The possibility of an al-Qaeda link in the Mumbai terrorist attacks along with the specific targeting of UK and US citizens there should concentrate the government's mind on other UK targets that al-Qaeda are known to have in their sights. In particular the government should take a long and hard look at the security implications of its decision to build a new generation of nuclear power stations.
Significantly, only this week a report by the US government's Commission on WMD and Terrorism warned that the US is likely to face a nuclear or biological terrorist attack in the next five years. In fact, evidence has long existed that al-Qaeda are already planning to attack nuclear power stations. For example, caves formerly occupied by by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan were found to contain a map showing the locations of US nuclear power plants. While in Europe, Islamist terrorists have already tried to attack a nuclear power station. Back in 2004 the UK had a very near miss as Dutch security services foiled a plot to attack a Dutch nuclear power station. Had the plot succeeded, an easterly wind would have meant that within a few hours the Suffolk and Norfolk coasts could have been covered in a radioactive cloud, which would then have drifted inland to cover much of East Anglia.
One of the government's main arguments for building more nuclear power stations is that we need 'energy security' - secure supplies of energy instead of relying on oil and gas from politically authoritarian and manipulative countries such as Iran and Russia. That is certainly true - as was clearly seen this week when Russia threatened to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine this Christmas.
However, the problem with the government's arguments on energy security is that they are too narrowly focused on securing reliable supplies of energy and show a disturbing lack of joined up thinking, particularly in relation to anti terrorism. Good security policy is based on making oneself relatively harder to attack than others. However, building more nuclear power stations, when we already know that al-Qaeda is planning to attack them, actually increases our vulnerability. It increases the number of potential targets, targets which by the very nature of their location on the coast are relatively hard to defend.
Moreover, it is questionable as to how much government planning has really gone into coping with the effects of of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power station. After the 9/11 attacks in America there was speculation that the the hijacked jet that crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside was intended to hit a nuclear reactor. The resulting press attention led Richard Meserve, the chairman of the US government's main nuclear safety body, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to admit that prior to 9/11 it was not a general requirement for nuclear power stations to be able to withstand an aircraft crash.
The very real terrorism threat to nuclear power stations must raise serious questions as to whether nuclear power should be the option of first resort to guarantee secure energy supplies for the UK.
Moreover, if we are, as a last resort, to have more nuclear power stations, then the government needs to undertake some serious planning as to how to cope with such an attack. Consider the possibility of a 9/11 style attack with an aeroplane, whether small or large being deliberately crashed into a nuclear power station. In fact, the existence of at least 49 'near misses' of nuclear power stations by RAF fighter jets since 2000 means that the government ought to be planning for even an accidental occurrence of this nature.
Let us take for example Sizewell B on the Suffolk coast, Britain's
most modern (pressurised water reactor) nuclear station, which is one
of the most likely sites for at least one, if not two of the planed new
nuclear power plants. It could easily be approached from half a dozen
or so European countries which are only a short distance across the
North Sea - including the Netherlands which has already had an Islamist
plot to attack a nuclear power station. If such a terrorist attack, or
even an accidental aircraft collision did occur the area around
Sizewell would need to be immediately evacuated. 
Areas that would require immediate evacuation include the major urban
centres of Ipswich 21 miles south west and Lowestoft 19 miles to the
north. (It is typically assumed that the area within a 50 mile radius
of a nuclear power station would need to be evacuated in the event of a
'major incident'). However, in the area around Sizewell there are only
single carriageway roads, including the A12 Ipswich to Lowestoft road -
the nearest A road to Sizewell. Although Ipswich does have dual
carriageways linking it to the south (A12) and west (A14), it seems
improbable that a town of 120,000 people could be evacuated within an
hour or so along these roads. In Lowestoft the situation would be even
worse, the town is an hour's drive from the nearest dual carriageway of
any length and 2 hours from the nearest motorway. Moreover, to escape
from a 50 mile radius of Sizewell, the half of Lowestoft's population
who live on the North side of the Harbour would have to cross one of
two small river bridges which are already gridlocked with traffic on a
daily basis, then join the rest of Lowestoft's 60,000 population
evacuating along the single carriageway A146/A143 for at least an
hour's drive before even reaching the A14 dual carriageway in central
Suffolk.
Now, with all the road building plans that Transport Secretary Geoff Hoon has been announcing recently, not one of them does anything to address the impossibility of evacuating the good people of the Suffolk coast, Ipswich and Lowestoft areas in the event of a terrorist attack, or even an aviation accident, at Sizewell. Mr Hoon did graciously announce a few million pounds to put up road signs warning of congestion ahead on the A12 to the south of Ipswich, though somehow I can't see people wanting to leave Suffolk in a hurry being too impressed by these! In reality he has done nothing to enable the area around Sizewell to be evacuated in the event of a serious incident, whether accidental or terrorist, there. He hasn't even announced the dualing of the A12 that links Ipswich and Lowestoft and is within a few miles of Sizewell, something that local MP John Gummer has repeatedly campaigned for. Nor has he announced any funding for the third river crossing in Lowestoft that local people have for decades campaigned for, which might give people in North Lowestoft at least some hope of escaping away from a radioactive cloud from Sizewell.
In short, there appears to be a dangerously worrying lack of joined up thinking by the government between energy policy, anti terrorism and transport policy.
An alternative more joined up approach to energy policy should include tidal power being given relatively more active consideration. In fact, tidal power has some significant advantages over nuclear power, not least in respect of minimising the risk of terrorism. Moreover, the UK has some of the best conditions in the world for tidal power. For example, it is estimated that a tidal barrage across the Severn Estuary, which could be operational as early as 2017, would generate around 8,640 MW, the equivalent of between two and half and three large nuclear power stations and at £15 billion would cost a similar or possibly smaller amount (E.ON recently produced figures which suggest that the cost of a 2,200 MW nuclear reactor would be around £6.7 billion). Moreover, a tidal barrage, whether in the Severn or elsewhere in the UK, would have an estimated life span of at least 100 years, compared to 30 or so years for a nuclear power station, no decommissioning or waste disposal costs, both of which are extraordinarily high for nuclear power plants, could provide an additional road link between south west England and south Wales, and would protect Somerset, Avon, Gloucestershire and South Wales from coastal flooding. The latter is not an insignificant consideration when there is a real possibility that climate change may lead to higher sea levels towards the end of this century. Moreover, as far as terrorism is concerned, the impact of a terrorist attack would be to release tidal water ponded up on the landward side of the barrage - out to sea. As with any energy source there would of course be environmental change, particularly in respect of the estuary mudflats being flooded and the need for alternative habitats to be created for wading birds. However, we need to always remember that environmental change is not the same as environmental damage, something that even the RSPB has accepted in other locations.
This sort of tidal power has the real potential to be a good example of genuinely joined up government. Something that unfortunately, the present government's nuclear policy does not seem to be - not least in respect of the very real threat that al-Qaeda type terrorists are already posing to nuclear power stations.
