to come up with the right answer than "experts" e.g. MPs.

Social issues e.g. gay marriage, GM foods, hunting, cloning and constitutional issues e.g. English parliament, EU treaties are issues which cut across party lines. Often they are unwhipped. They are issues where the personal opinions of 646 MPs are no more valid than that of their 60 million constituents. They are binary choices of morality or of constitutional importance well within the grasp of the electorate. MPs are elected because of their views on income tax and the NHS, not GM foods. Lords are not elected at all and their views are their own.

The Conservative Party has suffered much over the last 25 years from the media and from special interest group pressure for a social and constitutional agenda that is social democrat and profoundly anti-conservative. This has been promoted ubiquitously in the media and has become the new orthodoxy. To cavil against it has had us described as the nasty party. This proposal allows us to appeal over the heads of the media to the quiet people of England who are much more "small c" conservative. If we lose, at least we know that it is the popular will of the English people and not just the enacted prejudices of a metropolitan elite.

This proposal is that we should enact a law that all these issues should be put to a referendum and then the result enacted. The detail of any law would be left to the government and MPs in the House but as a security, the Law Lords must issue a certificate that the law enacted was in accord with the letter and the spirit of the referendum result before it could take effect. If the government refused to bring in a law, then it would be up to the electorate to punish them at the subsequent GE. Perhaps in the case of a constitutional question, the Queen should have the duty to dissolve parliament and cause a general election, if no law is forthcoming within 24 months of the referendum.

Any political party, which had more than 2m votes in the previous election would be able to suggest 3 referendums over the lifetime of the parliament and any pressure group would be able to ask for a referendum if it could present a petition to parliament with 500000 signatures of voters on the electoral register. Referendums would take place at the next national election i.e. EU or GE so that the electoral admin. and cost were kept to a minimum. In order to stop perpetual referenda on key topics, the Law Lords would have the power to refuse a new referendum on any topic until 10 yrs after the enactment of legislation that they deemed to be on the same topic.

> Political risks and opportunities

The cost of the ballot papers. All campaigning costs would be borne by interested parties.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

• Do you trust your MP?
• Can we call ourselves a democracy when there is no capital punishment in the UK despite 20 years of opinion polls suggesting that that is what people want?
• How long are you prepared to wait for an English Parliament or another vote on the EU?
• How well is the House of commons working these days as a democratic tool?

John Allen: Statistical Ombudsman

John is a Conservative activist in Bosworth. He has had a career as a mathematician and manager in electrical, gas, and consulting and network communications and is a member of the Operational Research Society.

> Policy summary

Appoint Statistical Ombudsman.

> Policy explanation

The electorate are regularly subject to spin, where the powers that be select facts that support their message and totally ignore all the facts and analysis that would prove the spin wrong. It is not that the facts are untrue; it is the message that misleads. One well known area is road safety, where there has been an obsession with reducing speed limits to below the average observed and use of cameras to raise revenue. An established trend over several decades saw fatalities reducing by 3 percent or so each year – this appears to have ground to a halt under New Labour.

Remember when the General Medical Council struck off paediatrician Professor Sir Roy Meadow after his "misleading" evidence in the Sally Clark case. He was an eminent expert in his own field but was asked to give statistical/DNA opinion. The prosecution & judge should have realised he was not an expert witness regarding probabilities so should have asked for an expert in that field.

This policy would provide an avenue for any citizen to request a professional analysis to be carried out, with the Statistical Ombudsman able to demand the necessary data from the ministries, police and local authorities to get an un-biased analysis done. 

> Political risks and opportunities

The Conservative Party has emphasised honesty; this policy would clearly show that we will put it into practice. The policy would encourage un-biased analysis before a bill is drafted. The downside is that many unfounded beliefs will be shown to be unsupportable by thinking people – didn’t everyone think that the world was flat etc.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

You may want to extend the range of the policy idea to other scientific and arts areas. The “Speed kills” statement has the merit of simplicity but little else. Accidents happen when observation, interpretation, judgement or control are lacking. Can anyone believe that terrorism has not increased as a result of an illegal, and illogical, war against Iraq?

> Costs

The cost of the policy will be a minor fraction of the savings achieved by not embarking on ill-founded actions.

 

Dr Jonathan Munday: A Federal Parliament

Jonathan is an NHS GP in central London and chairman of the Victoria Commissioning Consortium, commissioning secondary healthcare under PBC for 45,000 patients.  He has been a local councillor for sixteen years and was Mayor of Kensington & Chelsea in 1998.

> Objective

To correct the current imbalance in the constitution by which Wales, Scotland and NI have parliaments or assemblies but England has none.

To correct the current imbalance in the constitution by which Scots and Welsh MPs have the right to vote on English matters of Health, Education and the Environment, when they have no right to vote on those issues for their own constituents and when English MPs have no right to vote on these issues in Scotland and Wales.

To provide an equal, simple and coherent constitutional settlement for the whole UK together, thus providing our last chance to maintain the UK with fairness to all.

To cut the Gordian knot of reform of the House of Lords by abolishing the second chamber entirely, saving public money on Peers' expenses and secretariat.

> Policy

Abolish the current bi-cameral Parliament, Scots parliament and Welsh and NI Assemblies.  Hold a border referendum in England, Scotland, Wales and NI separately to confirm democratic consent for continuing the Union. If passed:

• We should set up a federal Parliament with four national parliaments, elected by FPTP, for England, Scotland, Wales and NI. Conservatives should agree to run candidates in NI on non-sectarian lines.
• Each national parliament would have all the powers of the current Scots parliament but including immigration and social services policy and would have full tax raising powers to decide tax levels for UK residents domiciled in its own area.
• Citizenship and tax liability would be decided by domicile of main residence. National parliaments would not have the right to restrict domicile after they are set up.
• The English parliament would sit in the old House of Commons chamber.
• Each of the four national parliaments would send representatives according to their national populations to a Federal UK parliament. There would be no separate elections for the UK parliament. UK MPs would be nominated by the national parliament speaker in consultation with the political parties represented in the national parliaments. The political balance of the representatives would be as per that in the national parliament.
• The UK parliament would sit weekly in the old house of Lords Chamber to decide laws on non-devolved issues of foreign policy and defence. It would administer a Cohesion Fund, analogous to the EU Cohesion Fund, which would transfer revenues from richer parts of the UK (England and Scotland) to the poorer parts (Wales and NI).
• The UK parliament would levy a tax on a GDP basis on each national parliament to pay for diplomatic and defence expenditure of the UK as a whole.
• The Prime Minister of the UK parliament would have the power to make treaties for the UK as a whole. All such treaties would need confirmation by UK wide referendums.
• The PM of the UK would appointment ministers for the MoD and Foreign Office.
• The PMs of the four national parliaments would appoint ministers for Health, Education, SS, the environment etc.

> Costs

The policy would save public expenditure by abolishing

• The House of Lords and its secretariat
• The salaries of current Celtic MPs
• The Scottish Welsh and NI offices in London.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

The UK parliament (as set out above) is subsidiary to the national parliaments, of which it contains representatives. It has a tax levy. This could be on a population basis but it is probably fairer that it should be on a GDP basis, as this reflects ability to pay. The Cohesion Fund requires a levy on a GDP basis. It is possible that the UK parliament should have separately elected MPs but this adds to costs and sets it up as a rival to the national parliaments and would certainly lead to constitutional clashes. Issues of foreign policy and defence, whilst important are rarely controversial and usually bi-partisan. Political debate on issues important to the voter will take place within the competencies of national parliaments. Thus in general the English Prime Minister will be more politically important than the UK PM, although they will often be the same person. They could not be the same person if UK MPs were separately elected.

Giving the national parliaments their own tax raising powers will lead to differing tax rates. People will be taxed according to their place of domicile. This could cause population movement. The alternative is that people should be taxed according to their place of birth and not be allowed to change according to their domicile. Although this is administratively more complex, it would put pressure on national parliaments to restrict tax rates and not lead to middle class flight from high tax areas. However, only with national tax rates will national parliaments be completely independent and accountable to their voters.

   

London Salmon: A new structure for London Government

This policy suggestion comes from the blogger London Salmon.

> Policy Summary

To reform the GLA so that the powers of the Mayor of London are suitably balanced to reflect the wishes and views of all Londoners.

> Policy Explanation

The Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority (GLA) were created in 1999 in response to the unique governance problem in London. After the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in the 1980’s, a power vacuum was created in which 32 Boroughs and central government tried to come together to deliver services in London, with arguably little success. Regardless of our view of the GLA, it is here to stay, so we must reform it to be the genuinely streamlined authority that we were promised.

After a London wide referendum, the Mayor of London was created - the first time a genuinely powerful directly elected individual was created in the U.K. The post was designed to operate on the regional, strategic level and given vast powers over transport, and some over housing and police. The government’s intention was to create an executive heavy power structure, with the London Assembly, a 25 member elected body only given soft powers of oversight. However, despite the understandable focus on strategic power, the lack of a powerful check and balance leads to problems in any organisation, as excessive power nearly always corrupts.

The Mayor has unfettered executive power; on any proposal within his remit; all he is legally required to do is hold a formal consultation. He is not bound by the results, and there is no requirement for him to take on any of the views expressed in the consultation. So, measures like the West London Tram and the western extension of the Congestion Charge have gone through, even though the majority were against them.

The London Assembly has no power to vote on or veto any Mayoral proposals. They do have a vote on the budget, but that requires a two-thirds majority to agree on a budget amendment that only considers headline figures. Because of the electoral system of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR), a two-thirds majority on an alternative budget has never been agreed.

My policy would be to amend the GLA Act 1999 so that the London Assembly is given the power to vote on every Mayoral strategy (as his proposals are termed), including the budget, with a straight majority needed to confirm or defeat the proposal. This would require any Mayor to listen to the concerns of Londoners, and amend their policies accordingly.

I would also require the Transport Commissioner to be confirmed by a straight majority vote of the Assembly, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. They would be subject to U.S style confirmation hearings to ensure maximum transparency.

In addition, I would also propose changing how the Assembly is elected. Currently, there is a mix of 14 ‘GLA constituencies’, which often cover areas with two or more Boroughs in them, with the remaining 11 members chosen on a European style party list system. Members are elected at the same time as the Mayor. The original intention was to ensure smaller parties to get a fair hearing, however what has happened in practice is that two members were elected from UKIP, who espouse policies which have nothing to do with London government and two from the Green party, who use their swing votes in the budget round to add needless pork to an already bloated budget.

I would change this drastically. Instead of having another layer of politicians elected to do nothing for four years, I would enlarge the Assembly to 32 members. However, these members would be not elected, but be appointed representatives from each London Borough, selected from the current pool of elected councillors only. So, if party A won control of Borough A, they would appoint a councillor to be the London Assembly Borough representative for Borough A, with an extra allowance and a minimum number of days they would have to be available for Assembly duties. Currently, the Assembly only meets for a maximum of twice a month, with each Committee meeting once a month; this would not be an unmanageable addition to a councillor’s workload.

Whilst there would be more members, the bill would go down. Assembly members currently get paid £50,250 a year, with no minimum attendance, and no formal record kept of votes or meetings attended. Despite the excellent quality of some of them, this is not value for taxpayer’s money, especially as they have no powers.

Having members as councillors would also increase local accountability, so that Boroughs could fight for their interest and have the powers to stop the Mayor going against residents’ wishes. A body of 32 members would also guarantee against parochialism, with compromise being required on major, London wide issues.

This electoral system would be similar to how London Councils work (formerly the ALG), except that with a stronger, Borough represented Assembly, we could abolish London Councils and transfer their remaining functions over parking charges to the Assembly. Political control would depend on the wishes of voters in Borough elections, and would be separate from the politics of Mayoral elections and keep extremist, fringe parties out. Hung councils would have to agree on the political membership of their representative.

Finally, I would change how the Mayor is elected. Currently he is elected by a 1st/2nd preference system, which means there is second round counting the second preference votes, and means tactical voting becomes more prevalent, discriminating against those who voted differently. For example, Ken Livingstone won the last election because the 200,000 odd people who voted for the Lib Dem candidate voted for Livingstone as a second preference to keep the Tory out. I would change it to a FPTP system, and let the best candidate win.

> Political Risks and Opportunities

A stronger Assembly might, in the future, hold a Conservative Mayor to a policy they don’t like and may strike down some very sensible future policies. The political complexion of Boroughs may change in the future to one we do not like. However, these are no arguments against rigorous accountability, in fact any party which believes it genuinely has the best policies and is willing to put in the political energy to achieve them should not be daunted by having to meet a higher standard.

A fully, Borough based, FPTP system for the Assembly would totally exclude smaller parties, but that is not to say their issues will not be heard. A green Conservative party, for example, is far more likely to effect real environmental change than a small but vocal Green Party. And Boroughs have a lot of independent and smaller party representation. Indeed, councils are where smaller parties have the best opportunity to make the breakthrough; both Green members of the Assembly are local councillors, and they have more opportunity to effect change in their respective Boroughs than they do as Assembly members.

The biggest opportunity would be that Londoners would be given a real voice, and reigning in the Mayor would be popular. Stronger accountability would re-engage Londoners in politics, pushing up turnout and keeping out the extremists. These are proposals that every genuine democrat should welcome, as they are sorely needed.

> Questions for Conservative Home Readers

• Would you keep the existing 25 member Assembly, instead of enlarging it to 32?
• Would you make them all directly elected, or just give the existing body more powers?
• Is it better for fringe parties to be in local government or strategic regional government?
• Would having members chosen by their respective Boroughs be accountable enough, instead of directly elected?

> Costs

This is the best part; having a stronger Assembly would stop the Mayor wasting millions on pet projects and having appointed Borough representatives would save the £50,250 a year cost of each current Assembly member. And using FPTP to shut out smaller parties would stop the horse-trading leading to less pork in the budget, whilst making sure their views were heard through the Borough councils.

   

Mark Wadsworth: A House of Lords representing local government

> Policy summary

Existing life and hereditary peers will only be allowed to sit and vote in the House of Lords (“HL”) if they are nominated by a local authority (“LA”).

In turn, each LA will be allowed to nominate a number of peers to represent it, depending on how many MPs represent that area. LA means the lowest level, in other words a City council but not a county council; a London Borough but not the GLA.

The HL will be given full powers to propose bills and to amend, block or veto legislation referred from the House of Commons. Responsibility for allocated regional funding will be taken out of the hands of Whitehall and be given to the HL.

> Policy explanation

A reform of the HL has been on the cards for a century, and while it works better in practice than it should in theory, there are problems with the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy. Because of this, the HL is very much a secondary power; it can only delay legislation and cannot vote on or amend the Finance Bill. Thus power is incredibly concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. As an indirectly democratically appointed Chamber, there is no reason why the HL should not enjoy the same powers as the House of Commons.

As some contributors pointed out in the discussion on a National Waste Management Strategy, LAs should be given more power to experiment; some experiments will go horribly wrong, but councils will hopefully learn from these mistakes (or be booted out). The government seems happy to adopt a liberal immigration policy and adopt EU regulations wholesale, but it is LAs who have to deal with the problems that this causes. LAs have relatively little real power or responsibility of their own and no power to influence legislation. Under this proposal, centralising bills that impose unnecessary burdens on LAs are much less likely to be enacted.

Thus this measure would kill at least two birds with one stone.

A directly elected HL is not really a runner, because MPs fear that they would have to share power; most people are already allowed to vote at local, regional, national and EU level, but it is only the General Election that matters; adding yet another layer of elections would impose extra costs without any real devolution of power; and finally, this would be a terrible break from tradition.

There are around 20,000 local councillors; the breakdown by party is closely proportional to each party’s overall national share of the vote, and around nine percent of councillors are independent. Local councillors would be able to vote for peers from a shortlist on a "first, second, third … past the post" system, so that large City councils (Leeds or Birmingham, with eight MPs each) would nominate peers from all parties. In smaller LAs, such as the London Boroughs (two or three MPs each), which are narrowly controlled or NOC, the two largest parties would nominate one or two peers each.

Nominations will not always be along party lines. For example Newham Council in East London is Labour controlled, but might well nominate Lord Coe, as the face of the 2012 Olympics. Westminster, with its many theatres and cinemas, may well nominate Lord Lloyd Weber or Lord Attenborough. And in rural areas, it is quite possible that the local hereditary peer would be chosen.

Hardworking and experienced peers such as Baker, Howe, Ashdown, Owen, Williams or Kinnock should have no difficulty in finding a nomination. Barnett Council (which includes Finchley) has one pretty obvious candidate...

The “loans for peerages” affair suggests that wealthy businessmen are prepared to pay £1m for a life peerage. While this policy would not interfere with the way in which life peers are appointed, a life peerage in itself would only be an honorary title. To actually be able to vote in the HL, peers would have to find a LA to nominate them, which would make buying a seat in the HL prohibitively expensive.

Turnout at local elections, which is very low, would increase because voters are getting two votes for the price of one, they can directly influence the composition of their LA and thus indirectly influence the composition of the HL.

A related topic is regional funding. There is increasing disquiet over the Barnett Formula; the London Weighting is the equal and opposite of this. The way in which the Department for Communities and Local Government allocates the Formula Grant of around £60bn is one of the worst examples of central interference imaginable. Even though Conservative and Lib Dem councils in the South East and South West have the lowest spending per capita, the Formula Grant is skewed towards Labour controlled Councils, so that Labour Councils have, on the whole, the lowest Council Tax bills. If all LAs are allowed to agree the allocation between themselves, acting via the HL, self-interest will probably lead to a situation where the grant is allocated equally to all LAs.

> Political risks and opportunities

This policy is not a primarily a party political issue; it is intended to redress the imbalance of power between Whitehall, the HL and democratically elected LAs. As most political activists and party members are at local level - and may well be local councillors - there is no reason why the proposal should not be popular to members of all political parties.

It is true that the Government of the day will not be over-keen to implement the proposal (short of their being a hung parliament or coalition government), but on the other hand, most local activists, even in the party of Government would support it, and the idea that voters can influence the composition of the HL, even if only indirectly, must be a popular policy.

Neither is the policy particularly radical; in the short term, the members and composition of the HL would remain broadly the same and there would be a similar number of the same peers, although it would move closer to proportional representation.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

• A balance has to be struck between the independence of peers and the power of councils to withdraw their nomination from peers who do not vote in the interests of the council that nominated them. If peers have to seek re-selection every four years (the normal electoral cycle for most LAs), then LAs have more power and peers less independence; if peers are nominated for a longer period, the reverse holds. Which would be the ideal term – four years, ten years or for life? In the last case, should LAs be allowed to withdraw a nomination in exceptional circumstances?
• It will seldom happen that any party has an overall majority in both Houses of Parliament, thus legislation will be enacted on a much more conciliatory and inclusive basis, with the emphasis always being on continuity and the devolution of power to LAs. Is this in itself a desirable outcome?
• Would the proposal have any unintended consequences?

> Costs

The cost to the taxpayer will be minimal, as it does not involve any major reforms or a further layer of elections.

 

David Simpson: Fund political parties through a flat rate levy per elector with the recipient chosen via a tickbox on the tax return

David Simpson runs his own computer services company.

> Policy summary

Each year every adult is asked to indicate on their tax return or to their employer where they wish their ‘contribution’ to be sent – this contribution would be about £1 or less per adult, paid by the Treasury to the party, organisation or individual of the voter’s choice. If they do not specify, no contribution is made to anyone. The recipient can be any UK based organisation or individual, whether involved in politics or not.

> Policy explanation

The advantages of public funding through a flat rate levy per elector:

Voters are fed up with politicians generally. Party funding for both Labour and Tory is a focus for that unhappiness. Public response to proposals for the state to fund the parties has been largely negative. But the existing methods are clearly unacceptable, whether it be union money, cash for peerages or large donations from anonymous millionaires. In addition the totals spent by the major parties are grotesque and it's debatable whether they actually contribute to the democratic process. Adequate funding through membership & local fundraising appears to be impossible. It is arguable whether local fund raising is of any real benefit (yes it gets the activists and members involved, but it doesn't raise much and takes a great deal of energy away from what are arguably the more important activities of canvassing, creating and developing policy and bringing pressure to bear on MPs and parties).

This would provide 100% transparency for the parties’ sources of funding.

It would impose an absolute limit on the total spend of each party (the national gross, not just the existing individual member limit) – parties could only spend what they receive through the levy and are not allowed any other sources of funding.

There would be no undue or hidden influence by private individuals, corporations or pressure groups because of their contributions to part coffers. The electorate as a whole will dictate each year how much is given to politics and to the individual parties.

There would be a clear separation between party spending and government spending with a watchdog to check that the government is not abusing its position to promote its own political agenda. Political advisors, 'spin doctors' etc and spurious government PR campaigns would have to be funded from the levy. There would be no Short Money or any other special funding for parties.

This will create a direct link between the individual and what he/she chooses to fund.

There will be a direct link between the success or popularity of a party and its share of the cake, reassessed annually (because decided by the choice on the tax return), regardless of the relative economic strength of its supporters.

Potential disadvantages:

In effect, politicians can decide how much to fund themselves – but all Parliament can set is the amount given per adult – not where it goes, or even if it goes to a political party. If the electorate objects to the global total, they can choose not to give it to anyone, or to send it to their own pet causes and not to politicians at all.

This may promote an even greater separation of the electorate from the political process (because they will have no need to join, participate in or actively support political parties)

A further encroachment of the state into what has been hitherto in the private sphere

There would be no need for a mass party membership (but this might encourage other forms of participation e.g. open caucuses for candidate selection)

A box on our tax returns where we indicate where we want our slice of the funding to go - which can be anywhere, including back to the Treasury (which would be the default if nothing is selected). Anywhere means anywhere that's not actually illegal, and any size - e.g. not just "CofE" but my Parish Church, not the Tories but my MP or prospective candidate - political parties, charities, pressure groups or my Great Aunt Joan. The recipient must be a UK citizen or a UK incorporated body (so no donations to Osama).

Absolute limit - no other donations of any kind to parties (cash or kind) are allowed apart from what is raised through the levy.

A new party/group can decide not to take the levy money, and rely on donations. They must declare everything (gifts, loans and sources - no anonymity). Once established, they can then choose to be funded by the state system. There would be an upper limit on private funding through donations or loans so we don't have some billionaire taking over the country.

Parties would not be allowed to borrow more than say, 20%, of their annual funding. Any borrowing would have to be from a conventional, independent third party i.e. banks or other mainstream financial institutions.

> Political Risks and Opportunities

All parties would be forced to have ‘clean hands’.

The party apparatus would lose control over funding (other than how to spend their allocation); party machines may be weakened.

Parties would need to keep close to their supporters throughout the electoral cycle.

A blip in the polls at end of the tax year could lose a party a disproportionate share of the levy.

Parties may become more cautious, over-sensitive to public opinion – but at least it won’t be sensitivity to opinion polls or focus groups, but to where voters actually send their money, that influences the parties.

Special interest pressure groups could become more grassroots based and richer and therefore more influential (if voters choose to fund special interest groups rather than parties).

Contributions to 'extremist' parties such as the BNP, Islamic or Christian fundamentalists etc may increase.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

• Do you think it's a bad idea if the party machines are weakened?
• This would give more power, potentially, to the grassroots - is that bad?
• Do you think current levels of spend by political parties are too low, about right, too high?
• Would this reduce the attention the parties pay to the key marginals?
• Would that be a bad thing? (i.e. the 'safe' seats might find that their electors’ money is going to special interests, or not to politics at all in the conventional sense)
• Should there be a tick list on tax return?

> Costs

Say a total per year of £30 million – the cost per adult would be less than £1 p.a.

The cost of capturing choices, especially idiosyncratic ones (e.g. Aunt Ethel) from tax returns etc Show the details on each adult’s P60.

 

David T Breaker: Westminster representation for Britain's overseas territories

David is about to start studying Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the University of Essex (see his Community profile).

> Policy summary

The granting of Westminster representation to Britain's overseas territories subject to local referenda.

> Policy explanation

Around the globe, Britain has 14 overseas territories. Most are very small or uninhabited apart from military staff - such as Diego Garcia or South Georgia - and obviously this policy does not refer to them, however several are very different. In the post devolution landscape, the powers of Westminster on local policy vary between the four home nations that currently make up the United Kingdom, just as its power varies between the overseas territories. So why then shouldn't our overseas territories be granted equal status through representation?

Their residents are British citizens, and although they have their own legal and political systems, this is no different to Scotland or Northern Ireland. Their foreign policy and defence is run from Westminster, in which they have no representation, and which could potentially transfer their sovereignty without consent. Take for instance Jack Straw's talks with Spain over Gibraltar's sovereignty, while Gibraltar passionately called their wish to remain British. Would this insult have happened with an MP from Gibraltar on the defensive? Or take the Falkland Islands, which could easily have been or in future be handed to Argentina without local consent. An elected representative could give them a voice.

Although no territory quite has the number of residents a normal English constituency has, they could be combined or act as part of an existing constituency. For example, Gibraltar already votes in European elections as part of the South West England region. By granting Westminster representation to our overseas territories - as France has done for many years as overseas communities and like America has in Hawaii - we will be securing their right to self-determination, liberty and freedom. Above all, we will be showing them the respect of equal treatment within the United Kingdom as our partners instead of as second class citizens in 'dependencies' or 'colonies'.

> Political Risks and Opportunities

The policy has huge opportunity in two areas. First in showing a more respectful and equal regard to our overseas territories, and second in putting Labour on the back foot, particularly given their disgraceful negotiations over Gibraltar and their behind-closed-door mentality. It would of course be highly beneficial to democracy. The new seats might even vote to be Conservative.

In the risk corner, poor presentation could lead to labelling as 'empire defenders', when this is actually far removed from the policy of giving equality to these areas. It could damage some relations, such as with Spain over Gibraltar and Argentina over the Falklands, and any such policy would need to be implemented skilfully and with tact. The options of independence and transfer could be included under some form of alternative vote system to smooth these relations and draw a line under the sand.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

• Is it too risky for the Falklands? What about Gibraltar? And could we feasibly do one without the other?
• Which territories should the offer be made to and how should constituencies be arranged given their populations (Anguilla 12,800; Bermuda 64,500; Virgin Islands 21,700; Cayman Islands 58,000; Falklands 3,000; Gibraltar 28,000; Montserrat 9,000; Saint Helena 6,500; Turks and Calcos Islands 26,000)?
• Should independence and/or transfer be included on the referenda?
• What about the crown dependencies of Jersey (pop 91,000), Guernsey (pop 65,000) and Mann (76,000)?

> Costs

The salary and expenses of the additional MPs, possibly with added expenses for travel to the constituencies and video links. This could be funded by reducing the number of MPs elsewhere.

 

Damon Lambert: Replace the House of Lords with a fully elected House of Defenders

> Policy summary

To replace the Lords with a wholly elected House of Defenders to review laws, hold the executive accountable, and defend the liberty of individuals from government encroachment and incompetence.

> Policy explanation

The lack of an effective second chamber hurts, the UK is over-legislated, the executive makes avoidable errors and the Prime Minister resembles an elected dictator.   

The House of Defenders will review, amend and pass or block all legislation, both primary and secondary, increasing the quality and reducing the quantity of new law.  The Defenders can initiate new law, but only if they remove sufficient law to leave the net quantum of legislation constant or lower.   

The Defenders will call the Executive Branch of government to account.  With better scrutiny, recent mistakes, eg tax credits, home office failures, MG Rover, and the surrender of much of the EU rebate could have been avoided.

The Defenders will approve treaties, sizable military actions and international agreements, ending the undemocratic one-man foreign policy of Prime Ministers since 1945 which saw amongst other errors, the botched entry into the EU and the Suez Crisis. The second chamber will have full rights over money bills, would approve the spending allocations in the budget, and ensure that the Budget process is accurate and consultative.   

The House will approve the appointment of senior judges, heads of government departments, EU Commissioner and ambassadors reducing Prime Ministerial patronage and ensuring that key positions go to the best qualified, not the best connected.  It would prevent anomalies, eg the UK has always had europhile EU Commissioners, despite mainstream public opinion being eurosceptic.   

Members must seek electoral mandates and show their desire for the role, rather than the current "embalmed, but not buried" Lords membership for retired politicos.

The name emphasizes the break from the UK’s undemocratic past, and the role of members in defending the people from excesses of either of the legislative or executive branches of government.

> Political risks and opportunities

A radical policy would establish clear blue water between Conservatives and opponents by directly campaigning for democracy.  It stresses our belief in the individual over the power of the State.  Using a name other than the "Lords" highlights and hallmarks the originality of the concept to voters, stressing the unique selling points of the Conservative reforms.   It would remove the stigma that Conservatives merely seek to protect the establishment.  The risks are low, campaigning against democracy is politically dangerous.  The opposition will seek to label detailed proposals as unworkable, but will struggle.   

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

• Can you think of a better name for the second chamber?
• What other roles should an elected second house have?
• Do you think that all members should be elected by region, county, metropolitan area or should some be elected by list?
• Is say a 6 year or 8 year term suitable for Defenders?
• Do you concur that members should be elected in tranches, as per the US Senate, rather than the entire membershp elected at once?

> Costs

There will be additional costs of elections.  These can be minimised by holding certain of the elections during Council, European Parliament or mayoral elections.  However, the substantial benefits of a stronger legislature that better monitors and checks the lower house and the executive should produce far greater benefits through improved governance of the realm.

Andrew Boff: "To give London's voters the power to propose binding propositions on the executive or to recall the Mayor."

Andrew Boff is a resident of Hackney and a Conservative activist. He led the Conservative Group in the London Borough of Hillingdon when they took control of the council in 1990, and more recently trebled the Tory vote in Queensbridge Ward.

> Policy summary

To give London's voters the power to propose binding propositions on the executive or to recall the Mayor.

> Policy explanation

The perceived disengagement of the governed and the government has more to do with the people feeling out of the loop between regular elections rather than any failings in the voting system. At all-out-elections they must choose between parties that may have some of their views, but not all of them. To address this, politicians put into place sham “consultations” which often amount to nothing. Voters often feel like they don’t have a say.

A “Voters initiative” procedure will give people the power to control their government and to put into place objectives that are often lost in the overall party programmes. To prevent abuse of the process a set percentage of the registered electorates names on a petition should be raised within a fixed period (eg 10% in two months). Propositions would have to be legally sound before they could be submitted to ensure that they were in the remit of the Mayor. There would also need to be a guarantee that both 'for-and-against' arguments would have equal opportunities to be presented.

The same procedure would also be used to replace an under performing official as in the case of California's lacklustre Governor, Gray Davis. In London, this, of course, would apply to the Mayor.

> Political risks and opportunities

Would this be seen as power to the people or an abnegation of the executive’s responsibility? The Mayor’s platform would have to take account of likely propositions (which is no bad thing). There may be propositions that are contradictory to the thrust of the administration or, indeed, other propositions.

In answer to this, executives will have to explain why they are doing some unpopular (though perhaps necessary) things and reconnect with the people who put them there.

We have a chance to change local democracy itself. To send a message that the Tories are the engine of delivering REAL power to the people.

> Questions for ConservativeHome readers

• What restrictions should there be on the subjects of propositions?
• How many names should there be on a petition to trigger a proposition?
• What should the time limit be on a binding proposition?
• What other levels of government should propositions apply to?

> Costs

The proposal is that propositions should only be put to the electorate at the next ordinary elections and would use the electoral machinery that is already in place. Additional costs would be for checking the petitions, an extra print run of ballot papers and the additional time for counting. For London, this would amount to about £3 million per proposition.