My post the other day about Section 28 has generated some excitement, as this topic is wont to do. I wanted to come back on a few of the points raised.
First, it seems to me that the extended discussions about whether homosexuality is the sort of thing one might successfully promote (whatever “promote” might mean in this context, which I will return to) are, from the political perspective, irrelevant. For, in the first instance, Section 28 did not outlaw the promoting of homosexuality. With Section 28 in place, the only individual or group forbidden from promoting homosexuality was local authorities. The aim of Section 28 was not to prevent an increase in homosexual activity (whether or not such a thing might be done – another issue to which I shall return); neither was it to seek to prevent society from increasing in either its acceptance of or toleration towards homosexuality.
Debates about the legitimacy or otherwise of a policy objective of preventing homosexuality from being “promoted” (when “promoted” is understood in terms of increasing the number of homosexuals (whatever that might mean)) just wildly miss the target. These debates were not relevant to Section 28, for Section 28 was not about the promotion of homosexuality, per se. It was specifically about the promotion of homosexuality by local authorities.
In the second place, here, the issue of whether or not homosexuality is the kind of thing the promotion of which can have any material effect is likewise irrelevant. For Section 28 related to a specific context in which some people were promoting homosexuality. The point at issue was not whether their promoting of homosexuality was likely to be successful. No! It was whether they should be doing it! If, as I believe (and as was the majority view at the time Section 28 was introduced), local authorities should not be promoting alternative lifestyles, that doesn’t become any less true if the promoting of those alternative lifestyles is likely to be ineffective.
That brings me to the objections of some of the commenters to my characterization of homosexuality, in this context, as a “lifestyle”. Whether I prefer oysters or snails is a preference, not a lifestyle. Whether I eat snails (as opposed to eating oysters or avoiding eating either); whether I spend every evening at a snail bar; whether I move to France so I can be near the best snails; whether I grow my own snails in my back garden – all of these are issues of lifestyle.
Whether I find men or women more attractive is a matter of my preferences. As with all other preferences, there are exciting debates we can have about the balance of genetic factors, nurture, social expectation, habit, and brain-washing in determining my preferences between men and women. But, for simplicity, let’s ignore all that and just assume, for simplicity, that I am born with my preferences; we shall say that my preferences are part of who I am. So, for the sake of simplifying the discussion for now, let’s assume that people are “born gay” in the sense of preferring members of their own sex.
Does that mean that it is illegitimate to describe homosexuality as a lifestyle? Obviously not. For when one refers to homosexuality the lifestyle, one is talking about the practice of having same-sex sex (perhaps along with some other characteristically “gay” things, like claiming to have a “gay-dar”, that we don’t need to explore further here). Obvious cases aside, no-one forces you to have sex with anyone at all. You choose to be a person that has sex as opposed to being celibate. So, just like the case of snails and oysters, which you prefer is not a lifestyle, but which (if either) you choose to partake of is a matter of lifestyle. And it is not the business of local authorities to promote the having of sex with members of the same sex (or indeed to promote any other alternative lifestyle, such as membership of a monastic order – and it is no more anti-gay to believe this than it is anti-monk).
Next, “promote”. This won’t detain us long. “Promote” in this context obviously means “promote the moral and/or social acceptability of”. Now, perhaps homosexuality’s becoming more socially acceptable might have led (or might eventually lead) to an increase in the number of practicing homosexuals. I think it’s natural to assume that it would. But that’s not the concept in view in Section 28.
(I note in passing that I side with those contending that arguments from whether or not homosexuality occurs in other parts of the animal kingdom are neither here nor there. I likewise attribute no significant moral weight to the question I simplified away above, namely to what extent homosexuality is genetic. If the moral legitimacy of same-sex sex arose from the possession of a “gay gene” we’d be driven to views such as that it would only be okay to have same-sex sex if one actually had the “gay gene” – people who lacked that gene but wanted to have sex with a same-gender someone they loved would be forbidden. Whatever the source is of morality, it surely doesn’t work like that.)
Just two more things. One is that I suggest those claiming that, whatever I may say, Section 28 was “really” about attacking homosexuals need to understand the Thatcherite period better. Issues like marriage and divorce or human sexuality just were not the kind of things that interested Thatcherites in the mid-1980s. Arguably in the Thatcher period not nearly enough interest was taken in such issues, and this neglect was not benign but, rather, had unpleasant social consequences that we still see today. Of course, by the Major period there was an ill-fated attempt to engage with this category of question, but in 1988 the Thatcherites really weren’t interested.
In general, 1980s Thatcherites preferred to park social issues. The 1981 Nationality Act was probably the best-known of the “parking” measures – after 1981, Immigration, which had been a significant issue from the late 1960s, just disappeared as an issue until it returned with the asylum-seeker debates of the mid 1990s. By killing off the issue in this way, race relations in Britain were given the space to improve enormously over the 1980s. Similarly, Section 28 was an effective “parking” measure. Outside certain parts of the gay community, concern about whether there was too much or too little promotion of the social acceptability of homosexuality largely disappeared until the late 1990s (once issues such as gay priests or the allegations about a “gay mafia” at the top of the Labour Party arose). This was less successful than the Nationality Act, in that there were important questions to be grappled with, such as equality of the age of consent or the need for civil partnerships, and these issues were let slide for too long. But the parking of the concerns about promotion of the social acceptability of homosexuality did create a space in which the promotion of homosexuality in the media and through films and books progressed apace with very little concern or opposition. I think it unlikely that this would have been achieved so smoothly had it not been for Section 28, i.e. if local authorities had been promoting homosexuality in the way that they did in the mid 1980s.
Finally, I want to comment on the offence taken at the term “pretended family relationship”. I see the thought, but think it somewhat precious. The term “pretended family relationship” here is a piece of legalese intended to identify the specific practice that the bill was trying to outlaw – the requiring of schools to carry literature such as “Jenny lives with Eric and Martin”. It’s good if legislation tries to avoid encompassing issues that go beyond its intended scope, and the term “pretended” here shouldn’t be taken as implying that the drafters thought same-sex love was “only pretend love” or something of that sort. “Pretended family relationship” is just a piece of legal jargon. There’s nothing pejorative about it, and no good reason to take offence.
As I said in the previous post, I wish we could let Section 28 alone. I don’t want to bring it back and as far as I know no-one else serious is proposing bringing it back, either. I wish our leader could leave it in the past, where it belongs.
